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ABSTRACT 
Diagnostic ability occupies a pre-eminent position in the skills of a doctor in modern 
society. Underpinning this attribute is a number of cognitive strategies which are 
gradually developed through a mixture of experience, acquired knowledge and 
training. These strategies include processing and structuring information, decision 
making, and the emergence of higher cognitive skills. The apprenticeship model in 
medicine assumes that students assimilate such skills during training, without ever 
questioning how they view or engage with the diagnostic role.  
The conceptual focus of this study is to use dimensional analysis (DA) to build theory 
from the perspective or ‘lens of the medical student’. This will use symbolic 
interactionism as its theoretical framework. DA acknowledges the relationship 
between the researcher‘s perspective and experience, the data and the participants 
using a constructivist, relativist epistemological philosophy.  
Filmed data has been analysed from real time simulated consultations between 3rd 
year medical students and a trained actor working from a standardised case 
(dyspepsia). Each participant completed a filmed consultation and a discussion of 
diagnostic ideas based upon the history alone. Diagnoses were re-evaluated in light 
of further examination data and the filming watched back with the researcher using a 
reflexive discussion approach.  Nine participants completed the study providing a rich 
diet of interactive and reflective data from the simulations focussing upon diagnostic 
ideas. 
Emergent themes point to the central organising theory of intermediary cognitive 
adaptation during an important transition in the curriculum. This is characterised by 
the use of learnt cognitive strategies which act as failsafe mechanisms in maintaining 
process within the simulation. However, there are examples of naive cognition in 
applying aspects of conditional reasoning and interpreting clinical probability rules. 
The diagnostic process is driven by the clinical history with little integration of the 
physical examination features. 
This finding may explain the emergence of cognitive errors during undergraduate 
training, and links normative theory with diagnostic errors seen in clinical practice. 
Reconstruction of clinical skills and diagnostic thought through reflective analysis are 
evident. Under the right conditions, simulations can provoke a constructive (intrinsic) 
perspective on cognitive skills which can advance professional development in the 
diagnostic reasoning process. 
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS 
 
CP 101 (Clinical Practice module 101) is an extensive module running throughout 
year 1, introducing students to the basic skills of clinical skills. The researcher is the 
Module Lead for both CP 101 and 201. 
 
CP 201 (Clinical Practice Module 201) is the equivalent module for year 2 which 
continues and augments themes from CP101. 
 
CR   (Clinical reasoning): the context dependent, generic decision making processes 
related to professional practice encompassing the dimensions of knowledge, 
cognition, reflective enquiry, and metacognition. 
 
DA (Dimensional Analysis); a version of 2nd generation Grounded Theory attributed to 
the work of Leonard Schatzman. 
 
DR (Diagnostic Reasoning) reasoning applied to the process of formulating 
diagnoses within clinical practice. 
 
DTI (Diagnostic Thinking Inventory): a 41 item validated inventory analysing flexibility 
and structure in cognition when thinking about making a diagnosis. 
 
Epistemology is the study of knowledge, in this study particularly what is meant by a 
diagnosis and what knowledge contributes towards making a diagnosis. 
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GTM or GTT (Grounded Theory Method or Technique): a rigorous qualitative 
research methodology proposed by Glaser & Strauss in 1967 using constant 
comparative analysis as a way of conducting a research enquiry. It emphasises that 
theory must emerge from the data, not prior knowledge. 
 
Narrative Reasoning studies what people say, how they say it and the interpretation 
of what is said (e.g. the medical history). 
 
Ontology is the study of being, and involves the individual’s perception of their 
changing role and identity influenced by context and professional development. 
 
Phase 1: The first two years of the curriculum comprising six systems based 
modules, and two (extensive) clinical practice modules running in tandem. 
 
Phase 2: Years 3 and 4 in the curriculum when ward based clinical rotations begin 
involving more face to face contact with patients. 
 
SI (Symbolic Interactionism): sociological theory of human interaction proposed 
originally by Mead (1934) and extended by Blumer (1969), based upon the principles 
that ‘humans act towards things based upon the meanings they have for them; 
meanings are handled in and modified through an interpretative process and by the 
person dealing with the things that they encounter’. 
 
SP (Standardised Patient); a patient or actor working from a standardised scenario, 
who is trained to deliver symptoms (and signs) in a consistent manner for the 
purpose of training or teaching. 
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1 Chapter 1: Introduction to the thesis 
 
1.1 Professional and personal perspectives-why am I doing this 
research? 
The essence of good patient care relies upon the diagnostic reasoning process to 
enable sound decision making in clinical practice, and it remains an essential 
attribute for all clinicians in the development of their individual expertise, and also in 
minimising diagnostic error (Norman, 2000; Heneghan et al, 2009; Norman & Eva, 
2010). But how is this attribute shaped and formed? Where do we learn the cognitive 
skills that are clearly so fundamental to the formulation of diagnoses and why are 
some doctors better than others?  Is the skill of reasoning in clinical practice merely 
an extension of the power of natural analysis in considering the attributes of a 
narrative and the meaning of events (Schatzman, 1991)? Such questions have been 
asked many times by research papers attempting to find a way to reduce human 
error in the reasoning process, as flawed cognition accounts for most diagnostic 
errors in practice (Graber, 2005). If expert cognition could be condensed and 
transferred through teaching that is more effective, then human fallibility in decision 
making might be minimised. 
Decision making in professional practice encompasses a number of interactive and 
complex skills under the generic term of clinical reasoning (CR), and these skills are 
gradually embedded in clinical practice (Higgs et al, 2008: 3-6). Such attributes 
embrace and facilitate the complicated issues which predicate decisions and 
judgements in patient care, and one of the central processes is diagnostic reasoning, 
which describes the cognitive processes which contribute towards reaching a 
plausible (and defendable) diagnosis to explain a range of symptoms and signs. This 
research study will focus upon this process and how it is viewed through the eyes of 
3rd year medical students grappling with one of their early exposures to stand-alone 
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decision making through the experience of the simulated consultation integral to this 
study. 
By adopting this perspective, the study places itself in a qualitative research 
paradigm with the emphasis firmly on the experience of the undergraduate medical 
student. Research in the complementary paradigms of information processing and 
judgement theory (which will be discussed later in this chapter) usually objectify 
decision making in the diagnostic process, and considerably less research has been 
devoted to exploring the perspective of the learner and how they view their role and 
responsibilities in this process. This informs one of the main questions within this 
thesis: How is the diagnostic process constructed from a student’s perspective and 
how might this influence teaching at the relevant stage?  
As a teacher interested in developing diagnostic reasoning in the curriculum what do I 
know about their views of diagnostic strategies? It is conceivable that I am making 
considerable assumptions about how students view one of the central processes of 
medicine and therefore committing the cardinal error of ‘forcing my views’ or theory 
upon the research process and in my teaching (Glaser, 1978). 
The origins of this thesis arose from trying to develop a new mnemonic strategy that 
would act as an aide memoire for novice students covering the key parameters of a 
consultation. Within the last stage of this mnemonic strategy was a diagnostic 
component; however, there was a nagging question about its development and 
application. The major problem with propagating the new mnemonic was the inability 
to put myself in the position of the student using it. I could see its potential use but 
could they?  
A research method was required to unlock their views on the diagnostic process and 
the features thereof, before deciding that this mnemonic would have some 
application. It was suggested that as a researcher, I had to align my perspective with 
that of the student cohort before further development might occur. Consequently, the 
research method and conceptual framework needed to reflect the student perspective 
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and what they understood about diagnostic reasoning; this pointed towards using a 
form of grounded theory method called Dimensional Analysis to explore emergent 
themes from the simulations. The mnemonic idea was shelved to concentrate upon 
achieving a greater understanding of what medical students think about the 
diagnostic reasoning process. 
One of the assumptions that could have influenced my views within the research 
process is the idea of theoretical anchorage (prior experience and knowledge), which 
will be discussed further in Chapter 2 (Schatzman in Maines, 1991; Kools et al, 
1996). To illustrate how prior knowledge might sway data analysis, it is worth briefly 
considering the integrated curriculum approach which this medical school has 
adopted. It is known that integration of biosciences with early patient contact confers 
a number of benefits (O’Brien et al, 2001; Woods et al, 2005; Diemers et al, 2008), 
however I cannot assume that the findings in my study will necessarily endorse this 
view; indeed the findings might suggest another perspective which hitherto has not 
been considered. 
Therefore recognising what impact this sort of assumption might have upon the study 
became an essential component of the research process for this thesis i.e. reflexivity. 
This ensures that the researcher is aware of their own meanings and perspectives for 
things based upon personal and professional experience, and therefore how this 
might influence the research process (Schatzman in Morse, 2009: 93). In addition, I 
have the benefit of many years of experiential learning through patient contact to 
draw upon, which sensitises me to analysing actions and thoughts from a specific 
perspective, and this expertise places me some distance from the medical students 
who do not have the same clinical knowledge, life experience or professional 
expertise. 
To explore the mental landscape of formative ideas on reasoning requires a 
methodology which encourages the participants to open up about their ideas and 
thoughts without foreclosure from the research process. Medicine relies heavily upon 
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personal connections and interpretations, and there is a growing voice to connect 
research in medical education to issues of social theory and cognitive psychology, 
thereby enabling us to analyse what is going on in the diagnostic process from 
different domains (Bunniss & Kelly, 2010; Norman, 2011).   
Symbolic Interactionism was chosen as the theoretical framework as it is intimately 
connected with the development of Dimensional Analysis (DA) through the Chicago 
School of Psychology. The central tenets of SI address the questions within the study 
which will be explained in greater depth later, but in essence this focuses upon 
meanings and interaction (Blumer, 1969). One of the core statements that underpins 
SI is that ‘humans act towards things based upon the meanings they have for them’, 
and this statement underpins one of the sub-questions in this study i.e. ‘How is the 
diagnostic process constructed from the perspective of a medical student? Does the 
term diagnostic reasoning mean anything to them, and can they analyse their role in 
this process through a reflexive discussion?  
Furthermore, why might this study be relevant to current practice and theory? What 
might be gained from listening to the student perspective? Firstly, it is important that a 
teacher of medicine, and in particular of diagnostic reasoning, be immersed in the 
issues which contextualise student learning. This should include current theories on 
expertise and cognition, but also of social theory and interaction through the 
simulation. Immersion in the situated learning environment of the student should 
facilitate a greater understanding of how they are developing the skills relevant to 
clinical practice, rather than assume that something else is happening. Secondly, the 
study should be credible and useful in creating a perspective through the lived 
experiences of the student, rather than that of the researcher. The latter often typifies 
quantitative methods which assess the various attributes of reasoning, when the 
‘means end’ is achieving the correct diagnosis (the ‘Holy Grail’), rather than an 
appreciation of the factors which contribute towards forming a range of possible 
diagnoses. 
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Medical teachers often reiterate the view that the most significant information 
contributing to diagnostic formulation comes from taking the clinical history, rather 
than the clinical examination or indeed investigations,  although this evidence is 
dated and arose from the context of secondary care in Neurology (Hampton et al, 
1975). The first sub-question will address this very issue in order to determine 
whether this assumption is true for these 3rd year students (‘establish what features of 
a simulated consultation provide most information to the students to assimilate and 
process towards a tentative diagnosis’). Equally the normative theory on the 
development of cognitive expertise tells us how causal links between different data 
sets merge to form illness scripts for individual illnesses (Feltovich & Barrows, 1984; 
Schmidt et al, ibid), but what does this concept actually mean to a third year student 
when all the jargon is removed?  
Similarly, we may categorise  the students according to the theory of skills acquisition 
as ‘novices’ or ‘advanced beginners’  (Benner, 1984; Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986), by 
virtue of where they situated within the curriculum, but without finding out how they 
think we will never know whether we are correct, or indeed provide the appropriate 
learning strategies for that stage of development. Through answering some of the 
research questions in this study, current theory may be confirmed, challenged or 
developed along a different pathway.  It is anticipated that a greater insight will have 
been gained into the student’s perspective of the role of making a diagnosis and the 
features which underpin that complex process. 
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1.1.1 What issues will be discussed in this thesis? 
The very essence of this study is to explore how medical students view the diagnostic 
process, and what it means for them. It will employ a qualitative methodology called 
Dimensional Analysis to explore the emergent properties in data collected from a 
simulated consultation and a reflexive discussion. 
Chapter 1 will contextualise the historical background to medical education in the UK, 
the ethos behind integrated curricula, and the transitions that exist within 
undergraduate programmes in spite of intentional integration, and finally the local 
context which situates the participants. 
Chapter 2 will provide the background to the theories on cognitive expertise 
alongside the research paradigms that underpin the current views on diagnostic 
reasoning. This will lead onto how simulation studies can be used in exploring the 
cognitive attributes that are the focus of this thesis, and finally reiterate the original 
research questions developed through the Research Process Approval (RPA). 
Chapter 3 explores the conceptual framework of symbolic interactionism and its close 
relationship with the methodological approach based upon one of variants of 
Grounded Theory i.e. Dimensional Analysis (DA). 
Chapter 4 will discuss the benefits derived from the rehearsal study, the recruitment 
process, the use of a standardised case scenario for the simulated consultation, and 
discuss the relevant ethical issues including insider research. 
Chapter 5 will demonstrate data analysis using the theme of cognitive mechanism as 
an example, and explore the stages of DA through illustrations from the transcripts. 
Chapter 6 will explore the case findings which achieved theoretical saturation and 
Chapter 7 will discuss the evolution of the substantive theory which emerges through 
the findings in conjunction with other theories. 
14 
 
1.2 The context of medical education in the United Kingdom 
During the last 20 years the field of medical education has changed considerably, 
primarily in response to the directives from the governing body, the General Medical 
Council (Tomorrow’s Doctors, 1993; 2003; 2009; Good Medical Practice, 2006; 
Redefining Good Medical Practice, 2013). In tandem it has adapted to sociological 
changes that have shaped how we perceive the role of medicine alongside the 
emergence of the ‘audit society’, consumerism, and evidence based practice, and of 
course in the context of spiralling healthcare costs in the National Health Service 
(Ham, 1999:33; Trinder & Reynolds, 2000:1-15). The following introduction provides 
a brief insight into the forces that have shaped changes in medical education in the 
United Kingdom during that period. 
The pressure created by the increasing cost of NHS care was a key factor driving 
changes in health policy. Perhaps the most radical changes undertaken by any 
political administration in the UK was pursued by the Thatcher government in 
recognising that the ever increasing expenditure on the NHS required better 
governance, and the most significant long term measure was introduced through the 
Griffiths report in 1983 (Ham, 1999:29). The report highlighted the need for better and 
effective business management in the NHS, and included a proposal that hospital 
doctors should ‘accept the management responsibility which goes with clinical 
freedom’ (Griffiths report, NHS Management Inquiry, DHSS, 1983:18).  
Such a radical measure was fuelled by the emergence of major funding pressures 
which had plagued previous political administrations, and further reforms were set out 
in the White Paper, Working for Patients in 1989, which included a number of 
efficiency measures in response to spiralling costs (Secretary of State for Health and 
others, 1989a). Working for Patients also aimed to make doctors more accountable 
for their performance (Ham, ibid, 37), and although at the time this was primarily 
aimed at clinical performance, the ethos included medical education in terms of 
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preparing medical students for future practice.  The subsequent introduction of 
annual appraisals and revalidation for doctors can be traced back to the emergence 
of public accountability during this period.  
Alongside this ethos was the increasing focus upon the use of evidence based 
practice in medicine during the 1990s. This included the re-evaluation of medical 
interventions that were either ineffective, expensive or were limited in application 
(Giddens, 1991; 1994). Although this was primarily defined and driven by the 
profession, in some ways can be seen as the profession’s response to the rise of 
managerialism which emerged from political directives. It also reflected the 
sociological drift towards what became known as the audit society alongside the rise 
of consumerism, which re-examined traditional practice and explains a more rigorous 
application of science (Power, 1997: 43-44; Trinder & Reynolds, 2000: 7).  
In many ways this was fuelled by a mistrust of the medical profession and 
contemporary science, with a context of questioning doctor’s competencies following 
high profile issues such as the Bristol Royal Infirmary Inquiry, which analysed deaths 
arising from surgical practice from 1984 to 1995 (Secretary for Health, 2001). As a 
result of this and other notable cases the GMC came under significant scrutiny to ‘put 
its house in order’ and to introduce systematic safeguards in practice, and to train 
doctors with better skills, particularly those with more effective communications skills. 
The response to these social influences can be seen in the reports from the GMC 
both upon clinical practice (Good Medical Practice, 2006), but also undergraduate 
medical education through the iterations of Tomorrow’s Doctors from 1993 onwards 
(ibid). 
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1.2.1 What has been the impact of these changes on medical education? 
It is worth briefly exploring the historical developments in curricular changes over the 
last century in order to explain the directions adopted in both curriculum design and 
broader pedagogical ideas.  The origins of the split between preclinical and clinical 
training periods in undergraduate education can be traced back to the Flexner report 
on the state of medical education in the USA and Canada (1910). Flexner proposed 
that following a period of embedding training in ‘formal analytical reasoning, the kind 
of thinking integral to the natural sciences’, there should be a phase of clinical training 
based in hospitals where students would learn to collect and evaluate data from 
patients under appropriate expert supervision.  
This idea spawned the basis for conventional undergraduate medical programmes of 
the early 20th century with a well demarcated preclinical/clinical split.  Subsequent 
changes in direction and ethos have been motivated by analysing how students learn 
most effectively, with defined objectives in the curriculum (Miller, 1961: Simpson, 
1972), including systems based teaching with active student involvement (Cox & 
Ewan, 1982; Newble & Cannon, 1983). This has been in response to the changing 
emphasis towards outcomes, societal values, and the medical schools’ 
responsibilities towards preparing the next generation of doctors (Grant in Swanick, 
2010: 1-14).  Through the influence of the first iteration of Tomorrow’s Doctors 
(1993), the GMC has sought to move the emphasis away from the conventional 
approach of memorising and reproducing factual data towards the ideas of 
developing more critical, independent thought alongside increased opportunities to 
interact with patients. 
Outcomes for medical curricula in the UK are directly linked to the graduate outcomes 
contained within the latest iteration of Tomorrow’s Doctors (2009), split between three 
main outcomes; the doctor as a scholar and a scientist; the doctor as a practitioner; 
the doctor as a professional.  In 1993, the first iteration outlined the expectations and 
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recommendations for revising the curriculum framework and promoting a core 
curriculum at undergraduate level in UK medical schools, and the impact of the 
aforementioned sociological trends were more evident in subsequent iterations. 
Amongst the principal recommendations in 1993 were proposals such as introducing 
‘systems based’ teaching, and integrating contributions from scientific and clinical 
knowledge in an attempt to eliminate the preclinical/clinical divide that existed in 
conventional programmes. Critical evaluation of evidence was to be encouraged 
alongside the introduction of special study modules (SSC) promoting learning in 
depth. Interdisciplinary synthesis was to be achieved through true integration of both 
horizontal and vertical themes in the curriculum. In parallel, more opportunities to 
interact with patients would be provided. Some medical schools undertook significant 
revision of their undergraduate programmes (e.g. Manchester, Liverpool and 
Glasgow) and embraced Problem Based learning (PBL) which promotes integrated 
learning and clinical reasoning. 
The objectives for undergraduate education enshrined within Tomorrow’s Doctors 
comprised three goals under the headings of i) knowledge and understanding, ii) 
Skills demonstrating competency (e.g. history taking and examination), and iii) 
attitudes. These objectives only allude to the cognitive skills that would be involved in 
reaching ‘a provisional assessment of a patient’s problem, and developing the 
capacity for self audit’. In Annex A of Tomorrow’s Doctors entitled, ‘Attributes of the 
independent practitioner’, the following statement encapsulates the aspirations for a 
qualified doctor; ‘the reasoning and judgement in the application of knowledge to the 
analysis and interpretation of data, and in defining the nature of a problem’ (1993).  
 
These are indeed very sophisticated aspirations which barely hint at the complexity of 
achieving those qualities. Critical thinking, clinical judgement, and the concept of 
reflection are fundamental qualities espoused of the independent practitioner. Therein 
lies the debate between the GMC’s drive towards achieving competencies and 
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defining standards, alongside the development of more complex cognitive skills 
inherent in concepts such as reasoning, judgement and metacognition. These terms 
encompass higher cognitive functions which link decision making and problem 
solving. Indeed, metacognition is sometimes called the ‘seventh sense’ which 
promotes implicit, unconscious skills to the forefront of the conscious mind space 
(Nisbet & Schucksmith, 1984). 
Maudsley and Strivens examined the tensions between achieving competencies 
espoused by the GMC, and the ethos of critical thinking in their discussion paper 
reviewing terms and concepts (2000). Within their paper the following comment 
crystallises this argument; ‘Barnett argued that pushing higher education towards the 
vocabulary of competence merely replaces one closed ideological view of higher 
education, i.e. academic competence serving cognitive culture, with another, i.e. one 
dimensional, operational competence serving the economy’ (Barnett, 1994).  
With subsequent guidelines, the GMC has pushed the agenda of undergraduate 
education towards defined competencies in order to validate transparency and 
accountability in the public domain. However, this tends to espouse the construct of 
competence involving performance synonymous with skill alone, thus concentrating 
upon specific practical procedures for many outcomes (Tomorrow’s Doctors, 2003; 
2009: Wolf, 1989).This belies the complexity of expertise, particularly decision 
making and problem solving. The defined outcomes required of the emergent 
graduate in 2003 focus around clearly defined clinical, practical, and communication 
skills, with further refinement in the 2009 iteration, however the terms used to 
describe cognitive skills are far more ambiguous.   
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1.2.2 The Integrated Curriculum approach 
The international and national drivers in education explored in the previous section 
provide the logical reasons behind the adoption a spiral, integrated curriculum design 
chosen many UK medical schools, and this structure is often delivered through 
systems based teaching, with vertical and horizontal integration of both modular 
teaching and core concepts. The spiral model was first described by Bruner with the 
specific intention aim of revisiting themes within the curriculum in ever increasing 
depth and complexity (Bruner, 1977; Harden & Stamper, 1999). Vertical themes in 
this type of model represent key skills and competencies such as clinical method 
(communication and examination skills), therapeutics, ethical issues, population 
studies, and professionalism.  
The philosophy of integration has significant foundation in studies of cognition which 
describe how doctors utilise both biomedical and clinical knowledge together in 
making diagnostic judgements. Basic biomedical knowledge is encapsulated in 
explanations for illness by clinicians who appear to make diagnoses at a syndrome 
level (Patel et al, 1988; Boshuizen & Schmidt, 1992; Norman, 2000). Expertise is 
gained by developing elaborate networks of knowledge which include the features of 
biomedical knowledge, clinical knowledge and experience.  
The features on individual illnesses are often incorporated into a mental picture or 
construct called an Illness script, which is based on the accumulated exposure to the 
same illness over time, becoming more refined with subsequent exposures (Feltovich 
& Barrows, 1984). This allows rapid processing of new case features by comparing 
with the stored default script i.e. pattern recognition (also called non analytical 
reasoning), and is heavily reliant upon prior exposure to similar cases in a particular 
domain, or ‘formal’ clinical knowledge. For more difficult or complex cases, slower 
analytical reasoning becomes the operative mode where biomedical and mechanistic 
explanations assume greater importance (Eva & Norman, 2005).  
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Early exposure to clinical cases alongside biomedical teaching helps facilitate the 
formation of encapsulated knowledge and improve diagnostic skill acquisition, and 
this is the premise for integrating basic science with clinical exposure (Boshuizen & 
Schmidt, ibid: Eva, 2005). Early patient contact has been shown to confer a number 
of benefits such as improved acquisition and retention of knowledge, better 
understanding of the impact of disease on patients’ lives, enhanced professional 
socialisation, and increased motivation to learn ( Prince et al, 2000: Diemers et al, 
2008; Dornan & Bundy, 2004).  Evidence about real patient contact improving 
analytical and non analytical reasoning skills has been reported (Diemers, ibid), 
however students also report difficulties in transferring biomedical knowledge to 
clinical problems (Prince, ibid; Patel et al, 1988).  
It has been suggested that making explicit links between patient problems and basic 
science are pivotal for students to make connections more effective (van de Wiel et 
al, 1999; Woods et al, 2005). A quantitative modelling approach has been used to 
illustrate the relative contribution between biomedical knowledge (BK) and clinical 
cognition (CC) towards diagnostic justification in students from an integrated 
curriculum (Cianciolo et al, 2013). Academic performance in the bioscience 
component of year 1 & 2 was captured from basic science examinations and used 
alongside assessment of clinical cognition (information gathering and interpretation) 
from SP examinations. This was compared to subsequent performance in the 4th year 
competency examination comprising 14 SP cases, none of which require diagnostic 
justification (DJ). Both BK and CC were found to have a moderate relationship with 
DJ in the 4th year examination; however, BK had a stronger statistical relationship, 
suggesting that this was influencing the higher-quality diagnostic explanations. It was 
therefore suggested that the clinical exposures in their curriculum were not yet 
sufficient to influence clinical cognition coupled to pattern recognition. It will be 
interesting to see if there is any resonance amongst our participants’ thinking. 
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1.2.3 Transitions in the curriculum 
Even with contemporary integrated medical programmes designed to provide the 
early clinical exposure to patients (thereby promoting the integration of biomedical 
knowledge with clinical experiences), there is often a significant transition between 
‘pre-clinical’ and ‘clinical ‘training. The ‘pre-clinical period’ in more conventional 
programmes covers the basic biomedical sciences (usually 2 years or the equivalent 
to Phase 1 in this curriculum; see Figure A), and the clinical attachments which typify 
the ‘clinical period’ involve significant immersion in patient contact in the multiple 
domains of medicine (Phases 2 and 3).  
This is the first of three significant transitions described in medical training i.e. the 
trajectory in medical education called the ‘medical continuum’ (Teunissen & 
Westerman, 2011), and the origins of the first transition can be seen in Flexner’s 
report , ‘the preclinical stage of training should be followed by a clinical phase in 
teaching hospitals (1910). The participants in this study are situated at this 
transitional point about the embark upon hospital based rotations where there is 
increased exposure to ‘stand alone’ practice i.e. less facilitation requiring more 
independent thought and responsibility, but without authority in decision making or 
management. Although programme design has aimed at reducing this transition by 
earlier patient contact, it still exists as a period when there is more exposure to un-
facilitated contact with patients, and expectations in behaviour change and role, 
including a move towards more self-directed, adult learning. Indeed some studies 
suggest that students feel this transition is still too abrupt without adequate facilitation 
(Prince et al, 2005). 
In Teunissen & Westerman’s critical review of the literature about the pre-
clinical/clinical transition, some colleges have introduced specific courses or modules 
to facilitate this transition, and inform students of the likely ramifications of a change 
in context and practice (ibid). This approach is based upon a transition being viewed 
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as a specific point in time, rather than a dynamic phase which is different for each 
individual in any given cohort. The abstract from this review contains a key phrase, 
‘turning a transition from a threat into a learning opportunity’, and suggests that 
educational strategies should be used to facilitate coping skills, converting negative 
emotions often quoted during this stage into positive opportunities (O’Brien et al, 
2007).  
Findings drawn from mainly qualitative studies (usually focus groups, interviews and 
questionnaires) highlight issues and stressors encountered by students, ranging from 
understanding roles and responsibilities, engaging with more effective self-directed 
learning, putting theory into practice, and applying theoretical knowledge to clinical 
reasoning (van Hell et al, 2000: Prince, ibid; O’Brien, ibid; Babaria et al, 2009). 
Preclinical knowledge and skills did not appear to influence the perceived stress of 
the transition, yet mature students appeared to cope better, were less likely to feel 
daunted (Schacklady et al, 2009), and exemplified more effective self-regulated 
learning capacities sometimes seen in students educated through PBL courses, 
although evidence remains mixed (White, 2007). Studies often focus upon 
conceptualising the differences between PBL and conventional curriculum designs, 
and results remain mixed, failing to justify the integrated thinking expected from PBL 
courses (Prince et al, 2000; Hayes et al, 2004). 
The second transition occurs at the point of qualification between a final year student 
and junior doctor (Foundation Year 1), and the last occurs at the end of the speciality 
training period and appointment as a consultant/independent practitioner.  Each 
stage can be accompanied by changing demands in role, expectations, stress and 
emotional coping strategies, as well as adaptations in learning (Helmers et al, 1997; 
Prince, ibid). Transitions also present potential opportunities for rapid personal 
development when behaviour can alter through the various challenges, and thinking 
is refashioned through new experiences. 
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1.2.4 The medical school curriculum (local context) 
It is important to situate the participants involved in the study within the integrated 
model adopted by this medical school, which uses interlinked modular teaching with 
both vertical and horizontal integration, including face to face contact to patients from 
week 2 of the programme in the clinical practice modules, CP 101 and 201. Teaching 
in the community setting at this stage of the curriculum is governed by well-defined 
learning outcomes for each visit to achieve equitable learning amongst the student 
cohort that links with five modular themes: Development of communication skills, 
clinical skills, the wider context of the NHS and society, population medicine, and 
multi-disciplinary team working.  
 
Figure A. The medical school curriculum 
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Community based teaching occurs in four out of the five years within the curriculum, 
however the philosophy in years 1 and 2 (Phase 1) is based upon gaining basic 
experience in generic clinical practice, rather than specialist General Practice per se 
(Figure A). Included in the experiences are studies where students make several 
visits to a family with a newborn infant (Year1), and a patient with a chronic illness 
(Year 2), and these provide opportunities to integrate knowledge with practice, meet 
other healthcare professionals and develop knowledge about the care in the 
community. 
The volunteers for this study will have completed contact time in the clinical practice 
modules amounting to 264 hours in total, which includes 36 hours in primary care 
with their GP tutors, 30 hours in secondary care placements, and 30 hrs in skills 
based workshops. Primary care teaching is linked with modular activities and 
students are exposed to patients with specific diseases which illustrate systems 
based teaching. Therefore face to face contact with patients amounts to a maximum 
of 90 hours during Phase 1 teaching, but in reality is less due to the constraints and 
safeguarding  applied to clinical exposure at this early stage of development i.e. 
supervision framed through careful facilitation by experienced clinicians. 
Diagnostic reasoning was introduced as an explicit theme in Phase1 of the curriculum 
3 years ago, mid way through the second year. The aim was to introduce an 
awareness of decision making modalities using a filmed example, with the aspiration 
that this would implant key ideas on formulating diagnoses ahead of more extensive 
exposure to clinical practice in the ward based attachments during Year 3. A core 
lecture mid way through year 2 was integrated with a specific experience in the GP 
attachments where students were exposed to a brief Case Based Discussion (CbD), 
to be assimilated subsequently into their professional portfolio. The explicit outcome 
was to write about using simple diagnostic strategies based upon their meeting with a 
patient in practice. The spiral curriculum for reasoning begins with this core session 
25 
 
and is linked vertically with subsequent diagnostic discussions at the end of each 
clinical attachment in Phase 2 (years 3 & 4).  
The key ideas were to introduce students to the various modes of reasoning, 
including analytical reasoning, pattern recognition, and the value of scheme inductive 
reasoning using clinical examples to illustrate underlying ideas (see 1.3 for further 
discussion of these terms). Written Clinical Reasoning Problems (CRPs) were used 
in facilitated group work to propagate ideas from a core lecture. The hidden agenda 
was to develop the understanding of metacognition in being able to bring cognitive 
processes to conscious level whilst trying to solve these CRPs (Nisbet & 
Schucksmith, 1984).  
Three ideas underpinned the pragmatic ’take home’ messages for the students. 
Firstly, the idea of ‘weighting’ various components of a medical history in terms of 
their relative importance to the possible diagnoses; secondly, looking for links 
between data within the history (propositional linkage), and the concept of chunking 
features together which relate to illness script formation (Cowan, 2001; Feltovich & 
Barrows, ibid). Finally to emphasise that faulty data gathering contributes towards the 
main reason for diagnostic error (Graber, ibid).  
Within these ideas was the theme of evaluating the relative importance of various bits 
of clinical information (weighting) encapsulated by the Lens Model and Judgement 
Theory which will discussed in Chapter 2 (Brunswik, 1956; Hammond, 1996). These 
describe how individual interpretation of data may influence diagnostic judgement, 
and where error can ensue. The resonance with symbolic interactionism (SI) is all too 
apparent in that individuals make sense of their world through various interactions 
with others and the meaning that things have for them (in this case the meanings that 
individual symptoms and signs have in the context of a presumptive diagnosis).  
This introduction to diagnostic reasoning can be seen as both deconstructing a 
daunting role for students and clarifying expertise (Hodgkinson, 1995), or what Schon 
described as ‘technical rationality’ (1987). However, it is espousing ways of thinking 
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about personal judgments in the context of diagnostic thoughts and therefore is 
‘allowing competence to understand itself’ i.e. informing metacompetence which is 
the intuitive approach to decision making (Schon, ibid; Fleming, 1991). It is also 
acknowledging an element of uncertainty that pervades the skill of diagnostic 
reasoning as briefly mentioned in Tomorrow’s Doctors (2009). 
In resume, the participants involved in this study are students from a medical school 
in the UK which has adopted an integrated, spiral curriculum. These students have 
successfully completed two years of undergraduate study across 8 integrated 
modules covering the main body systems, and they have been exposed to early 
patient contact amounting to a maximum of 90 hours as part of the two clinical 
practice modules delivered extensively across each year in Phase 1 of the 
curriculum. The curriculum introduces the foundations of diagnostic reasoning in year 
2, raising awareness of cognitive strategies at a basic level. 
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2 Chapter 2: Cognitive Expertise and Reasoning 
 
2.1 The historical context of research in clinical reasoning 
 
Chapter 1 illustrates the changes in society and medical education which have 
influenced the structure, delivery and ethos underpinning modern medical courses. 
The origins of the competency-based culture are easy to understand when viewed 
through the societal pressures on the governing body, explaining the focus upon 
measurable competencies, although less attention appears to have been devoted to 
the development of cognitive skills within teaching compared to technical skills. There 
exists a considerable body of theoretical research on the various attributes of clinical 
reasoning in medicine and other domains of healthcare; however, the discussion 
below will concentrate upon those that have particular resonance to the specific skill 
of diagnostic reasoning. The continuum of cognitive expertise and the normative 
processes involved in this maturation will also be considered alongside the current 
theories which apply to the development of reasoning in undergraduate medical 
students.  
The development of clinical reasoning has been approached through two different 
theoretical paradigms, the first being ‘processing theory’ exemplified by Elstein’s 
group using Hypothetico-deductive reasoning (Elstein et al, 1978). In essence, this 
seeks to understand how clinicians process information from the patient in suggesting 
possible hypotheses which explain the illness. The second approach is through 
‘structural’ theory i.e. how structuring and organising information in the mind helps 
produce diagnostic solutions (Lesgold et al, 1989: Schmidt et al, 1990: Schmidt & 
Rikers, 2007). In general, these are described as the normative processes which 
explain changes in cognition associated with the different stages in professional 
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development, determined by progressively enriched causal pathways linking various 
facets of the patient’s problem (symptoms, signs, risk factors, etc). 
The historical perspective of research into clinical reasoning illustrates the apparently 
diverse areas of exploration which are gradually being subsumed into a more 
accepted, inclusive opinion. Current evidence suggests that the process of diagnostic 
reasoning is a combination of analytic and non-analytic reasoning (NAR) working 
in tandem, or what is called Dual Process Theory (Norman & Eva, 2010; Pelaccia, 
2011). The relative contribution of each component is largely determined by the 
context i.e. situated learning, the operating variables which apply to each case, and 
importantly the level of expertise of the clinician (Lave & Wenger, 2007). This brings 
together the inseparable issues of cognitive development and case based exposure 
(i.e. prior contact with patients) which in particular underpins NAR. This study aims to 
determine how novices in medicine view the diagnostic process from their 
perspective at a stage when cased based exposure is very limited. The twin 
paradigms of information processing and decision making are now recognised as part 
of the multiple levels of the decision-making space, contextualised by the task 
environment , and summed up by the description of’ the sum of thinking and decision 
making processes associated with clinical practice’ (Higgs, 2006; Higgs & Jones, 
2008: Ch 1).  
Other sources have discussed the more specific features of the generic reasoning 
process including ethical reasoning (Neuhas, 1988), narrative reasoning (Bruner, 
1986; Benner et al, 1992), collaborative reasoning (Coulter, 2005), conditional 
reasoning (Fleming, 1991a), multidisciplinary reasoning, (Loftus, 2006), interactive 
reasoning (Edwards et al, 1998), and teaching as reasoning (Sluijs, 1991). The 
process of diagnostic reasoning features heavily in the information processing 
paradigm and encompasses the decision making process surrounding diagnostic 
formulation or hypotheses, and how doctors arrive at such decisions (Elstein, 2000).  
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Judgement and decisions that are based upon the information gathered are 
described in the decision making paradigm best encapsulated by Judgement Theory 
(Brunswik, 1956; Hammond, 1996), Significantly less has been written about the 
decision making processes involved in the subsequent management of cases once 
diagnosis has been reached (Monajemi et al, 2007).  Indeed reaching a correct 
diagnosis appears to be the ‘Holy Grail’ in many research papers. 
Historically the reasoning process has involved a number of interpretations or 
models, and these include issues such as content specificity (reasoning ability varies 
across case types), the expertise level of the clinician, and the impact of heuristics 
and bias in decision making (Patel et al, 1986; McLaughlin et al, 2007; Norman & 
Eva, 2010; Durning et al, 2011). Early research in the 1970s contrasted two models, 
hypothetical-deductive reasoning (analytical) and pattern recognition (also known as 
non-analytical, or categorisation using analogy). The former generally employs 
deductive or backwards reasoning moving from a series of observations about a 
patient (symptoms, signs, risk factors, etc) towards a generalisation or hypothesis 
that best summed up those features (Barrows et al, 1978; Elstein et al, 1978). 
Analytical thinking was the method generally ascribed to novices, or was used by 
experts with more difficult and complex cases where slower evolution of hypotheses 
occurred to represent symptoms and signs were considered in the search for a 
diagnostic label.  
The generation of hypotheses is dependent upon a four stage process starting with 
the acquisition of verbal and non-verbal cues from the patient which might inform or 
trigger the generation of a plausible hypothesis to explain the patient’s problem. Cues 
amount to information of any type from personal characteristics, risk behaviour, pre- 
encounter data such as the threshold for consultation amongst others, as well as the 
more obvious symptoms and signs of disease. With the exception of pre-encounter 
data there is a mixture of cues that have been assimilated into the case scenario for 
the SP e.g. episodic epigastric pain, substance misuse, and use of drugs implicated 
30 
 
in causing dyspepsia.  The data analysis will serve to illustrate how these various 
cues are represented in the thought processes of the participants. 
Early generation of a small number of hypotheses serves to limit the demand on 
working memory. It also directs further collection of information to refine and validate 
the possible diagnoses, called cue interpretation and hypothesis evaluation. 
Hypothesis generation is usually limited to 3-5 individual hypotheses to represent a 
solution to the problem in hand, and this helps to minimise the strain put on the active 
work space of the mind. This may have particular resonance for novices embarking 
upon their first exposure to making definitive diagnostic decisions in this study. 
The hypotheses generated may not initially relate to a specific, well rounded 
diagnosis in the first place but may represent anatomical or physiological 
explanations, particularly from novice practitioners. This represents the ‘essentialist’ 
view adopted by novices that signs and symptoms arise from a pathological process 
that can be identified and rectified, and the ‘nominalist’ perspective that experts 
usually hold which is that disease is a collection of abnormalities that arise together 
(Campbell et al ,1979: Norman, 2000).  
Pattern recognition or NAR is regarded as the faster and more efficient method of 
reasoning and usually employed by experts with significant case based experience. 
They utilise the memories of similar cases as mental constructs which exemplfy a 
specific illness or disease, also called ‘illness scripts’ based upon the original concept 
of templates or abstract prototypes (Rosch & Mervis, 1975; Cantor et al, 1980; 
Feltovich & Barrows, 1984). In this respect, prototypes serve as multi-faceted 
descriptors of an illness where most, but not necessarily all of the clinical features are 
represented in the symptoms and signs within any one patient.  
Within this illness script there are inherent semantic links and relationships developed 
from the various perspectives of biomedical, epidemiological, and clinical features. 
For example, a patient with a urinary infection (UTI) may have several symptoms 
including frequency of micturition, urge, nocturia, haematuria, and a fever, and this 
31 
 
pattern of symptoms/signs would represent a significant part of the typical picture of 
this illness. Most of these symptoms are seen in the majority of patients, but not 
necessarily all. The ‘weighting’ or relative contribution towards the formation of the 
possible diagnosis from each symptom or sign can also be viewed from the 
perspective of Len’s theory (see Figure B on page 33). If the various features being 
considered are labelled as X1(fever), X2 (haematuria), and X3 (frequency) using this 
example, then these features may reflect most of the cues contributing towards the 
diagnosis of a urinary tract infection, but not all are necessarily present in each case  
of the actual condition  i.e. the validation of condition A (Hammond, ibid). Human 
fallibility affects both the collection of the data (cues) from the history and 
examination, and the interpretation of the data sets (judgement of condition A or how 
the clinician utilises the cues). 
Memories of similar cases called ‘exemplars’ which have been subsumed into one 
default script (the ‘norm’) are accessed instantaneously from long term memory for 
comparison to the new case, whether this is a typical presentation or an illness or not 
(Bordage & Lemieux, 1991). This approach includes what is sometimes called the 
‘Aunt Minnie’ phenomenon-someone who you would recognize immediately, or the 
‘spot diagnoses’ of something that one has seen many times before and represent 
about 20% of diagnoses in General Practice, particularly in dermatological conditions 
(Sackett et al, 1995; Heneghan et al, 2009). 
Alongside the hypothetico-deductive model another  analytical model has emerged 
more recently from research proposing the concept of scheme-inductive reasoning 
based upon organised structures for learning, but not necessarily specific to 
diagnostic reasoning (McLaughlin et al, 2002; Coderre et al, 2003). These structures 
provide a generic framework for problem solving employing road maps or decision 
trees which help distinguish the decision making choice at various points (called 
nodes). Schemes provide the ‘big picture’ or scaffolding onto which other information 
can be assimilated, edited or elaborated.  
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Mnemonic strategies provide the clearest example of scheme driven reasoning and 
reflect their popularity in teaching across all domains. Their dual impact is observed 
in limiting the potential overload on short term memory capacity (Cowan, 2001), but 
also in facilitating encoding and retrieval of information from memory (Bellezza, 
1996).  A plethora of studies has shown that mnemonic strategies have a direct effect 
and beneficial impact upon the ability to remember a number of diverse areas, 
including recall and recognition of factual information (McCormick & Levin, 1987; 
Levin, 1993; Carney & Levin, 2000).  
Two examples of schemes feature during the discussions of the case findings in this 
thesis: firstly, the use of a mnemonic strategy called SOCRATES which is taught in 
the curriculum as an aide memoire for the features of pain; Site, Onset, Character, 
Radiation, Associated features, Timing, Exacerbating features and Severity. The 
other is the Traditional Medical History (TMH), used as a format for collecting data 
during the consultation. This is based upon a time honoured and universally accepted 
structure of sections starting with the history of the presenting complaint, past 
medical history, drug history and allergies, social history, and the systems review (the 
latter acting as a ‘sieve’ to pick up related symptoms from other body systems). 
The application of schemes has obvious resonance in the clinical practice setting 
where novices are exposed to multiple sources of information about a patient with 
little clinical knowledge to utilise, and therefore cognitive strategies often act as 
failsafe mechanisms (Gale & Marsden, 1984). Schemes are reflected in current 
guidelines or clinical prediction rules (algorithms), which are based upon current 
evidence (Grimmer & Loftus in Higgs et al, 2008; Ch 28). The advantage of scheme 
inductive reasoning is that it can be made available to novices for use in clinical 
cases at an early stage of expertise development, whereas pattern recognition is 
primarily available only to experts based upon years of practice. 
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These three models are used interchangeably  in medical problem solving although it 
is clear that pattern recognition and scheme-inductive strategies confer greater 
diagnostic success compared to hypothetico-deductive reasoning (Coderre, ibid; 
Blissett et al ,2012). They represent the information processing paradigm that 
emphasises how data is collected, rather than the interpretation and subsequent 
decision that is subsequently made based upon the data.  
 
Figure B: Representation of Lens Theory (after Brunswik) 
 
 
 
Fallible indicators 
of Condition A (UTI) 
X1 
 
Actual condition A                         X2                      Judgement of A by 
                                                                                              clinician                     
 
X3 
 
       Validation of Cues                              Utilisation of Cues 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This was first proposed in Brunswik’s Lens theory (Figure B) and subsequently 
developed by the work of Hammond on Judgement Theory (Brunswik, 1956; 
Hammond, 1996).  Indeed research has suggested that there is no association 
between the amounts of data generated from a case and the efficacy of subsequent 
data interpretation (Elstein et al, ibid). The Lens Model puts forward two key areas in 
judgement theory; firstly that a clinician being presented with condition A 
(represented by the actual symptoms/signs of X1-3) makes a decision about validating 
the cues for this condition. 
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Those cues are open to bias such as data gathering skills and the historical features 
presented by the patient (the fallible indicators of the condition e.g. a patient with a 
heart attack may not have the key indicator of chest pain). The right hand side of the 
lens model represents how the clinician interprets these features towards making a 
diagnostic judgement for condition A, and this interpretation is again fallible.  
Errors in decision making have been attributed to four main causes (Graber, 2005; 
Berner & Graber, 2008); 
• Faulty data collection e.g. poor history taking (which can improve with 
practice) 
• Reasoning based upon inadequate or outdated knowledge(using evidence 
based medicine) 
• Faulty data interpretation(or the utilisation of cues in Judgement theory); this 
does not always improve with experience 
• Faulty data verification 
 
Amongst these causes ‘premature closure’ is the most common error i.e. ‘the 
tendency to stop considering other diagnostic possibilities after reaching one 
diagnosis’ (Norman & Eva, ibid), and is correlated with incomplete history taking and 
examination, bias towards one diagnosis, and failure to consider the correct 
diagnosis. The psychological principle underpinning errors in decision making is the 
theory of Bounded or Limited Rationality (Newell & Simon, 1972), which puts forward 
the idea that issues such as the limitations of working memory and information 
processing capabilities mean that human error is inevitable.     
Common examples of error have been suggested to arise from the following causes 
(Croskerry, 2000; Norman & Eva, 2010); Premature closure i.e. closing down on one 
diagnosis too soon and not collecting information about competing alternatives 
(Graber, 2005); Base rate neglect  i.e. failure in probabilistic reasoning and estimation 
of true rate of a specific illness;  Representative bias i.e. missing atypical features 
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due to focussing on prototypical disease manifestation; Confirmation bias: endency to 
acquire too much confirmatory information rather than data that may refute the 
diagnosis (Wolf et al in Dowie and Elstein, 1988): Order effects: the sequence in 
which information is given  i.e. better recall of information at the very beginning and 
very end of consultation, rather than material mentioned in the middle (Bergus et al, 
1995);Conservatism or anchoring effects i.e. heuristic error based upon revising 
diagnostic opinion up or down from an initial anchor point that is inaccurate (Edwards, 
1968). Lastly, the most significant, incorrect interpretation, involving the persistent 
inclusion of data into one diagnostic solution when in fact it supports another which is 
not considered (Elstein et al, 1978). The potential traps for the novice student in 
diagnostic reasoning are manifestly evident. 
The various models of clinical reasoning  are not mutually exclusive and are generally 
regarded as being used in tandem in the form of ‘Dual Process Theory’ (Epstein S, 
1994: Hammond KR, 1996). This view emphasises the triggers from minimal, 
contextual cues that becomes interwoven with more deliberate, analytical thoughts. 
‘Intuitive’ cues come from rapid, readily accessible pattern recognition from previous 
exposures to similar events, something rarely vocalised by clinicians when 
substantiating decisions (teasing out and analysing the comment, “the patient didn’t 
appear normal”). The advantage of including this approach in teaching is to 
deliberately expose the subtle cues which contextualise events which usually remain 
poorly vocalised, and are often subsumed under the umbrella of intuition and wrongly 
attributed to ‘gut feelings’ about patients or events. Subtle cues are therefore often 
ignored and barely discussed or understood in the evolution of decision making. 
 
One further contextual complication to the development of reasoning skills is that 
learners progress through a number of transitional stages. This is reflected in their 
cognitive skills development which demonstrates maturity in the reasoning process 
(Schmidt et al, 1990), and secondly the impact of curriculum design upon changes in 
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clinical exposure and context, typified by the transition between early, conventional 
pre-clinical teaching and subsequent work based clinical attachments in various 
settings (Teunissen& Westerman, ibid).  
Situated learning describes the gradual acquisition of cognitive and social skills 
derived from face to face practice through a progressive apprenticeship experience. 
Part of this process involves increasing assimilation into the team responsible for 
patient care, also known as legitimate peripheral participation (Lave & Wenger, 1991; 
2007). The participants in this study are still peripheral to direct clinical care, and the 
limited exposure to patient contact experienced in the two years prior to this study will 
have provided few opportunities to practice diagnostic reasoning. Indeed even after 
intensive training in clinical reasoning, students from  Problem Based curricula (PBL) 
where CR is an inherent part of teaching, comment upon difficult ties in gathering, 
interpreting, and weighting relevant data, synthesising information and organising it 
hierarchically (van Gessel et al, 2003). 
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2.2 The spectrum of cognitive expertise 
Under outcome 2 in Tomorrow’s Doctors (2009), entitled ‘The doctor as a 
practitioner’, the expectation is that graduates will be able ‘to synthesise problems 
and define likely diagnoses, and make clinical judgements based upon available 
evidence in spite of situations of uncertainty’ (subsection 14; e and f). This brief 
summary of cognitive skills focusses around diagnostic judgement yet encompasses 
an almost seismic change in cognition from the perspective of the novice student 
entering medical school. It glosses over the immense shift from early facilitated 
practice immersed in basic procedural mechanisms (e.g. clinical skills tuition) towards 
the’ high road’ of autonomous decision making. Inevitably, this moves aspirations 
away from measurable competencies and into the field of ‘fuzzy logic’ which attempts 
to represent expert decision making. 
Where does this place the participants in this study on this spectrum? What is 
expected from this stage of development in terms of diagnostic cognition?  The 
theories of professional expertise provide different perspectives which explain the 
various factors that contextualise this domain. Amongst these theories are the 
paradigms of clinical decision making explained in section 2.1. These represent the 
information processing model (i.e. how information is gathered and processed), and 
judgement theory which explains how decisions are made once that information has 
been processed. This encompasses aspects of human fallibility, heuristic 
mechanisms and the influence of bias in subsequent judgements (Brunswik, 1956; 
Norman, 2000).  
Furthermore, the variety of decision making modes was described in Cognitive 
Continuum Theory (Hammond, 1980). Here ‘quasi-rational’ modes range from the 
overtly analytical mode of decision analysis dependent upon system aided judgement 
e.g. evidence based guidelines for practice, towards the more intuitive model based 
upon patterns and experience (Elstein et al, 1978). 
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Two other models have particular resonance with this study, firstly the ideas 
enshrined in the ‘Reflective Practitioner’ which provides an alternative explanation to 
the limitations of technical rationality’ (Schon, 1983: Eraut, 1994: 142-148).  He 
suggested that within ill-defined situations the practitioner resorts to an intuitive mode 
of thought which is creative, and reflects professional artistry built upon reflection. His 
ideas of ‘reflection in action’ and ‘reflection upon action’ are tacit assumptions that 
underpin the role of portfolios which encourage looking back at experiences with a 
view to improving future practice (Dewey, 1933). These ideas are espoused in the 
undergraduate curriculum at the medical school in Phase 1 and the effects of 
facilitating this ethos may well have an impact upon the reflective discussions.  
 
Figure C. Summary of the skills acquisition model (Dreyfus & Dreyfus) 
Level Features 
Level 1  
(Novice) 
Cannot use discretionary judgement and learns rules for 
action according to specific characteristics of a situation 
Level 2  
(Advanced Beginner) 
Can perform acceptably and, from prior experience, will 
notice recurrent, relevant, general characteristics of a 
situation, but needs support to prioritise 
Level 3  
(Competent) 
Lacks speed and flexibility but analyses, prioritises, and 
plans action, and assumes mastery and ability to cope with 
contingencies 
Level 4  
(Proficient) 
Perceives situations as wholes, not just aspects, is guided 
by situationally dependent maxims, and recognises 
abnormality 
Level 5  
(Expert) 
Only resorts to analytical tools, rules, and maxims in novel 
situations, and can see what is possible and what is not 
worth pursuing 
 
 
Lastly, the Dreyfus model of skills acquisition may provide a global framework with 
which the cognitive expertise of the participants may be viewed (Figure C). This has 
been effectively paraphrased by Benner in the field of nursing, and provides a 
structure to which our participants might be aligned (Benner, 1984; Dreyfus & 
Dreyfus, 1986; Benner et al, 1996).  
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For the participants in this study the emergent data and properties will hopefully 
describe attributes in cognition which support a judgment about their developmental 
position along this spectrum of expertise. It may answer questions about their 
reliance upon guidelines and provide examples of discretionary judgment within the 
simulation. The Dreyfus model of expertise provides far more complexity in reacting 
to, and coping with situations within clinical practice than can be explained by the 
achievement of defined, technical  competencies, and reveals an unspoken 
curriculum of expertise which is rarely articulated.  
This statement encapsulates the attitudes towards, and the difficulties in engaging 
with the idea of cognitive competencies within a medical curriculum. How do you 
measure high level, complex cognition and judgements other than in a global sense 
and who defines the parameters of such cognition?  As Eraut points out the Dreyfus 
model rarely quotes standard, competency-based tasks but focuses upon the whole 
process distilled from the learning experience which are contextually driven (Eraut, 
1994: 125).  
However deconstructing professional expertise and distilling the process into a series 
of competencies or routine tasks has advantages for the professional bodies such as 
the GMC, in that it makes professional practice more transparent for external 
scrutiny, and clarifies roles for novices by distinguishing functional levels (Blane, 
1986; Hodkinson, 1995). The counter argument is that competency based 
approaches may miss the link to meta-competence i.e. metacognition and reasoning 
(Fleming, 1991), and has led some commentators to suggest that ‘the competence 
movement in curriculum design is little more than an economically driven derivative of 
the behavioural school’ (Hyland, 1993). 
Eraut’s perspective of learning professional processes are highly relevant at this 
point, proposing that the journey towards expertise encompasses not only 
propositional knowledge (‘knowing that’), process knowledge (’knowing how’), but 
these are combined with personal knowledge and interpretation of experience (Eraut, 
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ibid, 100-122; Ryle, 1949). It could be said that the participants of this study have 
gained limited resources at this stage of their development, having experienced 
significant propositional input (biomedical science), some process knowledge of how 
to take a medical history and examine a patient, mixed with limited personal and 
experiential knowledge (exposure to patients). This mix would align our participants 
to Level 1 in Benner’s model in the face to face clinical setting, unless they have prior 
training in healthcare settings (an exclusion clause in the recruitment process). 
 
Through probing the perspective of the decision making processes used by the 
participants during a simulated consultation, it should become apparent what level of 
thought processes are being used, and how this influences diagnostic decisions, if 
indeed they are being considered. The aim is not to explore deconstructed 
consultation skills, but to build a picture of the thought processes involved in trying to 
make a diagnosis at a crucial transition in the medical curriculum where cognitive 
skills are stretched by changing the context of learning and responsibilities i.e. the 
transition from preclinical teaching to ward based clinical attachments. It strives to 
create an effective theory which encapsulates some of the professional issues at this 
particular stage. 
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2.3 The normative theory of cognitive expertise 
The normative process was first proposed by the Four Stage theory of cognitive 
expertise, composed of four interlinked stages of development in terms of how 
medical students think about case representation (Schmidt et al, 1990), which is 
closely related to accruing clinical knowledge through patient contact and therefore 
the transitions within any curriculum (Figure D). What it does not describe are the 
ramifications of departures from this normative process, assuming that these phases 
will merge effortlessly throughout professional development. Since errors in cognition 
are important to subsequent diagnostic decisions, where do these errors originate 
and are they preventable at an early stage?  
 
Figure D: The ‘Four Stage’ theory of cognitive expertise (from Schmidt) 
 
 
The first stage of this model represents the development of elaborated causal 
networks, whereby the different features of an illness or disease are gradually linked 
together as an increasingly complex cognitive package, which gives clearer 
understanding of the processes involved (Lakoff, 1987). The emergent networks help 
explain the links and relationships between things i.e. symptoms, signs, 
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pathophysiological features, etc. In this respect is allied to the approach of symbolic 
interactionism, except that medical training aspires to give the same meaning to 
disease processes across any given cohort (Blumer, 1969). 
The second stage illustrates the refinement of such causal networks into abridged 
ones, and is heavily dependent upon patient contact to suggest diagnostic labels for 
various symptoms and signs under more effective, higher level causal networks. 
During this stage shortcuts are developed in reasoning when the student has become 
more familiar with some of the typical features of illness through contact with patients 
(Schmidt et al, 1988). There is movement away from utilising all of the basic 
pathophysiological features which exemplify the first stage, towards higher level 
representation which is accessed more quickly from memory. There is considerable 
resonance with Schatzman’s opinion upon the inherent powers of ‘natural analysis’ 
applied to the process of data analysis (1991). 
The third stage exemplifies the formation of Illness Scripts as discrete, yet complex 
packages of information as a cognitive representation of an illness (Feltovich & 
Barrows, 1984), formed via repeated exposure to cases featuring similar symptoms 
and signs. In this way, there is further elaboration of the relevant script including 
issues such as atypical features and context. However, the order in which information 
is both gathered and organised depends upon the level of expertise, with medical 
students more reliant upon the serial order of items of information than experienced 
physicians (Coughlin & Patel, 1986.).  
New exposures are now compared to previous instances of the same illness 
(analogy) and this comparison with previous exemplars illustrates the emergence of 
pattern recognition. New exposures are stored as instance scripts in Stage 4 of the 
model, each contextualised in slightly different ways, yet merged into one prototypical 
form (Bordage & Zacks, 1984), which is sometimes characterised by quite overt 
‘autobiographical memory’ for more unusual cases (Hasselbrock & Pretula. 1990; van 
Rossum & Bender, 1990). 
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The developmental sequence is inextricably linked with education beginning with the 
biosciences, explaining physiological then pathological processes, and finally 
merging this with clinical knowledge acquired from patient contact. However, within 
these stages there is greater complexity and understanding through the broader and 
deeper conceptualisation of clinical problems and the discourse involved i.e. 
Semantic Theory which captures the meanings assigned to symptoms and signs 
(Bordage & Lemeiux, 1991). Cognitive expertise is demonstrated not through a 
greater knowledge base, rather through better organisation of both biomedical and 
clinical knowledge linked together as packages of contextualised data, with quicker 
accessibility and retrieval in working memory (McLaughlin et al, 2007; Boshuizen et 
al, 1987). 
The next section will discuss the general application of simulation studies in Medicine 
ranging from high to low fidelity studies, but more particularly the approach adopted 
by studies such as this one, which seek to explore cognitive attributes and attitudes 
through the use of techniques replicating clinical practice, rather than those 
addressing behavioural skills. 
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2.4 Using simulation to explore cognition 
The use of simulation studies is widespread in Medicine with a general emphasis 
towards practising behavioural and technical skills required in clinical practice e.g. 
clinical communication and examination, technical competences such as 
venepuncture, catheterisation, and basic life support (BLS). Tomorrow’s Doctor’s 
suggests a blended approach to teaching in the curriculum which includes simulation 
based activities (ibid, paragraph 100). Simulation based teaching in Phase 1 of the 
curriculum already utilises a spectrum of activities ranging from low tech simulators 
for resuscitation and examination tasks, to higher fidelity methods using actors 
working from standardised scripts in communication skills sessions.  
 
In order to explore cognition associated with diagnostic reasoning, a non-behavioural 
approach is required to correspond with the desired outcome i.e. an attempt to 
represent cognition associated with the nearest approximation to clinical practice. 
With this objective in mind the role of ‘patients’ in simulation will be explored in the 
following sections. The discussion below starts with a brief typology of various 
methods ranging from low to high fidelity methods used across various domains of 
practice, leading to those concerned with analysing cognitive attributes such as 
decision making during specific encounters with simulated patients (SP). Within this 
section the educational aspirations of some simulated studies will be explored, 
including the ethos of constructivism in reconstructing future practice, and  the value 
of extrinsic and intrinsic feedback to the participants (the ‘internal conversation’). 
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2.4.1 Introduction to simulation studies 
Simulation seeks to imitate situational behaviour or processes in real life by creating 
an equivalent situation for the purpose of training or study (OED, 2006). It creates a 
safer environment for learning specific skills, assessing competencies, and analysing 
tasks which may entail any combination of psychomotor (task based), cognitive or 
attitudinal domains. Decker provided a broad typology of simulation based 
education as illustrated in Table A (2008), which represents simulation tools as a 
spectrum of training mechanisms which are suited to separate domains of practice, 
rather than the more dichotomous perspective of low to high fidelity tools (originally 
based on technical sophistication). The key issue is finding the most appropriate 
simulation tool to match the educational needs of the situation/learner and the fidelity 
of the tool reflects its approximation to reality.  
The use of simulated patients (also known as standardised, abbreviated to SP) are 
far better suited to explore interactive communications skills such as those aimed to 
enable coping with an ‘angry patient’, than a computerised simulation model which 
would be better equipped to illustrate the management of critical care parameters 
involved with anaesthesia, shock or significant cardio-respiratory problems. 
Involvement of SPs in teaching also provide opportunities to invest in training where 
particular issues require a solution to replicate clinical practice in a safe environment 
and minimise student anxiety e.g. intimate examinations (Jha et al, 2010). For studies 
trying to probe decision making and cognition the SP provides the closest 
approximation to consulting with a real patient (RP), and a grounded theory technique 
is best suited as a methodological approach with which to explore the emergent 
issues. 
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Table A:  A typology of fidelity elements in simulation based education 
Tool Descriptor 
Partial Task Trainers 
(low tech simulators) 
Replica models or manikins used to learn & practice 
simple procedures 
Peer to peer learning Peer collaboration used to develop skills e.g. physical 
assessment 
Screen based 
computer simulations 
Program to acquire knowledge, assess competency, and 
provide feedback on knowledge and critical thinking e.g. 
driving test simulation 
Virtual Reality Computer generated  environment with multiple sensory 
systems via sophisticated training systems promoting 
authenticity 
Haptic Systems A simulator that combines real world and virtual reality 
exercises 
Standardised Patients 
(SP and RP) 
Role playing in simulation using actors or students 
paid to portray a patient in a realistic manner 
Full Scale simulation 
(medium to high 
fidelity) 
Simulation involving a full body manikin with 
programmable physiological responses to practitioner 
actions 
 
 
Miller provided the first classification of fidelity from the field of aviation to include 
psychological and physical fidelity (1953), followed by Rehmann who revised the 
classification which incorporated equipment, environmental and psychological fidelity 
(1995). Whilst there is historical evidence that simulation has been used since the 
eighteenth century with foetal models in obstetric training (De Boursier de Coudary, 
1759 in van Meurs, 2006), technological development has created the biggest impact 
on high fidelity, technical simulators used in the field of Anaesthesia (Tjomsland & 
Baskett, 2002). The field of Emergency Medicine is probably better known for the 
more widespread use of manikins such as ‘Resusci-Anne’ in cardiopulmonary 
resuscitation, but also the impact of teamwork in acute care (Small et al, 1999). More 
latterly with the advent of minimal access techniques, the field of Surgery has 
47 
 
benefitted from task-based psychomotor skills training in the acquisition of surgical 
expertise (Kneebone et al, 2004).  
Preparation and training using various forms of simulation provides not only a safer 
environment in which to err and learn from feedback, but also overcomes the 
reduction in opportunities as undergraduate training has moved away from the strict 
apprenticeship model (Kohn et al, 2000; McManus et al, 1998). Simulation also 
provides accurate reproducibility of case material, enables deliberate practice for 
consistent training towards achieving desired competencies (Ericsson, 2004), but can 
also utilise feedback or debriefing  from facilitators/instructors including analysis of 
filmed events (Issenberg  et al ; 2005; Hogg et al, 2006; Fanning & Gaba, 2007). 
In addition to assessing competencies and addressing political accountability, 
Bradley points to the issue of clinical governance in providing high quality care to 
patients (2006). This has given extra impetus to the role of simulation in 
undergraduate and postgraduate training, allowing monitoring of continued 
professional development (CPD), risk management, and remediation for poor 
performers. Furthermore, the assessment of skills and competencies in modern 
medicine through the use of simulation across a variety of domains of practice 
satisfies the expectation that new doctors have been trained to particular standards 
(Tomorrow’s Doctors, 2009).  
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2.4.2 Standardised Patients in simulation 
Barrows & Abrahamson first proposed the concept of programmed patients in their 
study of appraising student performance in diagnostic skills in the sphere of 
neurology (Barrows, 1993). Their study used what are now called standardised 
patients (SP) i.e. a person or actor with a particular history and/or signs trained to 
deliver them in a consistent manner for the purpose of training or teaching (Ker & 
Bradley, 2007).  
SPs provide high fidelity simulation and reflect the closest approximation to real life 
events during medical consultations, particularly those examining clinical method 
which include communication and consultation skills (Elstein et al, Ch 3, 1978). The 
SP is usually a trained actor or a patient working from a standardised ‘script’ 
containing specific directions, symptoms, and responses to enable consistency and 
reproducibility when used for assessment such as in OSCEs (Objective Structured 
Clinical examinations) that are linked to learning outcomes in the curriculum 
(Schuwirth & van der Vleuten, 2003). Experienced SPs may also become involved in 
scoring performance alongside examiners. 
This study uses a high fidelity, partial task simulation to explore the cognitive 
strategies of the participants and find out more about their decision making, 
judgments and opinions based upon the interaction during the simulation and the 
post hoc reflective discussion. High fidelity refers to the closest approximation to real 
life scenarios, in this study the medical consultation.  Partial task simulation alludes to 
the component of the consultation being analysed, and in this respect, the scope is 
targeted towards to gathering information, diagnostic reasoning, the perspective of 
the participant on those processes, and the influences that might have a bearing on 
these activities. For example, the inclusion of treatment and management options in 
such a scenario would reflect a complete task analysis with high authenticity, but well 
beyond the expertise level of these participants.  
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Table B: Qualities of high fidelity simulation 
Taken from Isenberg et al, 2005. 
1. Feedback is provided during the learning experience  
2. Learners engage in repetitive practice 
3.  The simulation is integrated into the curriculum 
4.  Learners practise with increasing levels of difficulty 
5. The simulation captures clinical variation 
6. The simulation is adaptable to multiple learning strategies 
7. The simulation permits individualised learning 
8. Learning outcome are clearly defined and measured 
9. The simulation is a valid (high fidelity) approximation of clinical practice 
10. The simulation is embedded in a controlled environment 
 
 
Simulation can address and facilitate the learning and rehearsal of basic skills for 
communication and examination, and aid the practice of complex clinical situations by 
integrating basic biomedical knowledge and human interactions into clinical practice.  
These communication sessions illustrate some of the pre-eminent, best evidence 
from Issenberg’s qualitative, systematic review of peer reviewed papers on simulation 
across 35 years (2005), which include the following key points (Table B).This study 
fulfils some of the parameters above even though it focuses upon one case scenario 
and therefore does not capture clinical variation. However, it is a good approximation 
of the interaction that is recognised in clinical practice using an office based setting. 
The participants in this study have already experienced simulation with experienced 
actors on three separate occasions in Year 2 using scenarios such as the ‘angry’, 
‘depressed’, and ‘garrulous’ patient in which to practice specific communication 
strategies in a facilitated, controlled environment with feedback using Pendleton’s 
guidelines (Pendleton et al, 1984). 
50 
 
2.4.3 Educational strategies in simulation 
The broader educational concepts underpinning the typology of simulation 
encompass behaviourism, constructivism, reflective practice, situated learning and 
activity learning (Ker &Bradley, 2007). This study adopts an interpretive, 
constructivist approach in that it seeks to create a central organising theme which 
reflects the thoughts and perspectives of medical students in a simulated 
environment. The reflective discussion following on from the simulation will explore 
beliefs and cognitive structures around the role of making a diagnosis based upon 
their cumulative experiences to date (assimilated experience which is individually 
constructed through multiple realities).  
It reveals their thinking about how they approach the context of the simulation based 
upon limited prior experience, how they handle and process a set of symptoms 
gathered from the SP which illustrates the way they are creating links between 
various features. Such experiences often provoke challenges to existing ideas 
through Transformative learning (Mezirow, 1991; Byrne, 2002; Parker & Myrick, 
2009), affecting both the participants’ and researcher’s views on the role of the 
consultation, data gathering, formulating diagnoses and their views on learning and 
teaching. Video recording of consultations is one such example where both ‘reflection 
in action’ and ‘reflection on action’ can both occur to help restructure thought allowing 
the participant to develop their own learning in a constructive manner for future 
practice (Schon, 1987).  
One of the caveats to learning from simulation arises from the additional cognitive 
load experienced by the participants which may act as an inhibitor in learning. 
Cognitive load theory (CLT) was proposed some years ago to explain the interaction 
between instructional designs and failure to learn (Sweller, 1988; Fraser et al, 2012), 
based upon the idea that working memory may become overloaded during certain 
instances (Miller, 1956). This effect is determined by a number of factors including 
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prior learning and the task difficulty (Intrinsic load), the excessive load created by the 
interaction with the task which impairs learning (extraneous load), and lastly the 
amount of working memory that is taken up with the task (germane load). Simulations 
can heighten the emotional components of the interaction and this may impair 
learning (Alessi, 1988; Rehmann et al, 1995). This may cause additional performance 
anxiety which affects engagement with the task. 
The central component of these simulations is the interaction between the actor and 
the student, including how and why the participant asks certain questions in the 
medical history to gather information, and what has influenced their choice of 
questions and their interpretation of the answers. It specifically addresses one of the 
concerns about analysing and influencing clinical thinking and decision making 
through the process of feedback in simulation studies. This may reduce the impact of 
bias and error expressed through the heuristic model of reasoning (Eva & Norman 
2005). 
Feedback associated with simulation activities can be achieved either extrinsically 
(from the ‘trainer, facilitator, or faculty’) and is usually provided after the event in 
studies based on practising behavioural skills (post hoc). It may be also gained 
through the intrinsic from the conversation embedded in the experience i.e. the 
discussion that the participant has with themselves about what happened, why it 
happened, and actions or thought can be reconstructed through other perspectives 
(Laurillade, 1997). This has resonance in the reflective discussion of this study, 
although not explicitly for feedback per se, rather to construct new meanings of 
events for future practice (Bradley & Postlethwaite, 2003). 
The simulations within this study represent significant themes in medical practice 
including the central competencies of communication and decision making, but also 
reflective practice through the post hoc discussion with the researcher. The research 
method is qualitative and focussed on the cognitive as well as communication 
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skills within the simulated interview, which are barely discussed in either of the 
aforementioned papers. 
Such ideas encompass much of the argument put forward by Eraut in his book 
‘Developing professional knowledge and competence’,  and specifically his 
discussion of learning professional processes (1994:107-115) where he pulls 
together five features of process knowledge, much of which is beyond the skills of the 
novice student as defined by Benner and others (Benner, 1984: Dreyfuss & Dreyfuss, 
1986). These skills include ‘acquiring information, skilled behaviour, deliberative 
processes (planning and decision making), giving information, and metaprocesses for 
directing and controlling one’s own behaviour ‘. These are complex, cognitive 
concepts which are more than just common sense, and this view resonates with 
Ericsson’s general suggestion that it may take as long as 10 years of deliberate 
practice to achieve proficient autonomous practice (1993).  
The participants in this study know the rationale behind the use of the traditional 
medical history (comprehensive, systematic and reproducible), and the basis for 
gathering information from the patient. Exposure to such experiences is limited during 
phase 1, and therefore will probably demonstrate the features of associative learning 
in varying degrees. Only deliberate practice will help achieve the goal of fluent history 
taking which becomes embedded as automatic practice and flexible enough to cope 
with different contexts. 
However, the cognitive stage is more complicated than learning a series of skills or a 
process as the task based approach suggests above. This linear model presents a 
reductionist approach and underestimates the cognitive processes inherent to 
decision making, and similar reservations regarding communications skills teaching 
have been hotly debated (Silverman et al, 2011; Salmon & Young, 2011). Critical 
reviews on the effects of simulation based medical education (SBME) have 
consistently focussed upon behaviouristic studies with measurable outcomes and 
methodological rigour in the acquisition of clinical skills, however gaps in 
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understanding are being highlighted, and this applies to the influences upon cognitive 
aptitude and professional experience  (Issenberg et al 2005; McGaghie et al, 2010).  
Significantly fewer studies have used SPs to examine cognition using an interactive 
reflective discussion to tease out perspectives in decision making (see literature 
review), but SPs do offer valuable opportunities to study problem solving alongside 
synthesis of clinical information (Yelland, 1998). In the postgraduate arena there is a 
growing body of research pointing to the benefits of using unannounced (incognito) 
SPs in real practice (Rethans et al, 2007), although there are inherent issues in data 
collection.  The maximum impact of SPs appears to be in the teaching and 
assessment of psychomotor and communication skills in the undergraduate 
curriculum (Hargie et al, 1998), and it has been suggested that vicarious learning is 
as effective as learning by doing if accompanied by a script for communication skills 
(Stegman et al, 2012). 
High fidelity human patient simulators (HPS) have been utilised to study clinical 
judgment in acute care nursing scenarios, using qualitative methodologies to explore 
decision making and judgments (Lasater, 2007). The role of the ‘debrief’ appeared to 
be the most important feature to examine clinical judgment but sufficient time needs 
to be allowed to facilitate critical reflection and integrate cognitive learning from the 
simulation (Seropian et al, 2004). 
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2.5 The Research Questions 
The aim of this thesis is to develop a substantive theory on how students at this stage 
in their development view the key skill of diagnostic reasoning (DR) by asking them 
to reflect upon their actions and decisions within a simulated consultation. The data 
derived from the filmed consultations and the reflective discussion will provide 
material to observe real time decision making and illustrate the sources of knowledge 
and experience that underpin the diagnostic decisions chosen by the participants 
during the simulation. In contrast to other research studies, it considers the diagnostic 
process from the perspective and experience of the student, rooted in the theoretical 
lens of Symbolic Interactionism i.e. acknowledging that views and interpretations of 
events are influenced by interaction with others, and that data cannot be analysed in 
isolation from knowledge and prior experience (Schatzman, 1991). The key sub 
questions within the study are: 
 
1. What features of a simulated consultation provide most information 
for the student to assimilate and process towards a tentative 
diagnosis? This covers the important area of data gathering from the 
clinical interview and from the provision of examination details pertinent 
to the scenario (if requested by the participant).  
 
2. How is the diagnostic process constructed from the perspective of 
a medical student? 
Students in the curriculum are encouraged to adopt critical reflective 
practice in their undergraduate portfolio as way of improving professional 
development. The participants in this study will be given an opportunity to 
view their own simulated consultation and reflect upon their thoughts and 
actions, and although such filming can evoke some anxiety about 
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performance, it remains a powerful investigatory/learning tool which has 
already been shown in other studies to improve interviewing skills in the 
postgraduate arena (Edwards et al, 1996). 
 
3. What dimensions drawn from the data might provide a more 
effective theory through which we can understand diagnostic 
reasoning at this stage of learning? 
 It is hoped that additional dimensions of thoughts, views, and perceptions 
will be drawn from the participants’ point of view which will enrich the 
current understanding of DR at this stage of development, and which will 
facilitate learning and teaching in the future. 
 
4. How can teaching methods be further developed using theory 
derived from the student perspective?  
 There is a perceived problem around the ‘theory-practice’ gap in teaching 
the cognitive skill of reasoning. Much of what is taught is by definition 
theoretical and many researchers have tried to bridge the gap using 
written case based scenarios e.g. Clinical Reasoning problems (CRPs), 
for use in teaching. Filmed observational studies with a reflexive 
discussion after wards may provide a more powerful medium through 
which to approach the teaching of reasoning. 
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3 Chapter 3: Methodology 
 
3.1 Introduction: Role, Identity, Understanding. 
In order to answer the key research questions posed by this study it is necessary to 
broaden and deepen the discussion to explore some of the fundamental assumptions 
that underpin the reality of human beings and the meaning of things for them. In turn, 
this may illuminate the ontological position from which the reality of the medical 
student can be viewed, which will include their changing role and identity as they 
pass through the undergraduate programme. Becker’s study describes the 
professional assimilation process, albeit from a very traditional curriculum in the USA 
(Becker et al, 1961), which encompasses a number of phases relating to professional 
identity from freshman through to intern, and similar transitions are seen in current 
undergraduate programmes (Diemers, ibid).  
Through the reflective discussions in this study, we are given a chance to look into 
their reality or existence, contextualised through the simulated consultation, and this 
may shed light upon how they view their role and identity as students at a particular 
stage of development (and perhaps the expectations that are placed upon them by 
transitions in the curriculum). This simulation is but one of many encounters in their 
careers which will influence their interpretation of what is meant by being a doctor 
(ultimately), the nature of that existence and the knowledge that surrounds it.  
The study will adopt a constructivist and relativist epistemological position in that it 
attempts to create a picture of the participant’s views and thoughts through multiple 
realities or perspectives (Charmaz in Morse et al, 2009: 138). It assumes the active 
influence with the external world around and a situated participant and researcher, 
acknowledging other influences. It strives to answer the following questions through 
emergent conceptual analysis with the possibility of creating new theoretical ideas; 
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‘What is going on? What is happening in the mind of the participant, what is this 
founded upon, and why?’  
Perhaps this can be illustrated by analysing the medical consultation from an 
ontological perspective i.e. examining roles and identities. In this way, it will also 
provide epistemological ideas on how the medical student acquires and views 
knowledge in general and in particular in the consultation gained through interaction 
with the patient. During a medical consultation particular gestures have great 
significance, for example asking someone to sit down using a hand gesture implies 
that a process has begun and is accepted by both parties, one accepting the role of 
the doctor and another the patient. The relationship started at that point conveys 
meaning to each individual for a period of time, and their reality changes with a 
different set of parameters which may be commonly accepted by the society to which 
that individual belongs. Vocal gesturing is more controllable with greater reflexive 
control, however non vocal gesturing is more problematic as it is difficult to ‘police’ 
our facial responses as we cannot see them (Mead, 1934: 65).  
Accepting or embarking upon the role of a patient has several implications from an 
ontological perspective and necessitates a pluralistic approach where the nature of 
being fluctuates between self determination (the norm) and ‘loss of control’ (The 
Illness Experience, Morse & Johnson, 1991). Control is temporarily assumed by 
another party, in this case a healthcare practitioner whose altruistic characteristics 
are sought and expected. In illnesses of short duration, self determination is regained 
quickly, however with enduring illnesses regaining control may never be fully 
achieved. 
Similarly, the medical student generally accepts that he/she will be expected to adopt 
a new role or self identity during different activities in the taught curriculum.  Each 
new identity has different role parameters, meanings and expectations. Early clinical 
interaction in the curriculum often requires the student to adopt a passive role as an 
observer, watching a more experienced clinician demonstrate various skills. One of 
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the skills most difficultly to convey to an observer  is what you are thinking about as 
an interview unfolds, and reviewing performance is often contextualised through 
defined competencies espoused at modular outcomes e.g. using open or closed 
questioning. Higher cognitive skills are difficult to assimilate and even harder to 
explain when the emphasis then turns from observation towards active engagement 
with a patient. 
A significant change in role and expectation is often associated with the key 
transitions in the medical curriculum, the first being between the pre-clinical period 
(usually the first 2 years in the UK), and the clinical attachments seen in years 3, 4, 
and 5 (Teunissen & Westerman, 2011). The fluency of this transition however, is 
learnt gradually by controlled exposure, by trial and error in safe environments such 
as simulated consultations (Maran & Glavin, 2003).  The emergence of thoughts and 
opinions on diagnostic reasoning is one such transition.  
There is an uncomfortable duality to such simulations in that the student recognises a 
learning situation with educational processes and outcomes (‘please take a history 
from this patient with a view to gathering information, making a diagnosis, 
acknowledging a complaint, etc’). Yet the student is required to adopt a new role or 
identity in steering a consultation towards the defined outcome whilst trying out their 
communication skills (?). The individual’s response to the new situation is partly 
enshrined in the idea of transformative learning, involving the reconfiguration of 
ideas, knowledge and professional boundaries (Mezirow, 1991). 
The interpretation of the meaning of things and events, such as the symptoms 
described within a consultation or the interaction between the parties involved will 
vary for each individual. The reliability of an undergraduate programme relies upon 
the ability to pull together potentially variable experiences into a series of common 
themes which could be viewed as dimensions organised by a central theme (see 
dimensional analysis). The multiplicity of academic and clinical experiences within a 
five year programme of undergraduate medicine contributes immensely to the 
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individual’s interpretation of meanings, and may vary considerable with some notable 
experiences e.g. Cardiac arrests, seeing their first death.  
This description is written from the perspective of a medical teacher, and not a 
student, therefore the danger here is that we may not know that the student’s 
perspective may be. This is where the conceptual approach utilising Symbolic 
Interactionism provides the theoretical framework through which the views of the 
medical student can be analysed. It has been suggested that medical students slowly 
develop cognitive structures which represent illness or disease by forming links 
between biomedical information and clinical information from the consultation 
(Schmidt et al, 1990). These features contribute towards the development of a mental 
concept of the disease in the mind of the student. Progressive exposure to patients 
with the same illness/disease adds to the complexity of this mental concept and helps 
create both the typical pattern for this illness and the more atypical features. These 
are both complex and yet fundamental mechanisms for the student to adopt as part 
of the diagnostic process however, how do they actually achieve these processes 
and are they aware of what they are doing and thinking?  
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3.2 The theoretical framework: Symbolic Interactionism 
The theoretical framework on which the study is based in the field of Social 
Psychology pioneered through the work of a number of prominent theorists including 
George Mead at the Chicago School of Sociology, who adopted a naturalistic view of 
studying human behaviour (Mead, 1934). Their conceptual approach was based 
upon Symbolic Interactionism (SI). This term was later interpreted more effectively 
by Blumer as; ‘human beings act toward things based upon the meanings that the 
things have for them; the meanings of such things is derived from the social 
interaction that the individual has with his fellows, and meanings are handled in, and 
modified through an interpretive process and by the person dealing with the things 
they encounter’ (Blumer, 1969: 2).  
The theory of natural analysis was also viewed merely as an extension of a person’s 
natural analytical processes (Schatzman, 1991), and there is a significant parallel 
between this and clinical reasoning skills. Both listen to a story, consider the 
attributes or features, how they are described and asks questions of what is not 
understood. Both also consider the meaning of the event or interaction with the 
researcher or clinician taking a perspective leading to an explanation or diagnosis. 
One of the fundamental constructs of SI is the mutual interdependence of the 
individual and society, and the social forces at play are just as relevant as internal 
forces within the individual. This incorporates Mead’s comment that ‘humans are both 
determined and determiners’ (Mead, 1932: 77) and behaviour resides within the 
interface between the two. Cooley’s view on the role of interaction is best defined by 
Meltzer who wrote ‘the role of interaction is that of a mediating bond between social 
environments and individuals, and it is this role that must be scrutinized to obtain an 
understanding of the mutual interdependence of these two entities in human society 
‘(Meltzer et al, 1975: 9).  
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The social environment for the participants in the study stems from a number of 
interdependent forces which would include the national and international drivers 
within undergraduate medical education (e.g. Tomorrow’s Doctors, ibid). Locally the 
values and ethos of the medical school as determined by curriculum design for 
example, and lastly the modular activities within different parts of the programme. 
Although this provides context at a macro and meso level in terms of institutional 
decisions and negotiations with teachers providing group work in CR, many of these 
conditions will be unknown to the student cohort. Their conceptualisation of clinical 
reasoning will by necessity be far more basic and centred inwards towards individual 
cognitive skills and tasks, which place this study in the dimensionalisation process 
described by Schatzman (1991, ibid). 
These interactions at various levels contribute towards the received meaning and 
interpretation of medicalised behaviour, including the inherent role of diagnostic 
reasoning. Some of these are explicit in social interaction during the curricular 
activities; others are more implicit or even subliminal e.g. The cognitive skills 
associated with making diagnoses represent one such area of medical expertise 
whereby role modelling can implicitly convey a desirable skill without explicit 
discussion of the intricacies of cognition that ultimately achieve the desired result. 
This would include complicated issues such as disease probabilities, weighting of 
cues in Judgement Theory (Hammond, 1996) and evidence based practice. Strauss 
& Corbin (1990; 165) described the conditions pertaining to any study in their 
conditional matrix, with the global factors in the more peripheral circles, the inner 
circles being relevant to the local conditions and actions. Strauss introduced the 
concept of negotiations to link negotiated interaction at various levels (Strauss 1978: 
77), but felt that many studies merely used these features as descriptive background 
rather than specific influences on the interaction.   
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Mead’s influence in social psychology (and to a lesser extent Dewey) was to move 
the psychological emphasis of the development of the mind away from the individual, 
and relocate it in the social environment.  He introduced the term ‘reflexiveness’ i.e. 
‘the turning back of the experience of the individual upon himself’ (Mead, 1934: 134).  
The idea of ‘self-concept’ was developed by Mead as a continuous interactive 
communication between the ‘I’ and the ‘Me’, the ‘I’ being the reaction to others or 
events in an impulsive, spontaneous human form which is then rationalised in internal 
conversation with the ‘Me’. The ‘Me’ evaluates and interprets in the context of 
interaction with others, before the experience is stored, creating the social self-
comprised of beliefs, attitudes, expectations and ideas (Mead, 1934; Aldiabat & 
Navenec, 2011).The cognitive skills of reflexivity and metacognition can be seen 
clearly as part of this internal dialogue and are reflected in the idea of intrinsic 
feedback in simulations studies. This concept has particular resonance with the 
subsequent work on Transformative Learning (Mezirow, 1991). 
Mead also viewed the perceptive ability of human beings as part of the evolutionary 
continuum (phylogenetic) alongside the development of thinking ability, and that 
perception acted as the mediating process between the individual and the social 
environment (Meltzer, 1975: 32). Both of these statements have current relevance for 
the position of reflexivity in research and reflective practice espoused in 
contemporary medical practice (which is also an integral part of the undergraduate 
portfolio in Phase 1). 
He quotes the term ‘generalised other(s)’ as the component that controls human 
behaviour, both in terms of the ‘Me’ as part of the self concept, but ‘others’ counted 
as individuals, social groups and sub groups. These others share attitudes as part of 
a larger community. Altruism could be regarded as one of these attitudes within the 
caring professions and in the wider population. This point is taken further by Blumer 
who believed that human behaviour is fashioned by the interaction with others (‘joint 
action’, Blumer, 1969: 17), which according to La Rossa promotes self-confirming 
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lines of action and ensures that personal values are not transgressed ( La Rossa & 
Reitzes, 1993). From this Blumer developed the triadic premises of SI: 
1 Humans act towards things based upon the meanings they have for them 
2 The meanings of such things is derived from social interaction 
3 Meanings are handled in and modified through an interpretative process and by the 
person dealing with the things that they encounter 
 
These assumptions have been augmented by Blumer and others to include (from 
Aldiabet & Navenec, 2011): 
4 Humans live in a symbolic world of learned meanings 
5 Humans and society have a relationship of freedom and constraints (La Rossa & 
Reitzes, ibid) 
6 Self concept provides a motive for behaviour 
7 The self is a social construct developed through social interaction with others. 
 
These are all useful concepts with which to view our social interactions and meanings 
of things, however they require some translation and interpretation in the context of 
the world of the medical student to provide some meaning. For the purpose of this 
study this entails considering the meanings between medicalised ideas (e.g. what is a 
symptom?), and the relationship between different ideas (how does risk behaviour 
relate to diagnostic reasoning)? 
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3.2.1 Symbolic Interactionism: What does this mean for the student? 
The power of reasoning linked to language was proposed by Mead as an integral 
feature of human behaviour which involves inferences about relationships between 
things (Mead, 1938: 518). For example, the linkage between a variety of symptoms 
and signs into a recognisable pattern representing an illness (‘Illness script’) is a 
prime example within the sphere of diagnostic reasoning used by experienced 
clinicians. The participants in this study will have only limited clinical knowledge with 
which to link symptoms and signs to biomedical knowledge in creating such patterns, 
and so their tentative ideas may illustrate difficulty in making inferences about the 
relationships between things at this stage of development. 
The language of medicine and its symbolism is another potential constraint to 
behaviour and thought, particularly in the early stages of development at medical 
school. One of the central concepts of SI is the idea of ‘role taking’ which is the 
behaviour resulting from the conversation between the ‘I’ and the ‘me’, primarily 
imagining oneself as seen by others. This approach has been adopted through the 
use of reflective practice within the undergraduate portfolio with the goal of 
encouraging students to step outside of their personal perspective and view 
events/interactions from other viewpoints, including their own role within 
consultations. The wider perspective is of course to develop critical reflection and 
analysis of professional practice (both good and bad) with a view to improving 
professional development and self-regulation (Sandars, 2009). 
The difficulty entering this new world for the novice medical student is emphasised by 
Charon’s comment, ‘moving from one symbolic world to another necessitates the 
learning of new symbols and language’ (1979). However, there is a constant flux in 
the meaning for things because of the constant reconstruction from 
experience and interaction. Thus goals will change from one situation to the next, for 
example, the goal of a simulated consultation in the curriculum (faculty aim) maybe to 
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expose the student to a new problem in a facilitated, safe setting when errors can be 
rationalised (an example of this is found in the clinical practice programme in year 2 
when students are exposed to communication in difficult situations e.g.bereavement).  
Charon’s comments are particularly relevant to the transitions in role and 
expectations during the medical curriculum which applies to the participants of this 
study, being at the first stage of one of the three significant transitions suggested by 
Teunissen & Westerman (2011). 
The learning process encompasses gradual changes in thinking, attitudes, language 
and self concept, and behaviour is gradually shaped through interaction with faculty 
and peers, and resonates with some of Becker’s comments about assimilation into 
the social organisation within medical school as students find their ‘professional self 
image’ (Becker et al, 1961:419). 
Both language and reasoning ability are fundamental issues in the diagnostic process 
whereby the use of particular phraseology almost creates another language through 
the basis of medical jargon. This can be viewed as an inclusive group activity through 
which doctors make sense of specialised terms and learn how to convey information 
in a succinct manner; or it can be viewed as an exclusive group activity which creates 
a cocoon of identity (joining a club). Immersed in technical terms often derived from 
other languages (Greek and Latin especially) the language of medicine becomes one 
of the primary tools in group interaction and conveys meanings for things that the laity 
have difficulty engaging with or indeed understanding. 
Where does that place the novice medical student trying earnestly to engage with 
new terms and meanings, particularly in clinical practice where human behaviour 
poses so many contrasting problems? Blumer views group life as a ‘process in which 
people meet in different situations, indicate lines of action to each other and interpret 
the indications made by others’ (Blumer, 1969: 52). He goes further in suggesting 
that this process is dependent upon both individual interactions but also between 
collectivities e.g. medical schools, universities. There may be an overarching 
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collective approach for example to patient centred care, however how each student 
interprets this ethos comes from a series of interactions with both teachers and those 
in professional practice, influenced by contact with various patients. This will never be 
a uniform experience and diagnostic reasoning ability is one such example.  
This interaction is dynamic, as students learn about their new world, develop 
perspectives and share experiences. Thus, their views on the role of the diagnostic 
process will change with time through the course and beyond with individual 
constructing some sense of meaning for ideas and terms, then reconstructing or 
adjusting those premises based on further interaction i.e. a social constructivist 
approach (Charon, 1979). 
 
Reflexive Memo:  
Individual reasoning ability is said to be very idiosyncratic with poor transference into 
other domains of practice (Elstein et al, 1978), and Blumer’s comment on self indication 
help substantiate this variability. What meaning of a patient’s differential diagnoses 
does the individual student take away from teaching in the skill suite or at the bedside? 
It cannot possibly mean the same thing to each member of a teaching ward round 
unless every intricacy of the history, examination, management and treatment is taken 
into account. How can prior teaching on the cognitive skills involved in diagnostic 
reasoning create a more definable group meaning without so much variance??This is 
the ‘raison d’être’ of many studies in reasoning-we know human judgment is fallible but 
how can we make it better? 
 
Human interaction is mediated by both interpretation and symbolism (e.g. cultural 
norms) and as Blumer also suggests this mediation process sits between the 
stimulus and response in human behaviour (ibid: 79). This applies not only to 
interaction between humans but is directed towards the ‘self’. There are countless 
situations which are recognised in everyday life such as arguing with oneself, 
rationalising and excusing one’s actions, making compromises, etc, etc. ‘Acting 
towards oneself’ is argued as a central process that gives rise to meanings and 
actions towards things and is termed self indication. 
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This is part of the ‘making sense of the meaning of things’ and its mere description 
implies a very individualised cognitive process that cannot necessarily be subsumed 
into broader psychological concepts, however can be aligned into a group action, and 
this is where teaching can facilitate the group action towards specific subjects such 
as reasoning. 
During the filmed consultations and reflective discussions, self indication and 
interpretation of an event (the simulation) will be uppermost in the mind of each 
participant as they search for a line of action within the consultation based upon the 
information that they have gathered. They may not recognise this as taking place 
however the position of the researcher will be to facilitate opening up the internal 
dialogue of each student focussed around their views on decision making and the 
diagnostic role. 
Finally, one of the key questions arising from this study is what is meant by a 
diagnosis? In grammatical terms, this word represents a verdict, opinion, or 
judgement however the implications of these various terms are significant for both the 
clinician and patient. What does this term mean for the fledgling medical student 
grappling with a multifaceted concept sitting in front of a patient for the first time? Any 
number of alternatives may be suggested from an experienced doctor’s perspective 
(and the researcher), which might include the solution to a patient’s problem, a 
medicalised term applied to a patient’s problem, a ‘catch all’ pattern representing a 
disease, or an alternative within a competing list of solutions. However, all of these 
alternatives are immersed in the individualised experiences of the doctor/researcher 
and none of these may mean anything to an inexperienced medical student making 
the first steps towards autonomous decision making. 
 
The next section discusses the methodological approach adopted by the study i.e. 
dimensional analysis (DA). This one of the 2nd generation variants derived from 
‘classical’ Grounded Theory Method (GTM) which emerged through slightly different 
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interpretations of the original theory proposed by Glaser & Strauss in 1967. The link 
between the interpretive position of symbolic interactionism and GTM is strong, and 
relates back to the philosophy of the Chicago School of Sociology in that attempts to 
understand behaviour, interpretation and thinking , thereby making it a natural choice 
to use for this study. 
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3.3 Grounded Theory Methods 
It is clear that the views, opinion, perspectives and experiences of the participants in 
this study are paramount towards the creation of a theory which explains how they 
perceive the skill of diagnostic reasoning, immersing this study firmly in the qualitative 
research paradigm. This places the participant’s view or standpoint foremost in the 
research process whereby the researcher’s interpretation of their perspective is 
critical to the analytical process (Denzin, 1978). The dimensions or attributes derived 
from the data reflect the meanings of things for the participants, primarily linked to 
decision making in the simulated setting in this study.  
Grounded Theory was established by Glaser & Strauss in 1967, primarily in response 
to the recognition that qualitative studies using natural analysis were not 
systematised or rigorous. Since that time, further interpretations/variations have been 
developed and these are encapsulated by Morse in Figure E (Morse, 2009: 17). The 
emergence of these variant forms of the original concept (which is now called 
classical grounded theory), have been grouped into four periods by Benoliel (1996); 
the discovery decade (1960-70), the development decade, (1970-80), the diffusion 
decade (1980-90) and the diversification decade (1990-1996), although further 
development has emerged since.  
Different positions have been adopted by various subsequent researchers in the field 
who have contributed to the corpus of knowledge and techniques arising from 
classical Grounded Theory, many of whom had worked under the tutelage of Glaser 
& Strauss. These enhancements or progeny have created a family of methods under 
the umbrella of GTM, some preferring to recognise three main forms (Glaserian, 
Strauss & Corbin school and Constructivist GT) yet others list seven versions (Denzin 
in Bryant & Charmaz, 2007: Ch 21). 
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Figure E: Genealogy of Grounded theory (adapted from Morse, 2009) 
 
 
 
Dimensional analysis (DA) is one such variant, although it cannot be considered as 
a standalone approach to analysis without first immersing its beginnings in the 
emergence of the Grounded Theory technique (GTT) which relies upon the constant 
comparative process. DA is ascribed to the thoughts of Leonard Schatzman who 
collaborated with Strauss using grounded theory technique before his own ideas 
gradually emerged (Schatzman in Maines, 1991).  
Grounded Theory Method (GTM) utilises a systematic, inductive and comparative 
approach to conducting enquiry as a way of developing theory (Bryant & Charmaz, 
2007:1). This means that emergent data arising from a case must be compared with 
similar properties arising within other cases, and if enough cases exhibit the same 
properties (theoretical saturation) then this may contribute towards creating new 
theory.  
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Hood suggests that three features are core to GTM, (1) theoretical sampling, (2) 
constant comparison of data to theoretical categories, and (3) focus on the 
development of theory via theoretical saturation of categories (ibid, ch 7). The 
similarities between GTM and Dimensional Analysis lie primarily in the constant 
comparative process and the cycles of induction and deduction used within an 
interactionist view of social psychology. However, there are differences in 
interpretation as well, illustrated by Glaser’s reaction to some of these variants. He 
concluded that in common with Strauss & Corbin’s departure from classical GTM 
published in 1990, Schatzman’s approach by implication was similarly flawed through 
the ‘forcing of data’, although others would argue that this merely acknowledges the 
impact of the researcher on the emergent data (Glaser, 1992: 94; Mruck & Mey in 
Bryant & Charmaz, 2007: 581).  
The argument against ‘forcing data’ was to integrate rigorous memo-ing with 
sufficient reflexivity and critical reflection to address this issue, thereby forcing the 
researcher to safeguard their methodological rigour. The issue of reflexivity has 
become a debate within itself across many disciplines. Opinion varies according to 
the field of application, however a shared tenet is enshrined by Steier as ‘turning back 
on one’s own experience’ with a self critical focus, or in a methodological setting, ‘to 
take account of their own relations to the groups they study’ (Steier, 1991:2; Lynch, 
2000). The outcome is to ensure that the researcher does not bias the empirical data 
with his own perspective or agenda whilst remaining blind to other emergent 
characteristics. 
GTM (and DA) are reliant upon the cognitive skills of cycles of Induction and 
deduction as part of constant comparative technique, illustrated in Figure F 
(Richardson & Kramer 2006). The original viewpoint in GTM was that theoretical 
concepts in the mind of the researcher should be set aside. However, as Kelle points 
out, ‘an open mind does not mean an empty head’ (Kelle in Bryant & Charmaz, 1995: 
Ch 9), and this analysis leads to the position of abduction as a form of reasoning in 
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both grounded theory and dimensional analysis. Abduction can be regarded as the 
creative insight that generates working hypotheses, and that creative insight or 
inference does not originate from an empty head, but relies upon ideas and general 
concepts that might be adapted to suit the context (Coffey & Atkinson, 1996). The 
analogy between this premise and the role of Scheme Inductive Reasoning in 
complicated medical cases is quite apparent, whereby general schemes or 
frameworks of approaching problem-solving can be applied to different scenarios to 
act as a catalyst for ideas.  
 
Figure F: Constant Comparative Process: Iterative cycles 
 
 
Using specific, singular forms of data from interviews for example, induction moves 
from the specific to extrapolate the conceptual category or dimension. Deductive 
reasoning moves from the general concept back to specific instances and is used for 
iteration to reduce fixation error risk (focussing on one particular solution or concept 
when further new data suggests competing ideas). There is a clear analogy between 
this process in research and the discussion of diagnostic errors in probability, 
including anchoring or conservatism, the anchor being the subjective starting point of 
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diagnostic probability before the features of a case are presented (Edwards, 1968). 
Similarly, the tendency to seek more and more tests that confirm a hypothesis, rather 
than using discriminatory tests that rule out alternatives is called confirmation bias 
(Wolf et al in Dowie & Elstein, 1988: Ch 17). 
Abduction comprises both the rational and imaginative form of inference (insight) 
required to develop theory, and is the step beyond simple induction and deduction 
required to create new knowledge/ideas. The first description of abduction can be 
found in the writings of Charles Peirce on logical inference as he tried to capture the 
final step when making sense of material that does not fit with pre-established 
categories i.e. insightful creation (Peirce, 1878; Strubing in Bryant & Charmaz, 2007: 
589). This skill is developed through natural analysis and problem solving learned 
through social interaction in early life (Schatzman in Maines, 1991: 305). By this, he 
meant that scientific enquiry was a natural extension of an individual’s natural 
analytical processes, and this reflects the natural (and variable) ability in clinical 
reasoning attributes seen in expert clinicians. It seems entirely logical to assume that 
researchers’ facility in using GTM applied to their data express the same variance in 
scientific ability. With progressive experience in both spheres, analysis should 
become more sophisticated.  
Natural analysis is akin in many ways to the linked skills narrative reasoning and  
interactive reasoning which constitute the pervasive human activity to make sense of 
their world as a form of meaning-making (Bruner, 1986; Benner et al, 1992; Fleming, 
1991), of particular importance in clinical medicine when listening to patients’ 
stories/histories. Bruner described this as the capacity to ‘read other minds’ and 
includes the interpretation of actions, speech, motives and the inferences drawn from 
such experiences. However, such reasoning is prone to considerable misjudgement 
and error particularly with unfamiliar social environments where the meaning of action 
may not be immediately apparent. 
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3.3.1 Dimensional Analysis 
The foundations of Schatzman’s ideas in developing DA can be seen in a book 
written with Strauss called ‘Field Research, Strategies for a Natural Sociology’ 
(Schatzman & Strauss, 1973), although the preface makes it clear that Schatzman 
was the primary source. At this time, research based upon naturalistic enquiry was 
perceived by some as a less rigorous method of scientific analysis with theoretical 
explanations of events under scrutiny that lacked an explicit approach in the 
analytical process (Bernstein, 1985). Such criticism is acknowledged by the authors 
of one of the most notable studies on student culture in medical school ‘Boys in 
White’, relying upon observations from field work pulled together under the guise of 
‘what is ordinarily vaguely referred to as qualitative analysis’ (Becker et al, 1961: 30). 
The authors go on to say, ‘the methods of arriving at conclusions have not been 
systematised and such research has often been charged with being based on insight 
and intuition and thus not communicable or capable of replication’. 
One of the authors of this book, Anselm Strauss recognised the challenge to develop 
a more robust analytical approach to such sociological theory and joined forces with 
Barney Glaser, culminating in the publication of their grounded theory method (ibid), 
based upon constant comparative analysis used in a structured and robust manner 
towards developing theory. Strauss came from the Chicago School of Sociology and 
was influenced by Blumer and Symbolic Interactionism (SI). Strauss invited Glaser to 
become involved in a study called ‘Awareness of dying’ at UCSF where he was 
working at the School of Nursing to develop the first doctoral programme for nurses, 
and this paper become their first collaboration (1965). 
Robrecht suggests, ‘grounded theory method stresses that the theory must come 
from the data, not prior knowledge, and that the operations leading to theoretical 
conceptualisations must be revealed’ (1995).  One of the key terms describing this 
methodological process is the insistence that prior knowledge or preconceptions are 
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laid aside during data analysis and the formation of codes.  Data is derived from the 
phenomenon being studied and through rigorous analysis and interpretive 
procedures a theory may emerge –the emphasis being trusting in emergent theory 
rather than the imposition of received theories (Strauss & Corbin, 1990: 20-23).This 
assumes that the researcher can conduct data analysis and subsequent 
categorisations independent from prior learning, experiences and social construction 
of ideas.  
The received impression of grounded theory is sometimes at odds with the 
discussion in Chapter X1 from Glaser & Strauss’ original book which expands upon 
Insight and Theory Development. Insight is what we would commonly refer to as 
reflexivity and reflection upon prior experiences, and feeds into the important issue of 
memoing to maintain a clear perspective of the influence of personal beliefs about the 
area of research being studied. To paraphrase the writing and apply it to the 
researcher’s domain (clinical teaching), the principle insights came from personal 
experiences as a teacher and doctor, but some are based upon subsequent 
theorising, and reflection upon earlier experiences (ibid, 252). A further comment 
suggests that Glaser & Strauss were already leaning towards a broader concept of 
grounded theory, ‘a third corollary pertains to how fruitful insights can be gotten from 
existing theory’ (ibid, 253). Yet they also sound a warning that adhering to existing 
theory will often stifle emergent ideas. 
Merriam (2001) suggests that all research is linked either implicitly or explicitly to the 
researcher’s view of the phenomenon being investigated, and theories relate to 
academic discipline or professional application (Passmore, 1997). As Schatzman 
clearly articulates, ‘Rarely if ever do we abandon prior theoretical or methodological 
anchorage’ (in Maines, 1991: Ch 17). Theoretical anchorage cannot be merely 
jettisoned for the purpose of any study and is an ever present feature of professional 
experience. Table C (section 3.4, p80) on memos and reflexivity illustrates the 
recognition of the various influences upon my position during the early phases of data 
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analysis, enabling me to understand my theoretical anchorage and how this was 
reflected in my interrogation of the data. This is illustrated in parts of the reflexive 
memo below: 
Schatzman’s comment about anchorage relates specifically to his experience of 
working with nursing students at the University of California (UCSF) using 
comparative analysis.  ‘Their comparisons proceeded on the basis of prior 
assumptions and understandings about the nature and variable importance of these 
considerations’ (in Morse et al, 2009: 92). What Schatzman recognised was the 
impact that these assumptions made on the analytical process but had not been 
identified by the comparative analysis associated with grounded theory and the 
dimension of experience was what was missing from the whole process (Schatzman, 
1991). His contribution was therefore to acknowledge that anchorage or relative 
position in terms of the researcher and making adjustments for the individual’s 
perceptual filter was an implicit part of the analytical process. 
Schatzman went beyond the parameters of classical grounded theory and expanded 
the range of analytical skills to include 
• Forming dimensions or characteristics using comparative analysis 
• Assigning value to these dimensions-those that have significance beyond others  
• Recognising the embedded beliefs of the researcher through professional experience i.e. 
the interaction with the researcher or the ‘dimension of experience  ... ....perspective both 
limits and directs analysis and also .........directs organisation of relationships’ 
(Schatzman in Morse, 2009: 93). This makes the tacit processes involved in grounded 
theory more explicit. 
• Making inference about dimensions and the relationships between them to develop 
theory 
In contrast to Strauss, he also suggested that comparative analysis be delayed until 
enough data had been collected to generate enough dimensions so that 
theoretical/premature closure was avoided. In effect, he was saying keep an open 
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mind for long enough to understand ‘what is all involved’ alongside the emergence of 
a central organising dimension or key linkage as it was first described (Schatzman & 
Strauss, 1973: 111). 
In scientific natural enquiry such as DA the tendency to fixation error can be 
minimised through theoretical saturation of the data, re-challenging and verifying the 
dimensionalising process through iteration and constant memo-ing through which 
ideas are hypothesised and extrapolated. DA relies upon cycles of induction and 
deduction using the constant comparative process to realign dimensions or themes 
(Figure F, p72). Theory in DA is constructed from a pragmatic, relativist position in 
that emergent ideas are then compared with subsequent data through several 
iterations and compared with the current literature base and theoretical concepts in 
the field. This separates it from classical GTM which adopts a positivist or objectivist 
stance where the observer is apparently neutral, free from context and any pre-
conceptions (Charmaz, 2006, 130-132). 
The researcher using dimensional analysis is not neutral and is situated with pre-
existing knowledge and perspectives where truth is conditional. Several 
interpretations of action may arise from the data which remains fluid in the early 
stages until the cycles of induction and deduction can create the beginnings of the 
explanatory matrix. Through each iteration the perspective on the data may shift as 
theoretical sensitisation refines the relevance (or not) of each dimension within the 
explanatory matrix. Perspective determines both the selection of dimensions and the 
relationship between them, either from the researcher’s viewpoint or the participant’s 
representation of the issue being studied.  
The researcher extracts and labels data which gradually builds a picture comprised of 
large chunks of similar data that represent a specific characteristic or attribute, called 
a dimension. Tabulated data is built up across participants to line up these 
characteristics and subsequent data analysis may conflate or confound such 
properties. Such cross referenced comparators eventually start to build a larger 
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picture based on working hypotheses which are proven or realigned by amalgamating 
the data sets from each participant. As Robrecht suggests the researcher adopts a 
perspective or viewpoint from an interpretavist position on the information (Robrecht, 
1995: 169-177). She goes on to describe the process of examining the dimensions 
arising from the data, accepting some and rejecting others until the most prominent 
dimensions begin to take precedence to provide a more effective theoretical position 
with a central organising dimension at the core. 
These working hypotheses become less literal and more theoretically mapped 
through differentiation and analytical abstraction. The ‘final’ phase is integration of 
dimensions into an explanatory matrix which should be justified by revisiting the data 
again (deduction) to maximise theoretical rigour through reflexive analysis. This will 
be discussed in Chapter 5 using themes from the data. 
Reflexive Memo:  
Yet again, the remarkable similarities between the theories of reasoning and natural 
analysis resonate in my mind. I had not anticipated this as my understanding of the 
field of both natural analysis and dimensional analysis up to this point was incomplete. 
The parallels between the domains are making the comparisons easy to draw out and 
are beginning to underpin the deeper knowledge and understanding that I have for the 
study overall. I realise that my expertise is growing slowly and the domain appears to 
suit the analytical side of my personality, but there are occasions I need the help of 
conceptual levers to propagate the analysis. 
Two experiences recently have provided some evidence of progression. Last week I 
met up with one of my fellow doctoral students who will probably use GTM in her 
study, but couldn’t analyse which theoretical framework would provide the foundations 
for her study. We talked about SI and the similarities between our two studies, however 
the significance was in my (new) confidence & ability to analyse her approach and give 
constructive advice. Later on one of my work colleagues asked me about what I was 
doing at this stage of my writing. The answer (I felt) was concise and clear, couched in 
terms that I think she understood for someone not accustomed to this domain of 
research. Is this merely a case of ‘See one, do one, teach one’ or evidence of deeper 
understanding. 
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3.4 Reflexivity and Memos 
Schatzman recognised the potential impact of the embedded beliefs of the 
researcher through professional experience i.e. the interaction with the researcher or 
the ‘dimension of experience  ... ....perspective both limits and directs analysis and 
also .........directs organisation of relationships’ (Schatzman in Morse, 2009: 93). With 
this statement he was reiterating a clear message originating in Glaser’s warning 
about ‘forcing data’ inferring a cause of potential bias (Glaser, 1992), yet he also 
appeared to acknowledge the potential benefit. His statement is immersed in Mead 
and Blumer’s work on symbolic interactionism i.e. ‘the researcher must be aware of 
their own meaning for things derived from years of both professional and educational 
experience impressed by various cultural norms’ with groups such as teachers and 
patients. It is a warning for the researcher to acknowledge their self concept and the 
internal conversations which may influence ideas and perspectives, including the 
interpretation of data within the study. This ‘reflexive stance’ is explicitly 
recommended in constructivist GTM which would consider the position of the 
researcher as core with memos as a key function (Charmaz, 2006: 189). 
Schatzman’s comment reflects the duality of this argument in that embedded beliefs 
can both limit and direct research. This view is shared by Strauss & Corbin who 
equally adopted a more positive stance on reflection and reflexivity than Glaser who 
regarded the researcher as the ‘neutral knower’, recognizing that researchers can 
build upon their personal and professional perspectives and to become aware of the 
impact it may have on data interpretation (Corbin in Cisineros-Peubla, 2004). This 
again emphasises the counterbalance required between reflexivity and abductive 
thought that define dimensional analysis compared with classical GTT. 
There exist a number of interpretative stances for reflexivity however they all share 
the underlying idea of recursive ‘turning back on one’s own experience’ (Steier, 
1991:2), which include Lynch’s methodological reflexivity underlining the concept that 
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research students ‘take account of their own  relationships to the groups they study’, 
and this has great resonance for this study (Lynch, 2000:29).  
 
Table C: Early prompts and memos reflecting issues of reflexivity 
 
Researcher question 
 
Memo-mixed types 
(Discussing the examination 
findings) “...starting with the key 
material (PA). 
 
Original analytical memo: Procedural elements of 
examination without being able to target expected 
findings exemplifies lack of clinical experience. 
 
Subsequent analytical and reflexive memo; 
Key features approach and weighting ideas-this 
reflects my stance in teaching-that there are key 
features in a clinical case that become apparent-this 
may not be the case for the novice student who will 
not be able to differentiate between strong features 
and weak one in the history or examination. 
 
“Go through your ideas of what 
was wrong with this lady? So what 
was top of your mind, your leading 
diagnosis?” (PC) 
 
Original analytical and reflexive memo: 
Assumption that they have made a diagnosis. There are 
some personal beliefs that I clearly hold which I have to 
set aside sometimes, almost akin to Husserl’s idea of 
‘bracketing’ (suspending prior assumptions and beliefs). 
 
Subsequent reflexive memo; my inference that there 
are also competing diagnoses and that the 
participant has formulated ideas from the 
simulation on a diagnosis 
 
“How does that help you with what 
you were thinking earlier? (PC) 
 
(Asking about how examination 
data influences prior thinking from 
the history). 
 
Original analytical memo: Leading question towards the 
examination clarifying the diagnosis: the term help may 
not apply! 
 
Subsequent reflexive memo: Assumption that extra 
information from the examination actually helps 
refine the diagnosis based upon the history alone 
 
 
Reflexivity is viewed by some as enhancing objectivity in the methodological process 
(Lynch 2000: 26), and Table C illustrates how this was used during the data analysis 
to highlight some of my theoretical preconceptions which acted as a blocking 
mechanism whilst trying to develop the preliminary dimensions from the simulation 
material. 
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To acknowledge this perspective early in the data analysis process became a pivotal 
point to maintain objectivity and rigour in the subsequent analytical process, 
particularly during deductive iterations of the data to substantiate some of the 
inductive dimensions (Kennedy & Lingard, 2006). This was amply illustrated by the 
lack of saturation concerning the ‘theoretical coat’ of knowledge deficits mentioned by 
only two participants during their reflective discussions. 
During the early stages of the data analysis when inductive ideas were at a premium, 
and pedagogical anchorage appeared to be acting as a blocking mechanism, it was 
suggested that I should examine the way in which my prompting questions were 
phrased. I looked at what the relevant memos were saying at the time, and how my 
perspective might have shifted (using data from the first five participants).   
At this point it was useful to remind myself of Patton’s comments: ‘good questions in 
qualitative interviews should be open ended, neutral, sensitive, and clear to the 
interviewee’, and not present one’s own perspective, thus potentially biasing the 
findings (Patton, 1987; 2002). This became a salutary reminder of my views on 
clinical reasoning and demonstrated the need for greater reflexivity. 
This prompted a theoretical shift towards issues such as knowledge organisation in 
the subsequent data analysis, and away from my subjectivity immersed in 
consultation behaviour and the reasoning literature. The memos associated with this 
shift illustrate movement from speculative and apparently unconnected comments 
towards a greater coherence as some of the properties were conflated into significant 
dimensions. They also reflect the change in researcher position and the internal 
dialogue of a researcher’s mind as raw data is labelled with conceptual labels whilst 
exploring and theorising about emergent patterns (Strauss & Corbin, 1990: Ch 12; 
Lempert in Bryant & Charmaz, 2007: 245-247).  
 
Memos are both part of methodological practice but also are the cornerstone of 
developing theory from data using increasing levels of abstraction (Charmaz, 2006). 
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They are the distillation process towards developing theory and conceptualise data in 
narrative form (Lempert, ibid). Glaser was quite clear about the impact of memos and 
described them as the ‘bedrock of theory generation’ (1978: Ch 5), and he described 
five goals of memos: 
1. Raising data to a conceptualisation level. 
2. Developing the properties of each category which begins to define it 
operationally 
3. Presenting hypotheses about connections between categories and/or their 
properties 
4. Beginning to integrate these connections with clusters of other categories to 
generate theory 
5. Beginning to locate emergent theory with other theories with potentially more or 
less relevance*. 
(*This last goal aligns Glaser’s ideas with those of Schatzman on dimensional 
analysis, although this chapter of the book Glaser adds a footnote to say ‘he indebted 
to Odis Bigus for many ideas’, begging the question whose thoughts are these? 
However, in Chapter 3 of Theoretical Sensitivity firmly rejects Schatzman’s views on 
selective sampling). 
 
Retrospective analysis of my memos illustrate a journey of increasing complexity in 
commentary from the initial, naive analytical memos immersed in consultation theory, 
towards memos scripted over a year later where the central dimensions are 
embedded in the central organising theme. Earlier memos were more descriptive, 
lacked depth and analytical complexity. The subject matter was often overtly 
medicalised as if a teacher was looking over a pupil’s performance. However, some 
memos on the ‘first pass’ through the data started to explore some of the concepts 
that would ultimately emerge from the data analysis e.g. participant A’s comments 
about gathering information: 
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“I suppose there is so much information coming at you at once you want to organise it 
a little and take it one at a time instead of trying to do everything at once, and forgetting 
important details and also you want to cover all the posts and I find it helps with 
structure, just to have it there” (PA). 
 
Research Memo: Organisation of information and mind-see ‘structural theory’ and 
revisit ideas on ‘Working memory’-organising function? 
 
This is probably one of the first significant comments from the first simulation that 
both reflects the respondent’s voice illustrating the complexity of the task from her 
perspective (the very essence of this study), but also the researcher’s voice 
formulating an idea about knowledge organisation through an analytical memo, rather 
than focussing on the teacher’s voice concerned with consultation theory. 
The theoretical memo from July 2012 exemplifies two aspects of the use of memos, 
firstly as a form of inductive thought in that conflation of the cognitive attributes of the 
data analysis was moving theory forward, and secondly that there was a feeling of 
‘coming together’ that provided a reflexive and positive emotional component(there 
was a ‘eureka’ moment): 
 
Theoretical Memo (July 2012) 
‘Conflation of the cognitive attributes became a fundamental stepping stone in the DA 
process at this stage of the analytical journey. There was a feeling of ‘coming together’ 
between the various properties in the data and the relationships between various 
smaller properties started to line up more effectively. I found myself returning to the 
same theme time and time again, that of knowledge organisation and adaptation which 
appeared to provide a suitable umbrella term for the properties in the data. Could this 
be the central organising concept?’ 
 
Secondly, it acted as an operational note in terms of jogging the memory to revisit the 
data to assess whether was enough saturation about knowledge deficits in the 
participants’ simulations (Strauss & Corbin, 1990: ibid). This was a key move in that 
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the theoretical idea of epistemological insecurity was not saturated by data, and 
therefore remained an abductive, theoretical thought without significant instantiation 
in the raw data. 
 
Operational Component to Memo (July 2012) 
‘Equally this was also a period of revisiting the data in deductive mode to substantiate 
the ideas of ontological security and its epistemological foundations. There were only 
two participants who made explicit comments about the role of knowledge in the 
simulation, which although clearly relevant, did not sufficiently saturate this idea. 
Accordingly revisions in the data analysis chapter were made regarding the impact of 
knowledge deficits.’ 
 
If memos act as the cornerstones for developing theory, extrapolation of these ideas 
found true expression in diagrams and figures, and reflects a tendency to resort to 
visuo-spatial representations of data. Pulling together data into diagrammatic 
representations often acted as a catalyst for conflating properties in the data, 
particularly the cognitive properties that appeared so diverse to begin with. However, 
the major caveat to the use of flow diagrams is the linearity in the representation of 
parts of the data analysis which were often far from linear, particularly the inductive-
deductive cycles involved in the constant comparative process. 
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4 Chapter 4: Methods 
 
The conceptual focus of this study is to build theory from the ‘perspective of the 
medical student’ using Dimensional Analysis as the methodological approach, with 
Symbolic Interactionism as the theoretical lens. Data was analysed from filmed, 
simulated consultations between 3rd year medical students and a standardised 
patient (SP) using a case scenario of dyspepsia i.e. something seen commonly in 
practice and covered already in the curriculum (see 4.1). The case scenario was 
created to provide a fairly typical picture of dyspepsia encompassing at least four risk 
factors with enough ambiguity in the case to encourage competing diagnoses.  
The participants were attending the introductory module for year 3 ahead of clinical 
rotations on the wards. This module provides a brief recap on core skills learnt in 
Phase 1, with augmented teaching on skills useful in the hospital environment. At this 
stage of the curriculum, there is a key transition between facilitated practice in Phase 
1, and more stand alone exposure to patient contact in Phase 2. A rehearsal study 
took place in April 2011 to prepare procedural elements for the study and to improve 
sensitisation to some of the methodological issues associated with DA, including 
familiarisation with the generic prompts. It also acted as an introduction to writing 
memos which became a significant learning point. Filming took place in the Media 
Laboratory in The Checkland Building, University of Brighton.  
 
The formal study took place from September –November 2012, and was comprised 
of four stages (all filmed); 
1) Filmed simulation between participants and SP (the researcher was present but 
was physically separate from the process quietly writing memos). Once the 
participant has acknowledged that they had spent enough time taking the history the 
SP departed. 
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2) The researcher sat down with the participant to ask about the diagnostic opinions 
based upon the history alone. 
3) Once the participants had completed their diagnostic discussion, they were 
allowed to ask for further information based upon physical signs from the case 
descriptor; information was released only in response to their specific questions. 
Once given this information they were asked to revise their diagnostic thoughts based 
upon the history and examination. 
4) Stages 1-3 were then recorded onto a DVD (2-3 minute gap) and the simulation 
was played back. The participants were allowed to stop the recording to reflect upon 
their thought processes and decision making at various points in the process. The 
researcher could also stop the simulation to ask generic prompts in the same manner 
to encourage discussion. The prompts were focussed upon the participant’s 
perspective unless the participant opened up the discussion to talk about specific 
issues, allowing the researcher to ask questions that are more specific e.g. if the 
participants mentioned mnemonics specifically then this area was explored further. 
 
The filmed account of the reflective discussion was inset with the original simulation 
DVD to allow timings/events to be cross referenced. Data analysis was subsequently 
drawn from the simulation (Stage1) and the reflective discussion between the 
participant and the researcher (Stages 2, 3, and 4). Filmed material was kept under 
lock and key with only the researcher and the two supervisors allowed to observe the 
simulations for analytical purposes. 
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4.1 Standardised Case Scenario 
Standardised patients (SP) provide high fidelity simulation and reflect the closest 
approximation to real life events during medical consultations, particularly those 
examining clinical method which include communication and consultation skills 
(Elstein et al, Ch 3, 1978). They were first introduced by Barrows & Abrahamson in 
the secondary care setting, and have subsequently been used in undergraduate 
teaching as well as in the assessment of general practice consultation skills including 
those arriving as unannounced patients in real practice (Rethans et al, 2007; Jha et 
al, 2009). 
An expert panel approach was used to create a scenario that would reflect a medical 
condition that would have been covered in the curriculum and that was common in 
practice. Expert panels are used in setting the standards for both face and content 
validity in several contexts, particularly in high stakes certification (Hutchinson et al, 
2002). Standard setting was achieved through an expert-judgement approach 
involving four expert GPs each with over 20 years of clinical experience in primary 
care and who were actively involved in teaching students at this stage of professional 
development, including the researcher. This expert group peer reviewed the actor’s 
role descriptor and changes were made by consensus opinion.  
The scenario involved a case of episodic upper abdominal pain which would 
represent a typical dyspeptic picture. It contains a number of predisposing and 
aggravating factors in the medical history such as anti-inflammatory drug use for a 
chronically painful knee (ibuprofen or ‘Nurofen’ TM ), smoking, excessive alcohol 
intake, work relate stress, and overindulgence in certain food types ( Appendix 4). 
The descriptor was suitable for either gender with minimal adaptation (there were no 
urinary or gynaecological symptoms), and two actors were involved in the filming 
(one male and one female of the appropriate age group). Both actors worked from 
the ‘Playout’© group who have contributed to undergraduate simulation for over 8 
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years. They were sufficiently experienced in role play and using standardised 
scenarios to provide an accurate portrayal of the case even though potential exists of 
variation in practice-this was not seen in any of the simulations (Tamblyn, 1991).  
Instructions in the descriptor indicated that ‘they should remain polite, interactive but 
not to provide too much information too quickly’ i.e. driven by the participant’s 
questioning (who would be able to piece together the information from the questions 
evolving from a full medical history). It was added that they should appear to be in 
pain occasionally through the simulation. The presenting complaint i.e. starting 
complaint would be ‘severe pain in the stomach’. The case includes an overall 
concern that although this pain is thought to be indigestion, it appears far worse than 
the actor would expect, and this coupled with a family history of ischaemic heart 
disease (father has had a ‘bypass’) has prompted more concern. Such components 
are based upon teaching to elicit underlying ‘ideas, concerns, and expectations in 
sharing and understanding of problems (Pendleton et al, 1984). 
 
The SPs were instructed not to reveal concerns unless directly asked by the student 
in order to maintain some consistency in responses.  There was enough ambiguity in 
some of the aggravating factors to challenge history taking skills, particularly 
clarification of symptoms and risk factors. It was hoped that such ambiguity would 
open up the possible differential diagnoses that exist with a case of epigastric pain, 
particularly for gall stone disease (fatty food component) and pancreatitis (alcohol 
intake), whilst still remaining relevant to prior teaching and biomedical knowledge in 
the curriculum. 
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4.2 Ethical considerations 
The central tenets of ethically responsible research concern informed consent 
(exercising autonomy, voluntary participation and knowledge of the risks and 
benefits), These tenets include protecting people from harm (non-malificence), 
confidentiality, and mutual trust between the researcher and volunteers (adapted 
from Silverman, 2006: 315-323; Good Clinical Practice in Clinical Trials, Medical 
Research Council, 1998). Ethical clearance was granted through the Research 
Governance and Ethics Committee of the medical school; ref 11/040/SCO (see 
Appendix 6). 
One of the primary issues with a study of this type is the impact of insider research 
upon the relationship between the participants and the researcher, considered as the 
potential ‘power dynamic’ in the study. This brings into play both mutual trust and the 
voluntary nature of participation in the research process, rather than any perceived 
pressure to become involved to please a member of faculty. Inside knowledge of 
organisations and the members thereof confers a ‘status set’ including a sense of 
authority, social status within the hierarchy, and access to privileged knowledge e.g. 
examination results (Merton, 1972: 11-22).  
Merton discusses the two competing doctrines of ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ research 
comparing different views contextualised by issues such as gender, race and 
position. Using an extreme example from research into racial groups, one 
commentator states that outsider research is not credible using the statement, ‘whites 
are basically incapable of grasping black realities’ (Wilson, 1974: 324). This assertion 
may have some truth in it; however, it is generally not that simple and would ignore 
the powerful impact that some ethnographic studies might have in creating differing 
perspectives which contribute to creating negotiated views.  
Shah argues that social insiders are better positioned ‘because of their better 
knowledge of social patterns of interaction required for gaining access and making 
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meaning’ (2004: 556). Access is generally more easily gained to specific groups, 
however awareness of theoretical and social anchoring are paramount in 
counterbalancing the insider position through greater reflexivity.  
There are some delicate dilemmas that pervade insider research.  Conversely, some 
would argue that Informant bias may contextualise responses with this caveat, 
‘known or expected alignments or loyalties are crucial to the way in which an 
interviewer is perceived’ (Powney & Watts, 1987:40). In other words although this 
study does not explicitly use an interview process, the diagnostic discussion may be 
framed by prior knowledge and interaction between a teacher and a participant i.e. 
‘they are influenced by who they think you are’ (Drever, 1995: 31). This premise is at 
the heart of symbolic interactionism. This can only be mitigated in part through 
adequate signposting at the start of the study. 
Griffiths suggested the insider as ‘someone whose biography gives them a lived 
familiarity with the group being researched’ (1998; 361), and this would partly include 
the prior relationship as a module leader with the participants. Any familiarity must be 
set aside in the research process thereby attempting to exclude one component of 
the ‘status set’ described above. The recruitment process was modified to take 
account of this during the initial contact period and the Participant Information Sheet 
included a statement to create distance between the researcher from any prior 
function or interaction in the curriculum. Indeed the premise that participation in this 
research might inform future teaching and contribute to development of the 
curriculum could appeal to more altruistic tendencies (and move it away from 
assessment processes).  
It was important at the consent stage for this study that the relationship between the 
researcher and the potential participants was redefined explicitly, and that there was 
no component of assessment taking place within these simulations. The primary 
focus was to find out what they were thinking and for them to explain this wherever 
possible, and not to express what they might think I would like to hear (as a teacher 
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previously involved with their education). Equally, it was important to remind them 
that knowing more about their views on the diagnostic reasoning process would have 
potential benefits, not least for themselves in a reflexive manner but also from the 
perspective of consultations skills (Edwards, 1996; Mezirow, 1991; Bradley, 2007).  
 
Ethical considerations for any research study means creating conditions that are right 
for the research participants, based upon values from within the research community 
and school (Illing in Swanick, 2010: 295). In a filmed study such as this informed 
consent, confidentiality and anonymity are paramount. It is imperative that volunteers 
are reassured that their identity is protected, and what will be entailed in volunteering 
for the study. This includes advice about the benefits of filmed simulations for the 
individual and their development, but also issues regarding performance or 
withdrawal from the study (see excerpt from PIS in Appendix 2).  
 
The problem of performance anxiety or distress over perceived mistakes in 
consultation technique or diagnostic ideas will be addressed within the debriefing 
period, if requested by the participant. This is fundamental to the feedback process 
from an ethical perspective in mitigating negativity from a bad experience. It has been 
reported that the increased intrinsic cognitive load associated with complexity created 
 
 
Excerpt from Participant Information Sheet: 
 
‘What are the potential benefits in taking part? 
Similar studies using simulated consultations have shown that participants improve in their 
consultations skills as result of their involvement, and a deeper insight into decision making 
improves diagnostic skills. 
 
What if I have any concerns over my performance? 
There will be an opportunity to undergo a debrief session with the researcher should you 
wish to address any concerns over your performance. Your involvement is not being 
assessed and is not part of your degree at BSMS. 
 
What if I want to pull out of the study? 
If you consent to being part of the research, you nevertheless retain the right to 
withdraw at any stage should you so wish. This will not affect your progress  in the 
undergraduate programme. 
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through any simulation may compromise learning, but also that high extrinsic 
emotional load (e.g. decreased tranquillity in diagnosing a heart murmur) may also 
have the same impact (Basu Roy & McMahon, 2012; Fraser, 2012).  
The simulation in this study will have a high intrinsic cognitive load but the emotional 
load was minimised in a tranquil setting. It was also stressed beforehand that 
achieving the correct diagnosis was not the aim, and no assessment of this process 
was considered. It was all about ‘how their mind was thinking’ and how this impinged 
upon creating viable diagnoses. The whole experience was introduced and 
constructed as a positive experience for the participants (which implicitly promote the 
valuable internal and external dialogue about the simulation). This includes the ability 
to diagnose issues of performance for themselves when filming is involved (Laurillard, 
1997; Festa et al, ibid).  
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4.3 Recruitment of participants 
Recruitment of volunteers for the study took place during the summer in 2011 after 
the examination results from Phase 1 were released in July (Figure G). Timing was 
influenced by two key factors. Firstly, a natural transition point in the undergraduate 
curriculum during a summer recess following completion of the full eight modules that 
comprise Phase 1(Years 1 and 2). Secondly, it was imperative that students whom 
might volunteer for the study perceived no relationship between this study and 
subsequent progression or indeed assessment in Phase 2 of the course (Years 2 & 
3) commencing in September 2011. 
My position in the medical school as Module Leader for the Clinical Practice Modules 
in Phase 1 means that I am juxtaposed between a role as a researcher and an 
assessor in the curriculum, therefore the recruitment process took place as the 
students embarked upon year 3 of the curriculum, where I have no involvement in 
assessment. A reflexive dynamic may still exist during the reflective discussion in 
terms of a perceived ‘power relationship’, however every effort was made to distance 
the research study from progress within the undergraduate programme. An explicit 
statement in the Participant Information Sheet (PIS) reassured participants that 
withdrawal from the study was permissible without sanction. 
Initial contact was made through an email to the relevant student cohort who had 
successfully completed Phase 1 studies from a member of the faculty administration 
who had no direct involvement with the study. This email suggested that interested 
parties should contact the researcher directly by email if they were interested in 
volunteering for the study. In this way there was no perceived pressure to agree to 
participate in the study from the researcher as a member of faculty, in order to 
circumnavigate some of the potential ethical and methodological issues involved in 
insider research (Labaree, 2002). 
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Figure G: The Recruitment process 
 
 
 
The ethical principles developed by the MRC recommending Good Clinical Practice 
in Research were followed (MRC, 1998). These included the issues of confidentiality 
and anonymity within the medical school and the university at large. The Participant 
Information Sheet (PIS) was sent electronically to the volunteers ahead of the 
simulation, allowing time for prepared questions on the process. The volunteers of 
were explicitly reassured about both of these issues and that the filmed simulations 
would be viewed only by the researcher and one supervisor, who is not a member of 
the medical school faculty, and would not be used for teaching purposes in the future.  
12 volunteers agreed to take part in the study and filming took place during 
September, October and early November in 2011 using the media laboratory. Three 
volunteers subsequently failed to turn up for the simulation. 
Following completion of the simulated consultation every participant was offered a 
‘debrief’ after the reflective discussion, in line with the findings from systematic 
reviews of best practice in simulation studies (Isenberg et al, 2005). These endorse 
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the importance of feedback within simulation and the conversations embedded within 
the interaction that stimulates construction of new ideas (Laurillade, 1997; Parker & 
Myrick, 2009). Extrinsic feedback from the researcher was provided after filming had 
stopped if requested by the participant (2 cases), and serves to temporise fears over 
performance anxiety and making errors. It is recognised that reflection upon 
performance may occur either a) at the time of filming (reflection in action), or b) by 
watching the recording back (reflection on action) immediately after the discussion, or 
c) sometime after the event (Festa et al, 2000). Therefore participants were asked to 
contact the researcher if they wanted to review the simulation at a later stage (none 
used this offer). 
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4.4 Rehearsal Study 
The rehearsal study took place in April 2011 using two volunteers with two explicit 
aims in mind: Firstly, as a novice researcher using a form of grounded theory it was 
important to sensitise myself within dimensional analysis including memo writing and 
ideas of conceptualisation.  This issue formed the focus of some of Schatzman’s 
deliberations about what was involved in analysis, what the researcher actually did, 
and how researchers learn to do analysis (Bowers & Schatzman in Morse, 2009: 87-
88)? This was most pertinent to a researcher coming from a different discipline. 
Secondly, to formalise, practise and work out the optimal timing schedule the 
recording of the simulated consultations in the media laboratory. This included 
familiarisation with the facilities in the media laboratory and to plan the film schedule 
with the media technician. Both of these outcomes were realised with significant 
benefits to the final study later that summer. 
 
Three participants volunteered for the rehearsal, two students from the 2nd year 
undergraduate cohort and a transient member of the academic staff acting as a 
reserve -an F2 (Foundation year 2) attached to the department of Primary Care. The 
volunteers were taken through the Participant Information Sheet (PIS) and consented 
to being involved in the rehearsal, with the knowledge that involvement in the 
rehearsal would have no impact on current studies or progression in the programme, 
and would of course mean that they could not participate in the final study later in the 
summer. All agreed to this process and found the participant instructions clear and 
unambiguous. 
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Benefits and outcomes of the rehearsal: 
1. Participant scheduling 
One student volunteer withdrew one week before the filming so the reserve was 
utilised (F2). Two participants completed the rehearsal simulation and subsequent 
reflective discussion with the researcher on film. Each simulation and discussion took 
approximately 60-70 minutes to complete including time to record onto DVD, 
suggesting that the final study would require several days of filming to complete. The 
value of the feedback during the ‘debrief’ off camera was also endorsed by 
discussion with the two participants, particularly with the undergraduate volunteer 
who was keen to be reassured about her consultation skills during the simulation.  
 
2. Memos and notes 
One of the earliest lessons derived from the rehearsal study was the difficulty of 
making ‘first pass’ memos during the simulated consultation. Memos are the 
distillation process towards developing theory and conceptualise data in narrative 
form (Lempert, ibid), however it was quite apparent that early attempts at analytical 
memos during the rehearsal were extensively immersed in consultation behaviour 
and technique which subdued abduction. Bowling suggests that the analysis of 
observational studies should begin after a time has elapsed when the ‘reactive 
effect’ has worn off, thus reducing the real chance of for bias in the interpretation of 
events (Bowling, 1997:321). A time delay between recording and transcription 
allowed enough reflection upon events, and in particular, the realisation that first 
pass memos were of limited value.  There was also acknowledgment of the impact 
of my presence upon the participants’ behaviour during filming of the simulation, 
known as The ‘Hawthorne effect’, although this is known to erode with time 
(Roethlisberger & Dickson, 1939; Clark & Bowling, 1990).  
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Glaser was quite clear about the impact of memos and described them as the 
‘bedrock of theory generation’ (1978: Ch 5), but research naivety was a fundamental 
issue at this stage of the study. Resolution of this problem became an evolutionary 
process during the following 12 months as ideas of reflexivity and acknowledgement 
of pedagogical influences were recognised. 
3. Filmed simulations and discussion. 
Using the visual medium for analysing simulated consultations employs a mixed 
methods approach of both observational analysis, and semi-structured prompts 
which stimulate discussion about how and why the simulation evolved in a particular 
way. This reflects the potential complexity within these social interactions in terms of 
verbal and non verbal cues. It also enables the reflexive analysis of communication 
practice and decision making from different perspectives, including the risk prone 
dimensions of thoughts and actions associated with clinical practice (MacDougall, 
2006; Carroll et al, 2008). Video has been utilised in studies of social communication 
within healthcare as an instructional and reflexive medium (Jeffers & Guthrie, 1988: 
Latvala et al, 2000). It provides visual feedback derived from interviewing patients 
and performing clinical skills, including the cues associated with dynamic negotiation 
in teams which are not available in text based studies (Coiera, 2000). Video 
feedback has been used successfully as a communication teaching intervention in 
postgraduate settings focussing upon core skills such as listening, questioning, 
responding to patients’ emotions, and building rapport (Roter et al, 2004). 
The psychological fidelity of this type of simulation requires both preparation and 
feedback to facilitate learning and subsequent discussion. It is acknowledged that 
the participants go into role during simulation in a situation of ‘suspended disbelief’ 
(Ker & Bradley, ibid), in addition to the anxiety associated with performance on 
camera when it is known that the emotional load created by simulation may inhibit 
learning and performance (Fraser et al, ibid). Coming out of role is usually 
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recommended for the purpose of feedback, particularly if the SP is being used to 
provide feedback. The decision making role created within this study will be 
breaking new ground for the participants, who up to this point in the curriculum have 
been asked to gather data and/or examine only. This creates an added burden of 
responsibility with the attendant performance anxiety and affective learning 
recognised in all experiential activities such as simulation (De Maria et al, 2010; 
Yardley, 2011).  
This places more emphasis upon the feedback process in simulation, and in this 
case the debrief mechanism should the participants need it. Moreover, it means that 
the generic prompts used in the reflective discussion are flexible enough to bring out 
areas of discussion or concern, whilst not appearing to force any issues. In this way 
the integrity of the data collection process is maintained, the dialogue is open and 
transparent to external review, and rigour is evident (Benner et al, 1996: 351-358). 
One of the learning points from the rehearsal study was to become more 
accustomed to the use of open questions/prompts, and so for the final study care 
was taken in setting the tone of the diagnostic discussion without leading questions 
or appearing to justify their diagnostic choices. In this way, the explanations about 
what was going on in their minds at various stages in the simulation were 
encouraged in their own language. Technical or theoretical language was avoided 
unless introduced first by the participants, and then the researcher was allowed to 
ask for an explanation of their meaning.  
4. Learning about data analysis 
Perhaps one of the most significant issues which became apparent during the 
rehearsal and subsequent analysis was the subject of researcher position and the 
use of the term ‘neutral knower’ (Bryant & Charmaz, 2007: 247), which illustrates the 
tensions between classical GTT and some of the subsequent interpretations of 
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grounded theory, particularly Dimensional Analysis. The original work of Glaser and 
Strauss (1967) gave little consideration to the role, position, and experiences of the 
researcher within the data collection and analysis. This very point became an obvious 
issue during the rehearsal as I became aware that my analysis and interpretations 
were clearly not neutral (and also not knowing as a novice in this domain) and heavily 
influences by pedagogical perspectives and my role at the medical school.  
Early memo writing during the simulation focussed heavily on consultations skills, 
merely commenting upon the use of a generic framework for subjective complaints 
like pain (SOCRATES mnemonic) and the degree of flexibility to depart from the 
traditional medical history format demonstrated by the 2nd participant (F2 Doctor). 
There was a memo to Benner’s work on the novice ‘being reliant on guidelines’ 
(1984), which confirms the lack of neutrality in my position in adopting a grounded 
theory techniques approach, however Schatzman would no doubt regard this the 
inevitable retention of  prior theoretical anchorage (inMaines,1991:306).Subsequently 
this reflexive memo was added with the insight of retrospection:  
Reflexive Memo: 
May 2011.  
There was no depth in the analysis of the rehearsal compared with subsequent memos 
in the final study (unrealistic expectations?). The lens of symbolic interactionism was 
entirely clouded at this point in time. The frustrations experienced by novice 
researchers in early data collection became all too obvious. Emergent theory was 
waiting to jump out at me (or so I thought), and the individual chunks of data stood 
splendidly alone in isolation without any links to start piecing together towards some 
semblance of thematic analysis. 
 
The second attempt at analysis of the rehearsal began with a template using four 
perspective prompts adapted from Strauss and Corbin’s work on axial coding (1998), 
those of Interaction, Meaning, Action towards, and lastly Language and Reasoning. 
The idea of the template was to develop more avenues of thought using themes 
within Symbolic Interactionism, however this manoeuvre can be seen retrospectively 
as trying to ‘force the data’ (Glaser, 1992), or by others as a conceptual lever. Clearly 
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the insecurity created by the lack of coherent analysis forced the adoption of a coding 
mechanism aimed at linking initial coding (specifying the properties and dimensions 
of a category) when constant comparative analysis had not occurred with enough 
cases, or indeed enough depth of analysis. Supervision repositioned this process and 
analysis from the rehearsal study took on far more meaning. The memos below 
reflect my thoughts at the time. 
 
Reflexive Memo (June 2011) 
‘Shifting Perspectives’ 
There are no doubt salient moments in any research project and in the development of 
a skill set, in this case my tentative foray into data analysis for the first time. It might be 
entitled ‘a sudden realisation’ as it happened in the space of 45 minutes of supervision 
looking at the rehearsal study in May 2011. 
I am fortunate that the ‘Be Prepared’ motto is a mantra that somehow stuck with me 
into adult life. Without organisational foresight it would be impossible to deliver the 
modular learning throughout the academic year. I recognize it as a strong feature in my 
character which in general yields positive ramifications, and this certainly applies to 
academic study. There are draw backs of which I am aware-occasional inflexibility in 
the face of sudden changes and the sense that too many changes create subdued 
panic at times! 
However, back to the positives as it is much easier to reflect upon changes with a 
positive outlook. At the time of the RPA and Ethics approval I was planning the 
rehearsal study to immerse myself in some data collection and iron out any issues in 
the method (filming).A technical hitch during the first rehearsal fully justified this 
decision and the second rehearsal using a F2 doctor went to plan thereafter. This data 
was used in supervision.  During the first stand alone analysis, I realised that my 
perspective was purely pedagogical, appeared very superficial and wondered how I 
was ever going to develop some substantive material to utilise for the project. 
Analytical memo: 
Avoid leading questions during the reflective discussion-stick to more open ended 
prompts unless the participant has opened up the subject matter for discussion. There 
is too much of a diagnostic slant, and a tendency to interpret actions of the participant 
rather than let them explain.  
In future: Must ask ‘why’ more. Ask participant to explain and defend decisions. 
 
102 
 
4.5 Theoretical Sampling of the literature 
Novice researchers using grounded theory for the first time has often been advised to 
leave sampling of the literature until the very end of the analytical process, trusting to 
emergent themes only arising within the data and not allowing preconceptions to be 
limited by engaging the literature in advance (Bryant & Charmaz, 2007: 176). The 
idea of ‘naïve empiricism’ (‘entering the research process with an empty head’) has 
largely been discounted as it is impossible for researchers to jettison professional and 
experiential anchorage (Pelle in Bryant & Charmaz, 2007:194; Schatzman in Maine, 
ibid). Early theoretical sampling runs the risk of premature closure on properties in 
the data (the same as premature closure in diagnostic reasoning), both in terms of 
sampling the data collected but also in sampling from the literature base (Charmaz, 
2006: 106-7).  
Yet being familiar to some degree with the relevant literature may provide orientation 
i.e. guide analysis rather than limit it.  Being aware of pre-existing concepts may 
heighten theoretical sensitivity i.e. the ability to generate ideas and theorise, however  
preconceptions may interfere with interpretation and the confirmatory evidence may 
be poorly scrutinised as a result (Dey in Bryant & Charmaz, 2007: 175). Reflexivity 
has been vitally important to recognise the potential impact of pedagogical and 
professional anchorage during the early stages of data analysis, yet theory has acted 
also as a conceptual lever on some occasions, moving conceptualisation forward e.g. 
Glaser’s coding families (Glaser, 1978: 81; Strauss & Corbin, 1987).  
 
It was important to sample the literature for comparable studies in the field of 
simulation and to find out whether any of these studies were employing qualitative 
analysis, either as classical grounded theory or versions thereof (such as dimensional 
analysis). As a result sampling for similar simulation studies was performed ahead of 
the study. The yield of comparable studies was very low (Table D), except for one 
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very illuminating study on using DA amongst nurses dealing with acute confusion in 
the elderly (McCarthy, 2003). This study provided a broader idea of the type of 
conceptual vision that would be required to move my own study away from 
pedagogical immersion, and thus acted as a conceptual lever, opening up the 
avenues for theorising. However, most simulation studies utilise a quantitative design 
method with a focus upon measurable competencies and skills, with passing 
reference to cognitive skills and transformative learning in the theoretical sense. Such 
papers acted as background material to Decker’s typology (ibid). 
In the domain of CR where much of the literature was already familiar, an explicit 
decision was made to maintain awareness of the newest publications in case they 
provided a different perspective with which to interrogate the data. Several review 
papers were useful in providing the historical aspect to research with the inherent 
shift from information processing models through to the knowledge organisation 
paradigm, and subsequently dual process theory. Conceptual links immersed in 
studies linking  the potential benefits of reflective practice and the accuracy of 
medical diagnoses in complex cases were uncovered after the data analysis had 
been completed, but nevertheless provided a useful avenue for theorising  (Mamede 
et al, 2008). The sampling of research papers on the experiences of the key 
transitions in medicine was performed after the data analysis after the substantive 
theory had already emerged. These papers were subsequently valuable in providing 
some resonance with some of the findings on creating context and the data gathering 
role.
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Table D: Theoretical Sampling
Theoretical Sampling of the literature 
Review and Search Strategies 
Search Engine Databases searched Search Terms Results Filters Results (2) 
Proquest 
(Dialog Datastar) 
Australian Education 
Index, British 
Education Index, ERIC 
Medical Decision Making AND 
Grounded Theory (S15) 8 Peer reviewed  
Proquest “ Diagnostic Reasoning AND Dimensional Analysis (S10) 0 Peer reviewed  
“ “ Decision making AND Dimensional Analysis (S11) 25 Peer reviewed  
“ “ Clinical Reasoning AND Grounded Theory (S7) 4 Peer reviewed  
“ “ Diagnostic Reasoning AND Grounded Theory (S6) 1 Peer reviewed  
“ “ Decision making AND Grounded Theory 224 Peer reviewed  
      
“  Reasoning or decision making AND Simulation  [Medicine or Nursing] 3 
EBSCO PsycINFO Reasoning or decision making AND Simulation Studies  
[Healthcare or Medicine] 
Full Text and Peer reviewed 8 (2 relevant) 
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Search Engine Databases searched Search Terms Results Filters Results (2) 
 “ British Nursing Index Simulation 44 Full text and Peer  reviewed  
Proquest British Nursing Index 
Simulation studies  
AND PUB.exact [Journal of 
Nursing Education’] AND 
decision making 
144 Full Text and Peer reviewed  
“ AEI, BEI, ERIC 
High Fidelity patient simulation 
AND [medicine or nursing or 
physiotherapy] 
 Full Text and Peer reviewed 18 
 
      
Proquest AEI, BRI, ERIC 
Standardised patients AND 
[medicine, nursing or 
physiotherapy]  
20 Peer reviewed  
“ “ 
Standardised patients AND 
[cognition OR reasoning OR 
decision making] 
3 Peer reviewed  
“ “ Inference AND reasoning OR decision making   [Medicine and Nursing] 6 
EBSCO host 
CINAHL plus with full 
text, PsycINFO, and 
e journals 
Standardised patients AND 
diagnostic reasoning 3 Peer reviewed One relevant 
“ “ Standardised patients AND cognition   
[Medicine and Nursing] 
Full Text 1 
 Medical Education Simulation studies with actors AND medical education 129 Full text and Peer reviewed  
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5 Chapter 5: Data Analysis 
 
 
The following section illustrates the methodological process of Dimensional Analysis 
using the key components of labelling, collating properties of the data across 
participants, sorting these into concepts or dimensions, and the formation of a 
central organising perspective which generates the theory that explains the 
phenomenon being explored.  
An example will be taken from the data analysis concerning the cognitive strategies 
used by participants to illustrate both the individual components of the process, and 
the journey involved as a researcher as the process evolved and different properties 
emerged. Cognitive strategies emerged as one of the significant dimensions in the 
analytical journey and subsequent explanatory matrix; however, the same data 
analysis process was equally applied to the other properties that will feature in the 
case findings in Chapter 6. The various representations of the data analysis and 
ideas in this chapter are not necessarily the final perspective and more often are 
examples of ‘work in progress’, expressing cycles of induction and deduction in the 
constant comparative process.  
Within this chapter there is an acknowledgment of my professional anchorage 
expressed through a growing sense of reflexivity as a novice researcher using 
dimensional analysis for the first time. In addition, the valuable contribution of 
conceptual levers will be discussed e.g. coding families (Glaser, 1978), and how 
they created different perspectives with which to interrogate the transcript data. The 
influence of these concepts will illuminate the data analysis process and the gradual 
emergence of ideas. 
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5.1 Key Stages in the process of data analysis 
Schatzman identified the processes within Dimensional Analysis that can be 
represented by the points paraphrased below (in Maines, 1991; 303-313):  
 
1) Labelling bits of data that contribute to the whole process (multiple 
components), akin to functional coding these are the parts, attributes, or headings 
which may ultimately give ‘critical mass’ to various dimensions within the data. 
2) Comparing this data across cases and expanding into various attributes which 
are abstract concepts called dimensions through an iterative cycle of induction and 
deduction involving a constant comparative process. These dimensions have 
various properties which coexist in a relationship aligned by the dimension itself. 
3) Collating multiple dimensions which ultimately explain the social process 
under scrutiny and provide the explanatory matrix with themes which explain 
context, conditions, processes and consequences. 
4) Determine what the central perspective is and analyse this with respect to 
context, conditions, processes and consequences (ordering the data). 
5) Revisit data to achieve theoretical saturation until a central organising 
perspective emerges which explains the relationship between the key dimensions 
(Integration). 
 
Differentiation involves expanding or conflating dimensions of the data and defining 
the relationship between them, and in this study perhaps the most significant 
findings have emerged in the area of cognitive strategies.  
In order to reach an explanation of the whole process bits of data are labelled or 
given designations, which will be illustrated below by utilising the example from the 
data analysis (Table E in 5.2). As the simulations were being transcribed short 
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analytical memos were added to the relevant sections and highlighted for 
subsequent analysis. These start life as the multiple components of the process but 
are expanded into various attributes of the whole process by the researcher’s 
interaction with the data, which ultimately create the increasingly abstract concepts 
or dimensions (Kools et al, 1996). In parallel the labelling process helps illuminate 
the decision making processes as the data was collected and ordered under various 
headings.  
As Schatzman comments the interaction between the data and the researcher 
borrows from the researcher’s experiences and theoretical anchorage, compared to 
classical grounded theory which trusts ideas to emerge purely from the data 
(Schatzman in Maines, ibid: Robrecht, 1995). As discussed in the previous chapter 
this is where DA is assumed to depart from classical GTT espoused by Glaser, 
however during the process of data analysis there were occasions where Glaser’s 
ideas helped considerably with theoretical sensitivity, specifically the use of his 
coding families as conceptual levers (Glaser, 1978). The process of DA is therefore 
reliant upon the fundamental concept of reflexivity which acts to remind the 
researcher as to their perspectives, personal beliefs and experience. Reflexivity will 
be discussed later in this chapter. 
 
Reflective Memo (March-April 2012) 
The descriptions in this chapter provide some illumination to the evolutionary 
processes involved in the successive iterations of the data, starting with a 
perspective which was heavily influenced by professional anchorage, the literature 
base, and pedagogic fixation. Initially the data sets from the simulations swallowed up 
any power of natural analysis and I felt only inertia in the research process without 
any energy to respond to encouragement from my supervisors. ‘Find another 
perspective, another angle or view point, with which to interrogate the data’, were 
their words. Schatzman’s comments about complexity in the analytical process 
diverting the researcher away from generating theory were apposite. Some of the 
dimensions were in front to my face but I couldn’t make sense of them, never mind fit 
them into some overarching explanatory matrix.  
 109 
 
The change came about trying to engage with the concept of theoretical sensitivity 
and in a sense, challenging my professional and pedagogic foundations. What I had 
previously written about in the methodology section now began to make sense and 
had clear relevance to the data and emerging dimensions. Creating some distance 
between me and the data began to provide clearer, more globalised theoretical 
concepts in my mind and explaining this to fellow research students and work 
colleagues allowed me to clarify those conceptual ideas which will be explained in the 
next section. 
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5.2 Labelling and differentiation within the data analysis.  
The most significant dimension of the data which arose from exploring and 
analysing features of the transcripts was concerned with the cognitive mechanisms, 
and this became the first composite term to describe a number of strategies 
employed in the simulation by the participants during the early iterations of the data.  
Table E provides an example of the opening section of one simulation illustrating 
the how the data was labelled and how it reflects my interaction with the data at that 
point in time.  
Each simulated consultation and reflective discussion was transcribed verbatim by 
me, watching for non-verbal cues to support what was said on film. Notes and some 
analytical memos were written during the initial transcription (first pass), but the 
more effective interaction with the data sets occurred during a more reflective review 
of the simulations which provided better objectivity and a salutary reminder of how 
anchoring in the clinical reasoning domain could influence the analysis.  
 
It also helped to acknowledge the potential influence of the generic prompts in the 
reflective discussion on the participant responses. In fact, memos and field notes 
written during data collection (i.e. whilst watching the simulation) were heavily 
influenced by focussing upon consultation features and pedagogical anchoring 
(‘watching my ex pupils grappling with the simulation and seeing how they 
performed’), to the point where notes became counterproductive and in retrospect 
they restricted abductive thought. 
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Table E: Illustration of the labelling process 
 
The excerpt in Table E is taken verbatim from PF’s transcript 53 seconds into the 
simulation, after a simple introduction and the opening statement from the actor 
about the problem he is experiencing. The labelling process at this early stage 
reflects my pedagogical interaction with the data as a simple interpretation of the 
process unfolding from the simulation. 
The labelling process appeared to give rise to two properties in the data; firstly on 
the individual features of the SOCRATES mnemonic (highlighted in bold type), 
which were well demarcated in the transcript i.e. Site, Onset, Character, Radiation, 
Associated features, Timing, Exacerbating features and Severity. Secondly, 
Conversation between Participant F and Actor 
(A) 
(after the actor had given his opening description 
of the problem) 
Labelling Process 
 
P; Can you tell me a little bit more about the pain? 
 
A;  I guess it started out as a deep seated ache and 
now it’s getting a lot worse, gradually over the last few 
days and nothing seems to shift it. 
 
P:  (nods) Ok and you say it’s just around here 
(motions to lower chest/abdomen)? 
 
A;  Yeah just around here (motions again to upper 
stomach) 
 
P; And you said it’s come on the last few days, 
how many days exactly? 
 
A;  This is day 5 (P writes down this) 
 
P; How did it come on, slowly or quite quick? 
 
A ; Erm, we were at a wedding that’s when I noticed it, 
we were eating, drinking, usual sorts of things you do 
at a wedding reception, and it was shortly after the 
meal that I noticed it. 
 
P; (nods) And it’s gradually got worse....and can 
you describe the character of it? What sort of word 
would you use? 
 
 
A; I would describe it as dull, deep seated ache 
      
 
Label; open question about pain 
 
Label; onset of pain and 
character 
 
Label; Clarifying question about 
site of pain. Acknowledgement 
through nod. 
 
Label; Site of pain 
 
Label; Clarifying question about 
duration of pain 
 
 
Label; Onset of pain 
 
Label; Onset and context with 
associated features e.g. food 
and drink 
 
Label; return to character of 
pain and temporal nature. 
Acknowledgement and further 
clarification. 
 
Label; Character 
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alongside these features were data associated with consultation skills used by PF 
(italics). Consultation skills included the use of clarifying comments, 
acknowledgements or facilitation of the actor’s complaint (e.g. non verbal cues such 
as nods), and looping back to revisit subjects previously discussed either to elicit 
further information or to confirm understanding (looping could be viewed as cycling 
in Glaser’s terms?). The latter skills are all described in terms of developing rapport 
which is taught behaviour within the curriculum (Kurtz et al, 2005: 47). 
This stage of the analysis illustrated Schatzman’s comments upon research 
students ‘being naturally inclined to work from substantive metaphors and 
paradigms drawn from their own experience or prior knowledge’ and the resonance 
in my memos and comments is evident (Schatzman in Maines,1991: 305). My 
interaction with the data at this early stage illustrates two themes heavily reliant 
upon pedagogical foundations, and subsequent development required significant 
leverage using other conceptual ideas. 
At this juncture, there was little abstraction involved in describing these properties of 
the data and the analytical process appeared uncomplicated. Theoretical sampling 
across cases revealed that these two properties of the data populated every single 
case providing theoretical saturation. Comparison across cases confirmed that all 
the participants used the features of the mnemonic strategy to collect information 
about the problem, and indeed they were using this within the structure of the 
traditional medical history i.e. theoretical saturation. 
 
What did this labelling process tell me and was there anything else in the data that 
corroborated why this was happening?  The problem at this point was the restrictive 
influence of pedagogical anchoring (consultation parameters) which impaired my 
ability to think inductively about the broader meaning of the two mechanisms. I had 
to step back from the data at this point and think about what these two properties in 
the data actually represented. The analytical memos associated with this stage 
 113 
 
reveal that the use of the TMH format was viewed as a separate property from the 
mnemonic in the first iteration of the data (and was labelled thus). It slowly became 
evident that both were clearly being used as heuristic devices for working memory. 
Changing the perspective of how I viewed these properties began cementing the 
relationship between the TMH format and the mnemonic strategy acting as 
sequencing mechanisms. This became one the key analytical steps towards 
identifying the strongest dimension within the analysis.  
 
Memo:  
Whilst struggling with the data analysis and watching the reflective discussions with 
each participant I was drawn to the recurring nature of my prompts. Alongside a 
tendency to ask leading questions in some of the early discussions and the 
subsequent adjustment in the way that questions were versed (critical reflection?) 
was the realisation in the gulf in perception between the participants’ views on the 
role of history taking and my own.  
It became apparent that some of their views focussed purely on the history as merely 
gathering data as a perfunctory process to complete without making any mistakes, 
but with little thought to forward diagnostic thought. This realisation re-centred my 
understanding of their developmental position and my expectations of their decision 
making capabilities (=transformative learning). In addition, it changed the presentation 
of my introductory lecture on clinical reasoning for the year 2 cohort which took place 
during the data analysis. Some of the more theoretical ideas were dropped from the 
presentation, focussing more on the basic interaction and thought processes 
illustrated by a filmed consultation. 
The data analysis had informed my perspective on where they were situated in terms 
of early diagnostic reasoning which should be one of the prime outcomes for a 
professional doctorate. 
 
The first conceptual lever was to view them as memory devices rather than as 
separate consultation mechanisms (trying to move away from my professional 
anchorage). The second lever that shaped this process was to view the data using 
Glaser’s coding families (1978: 74-82), particularly those of process, ordering, 
chains, shaping and cycling (Figure H). The combination of these two analytical 
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viewpoints initiated the conflation between the first and second iterations, with the 
idea that both contributed towards organising the data arising from the simulation. 
By adopting some of these coding families with which to interpret the data provided 
a stepping stone towards greater abstraction and conceptualisation in the dimension 
of cognitive mechanisms (the term used at that early stage).  
 
Figure H: Cognitive mechanisms shaping theory 
 
 
 
 
There was a strong sense that by employing the two mechanisms provided order in 
the collection of data from the simulation, and indeed a sequence that could be 
relied upon i.e. a ‘fall back’ or ‘fail safe’ mechanism, and this was borne out by 
quotations from the participants during the reflective discussion i.e. grounded in 
evidence from the transcripts. By using these mechanisms to help sequence the 
collation of the data emerging from the simulation it follows that ‘chunking’ should be 
enhanced i.e. the connections between individual pieces of data. 
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The following quotations illustrate how two of the participants viewed the use of 
cognitive mechanisms and further examples will be shown in the case findings 
chapter. 
“How useful it is to have the structure of the history because sometimes when I lose 
my train of thought...........so I just went back to the traditional structure” (PI) 
 
 
(Talking about written aide memoires): 
 
"Organise my mind a bit, hopefully not miss things out!  I 
suppose there is so much information coming at you at once you want to organise it a 
little and take it one at a time... cover all the posts and I find it helps with structure” 
(PA) 
 
 
The next stage was to look for other properties in the data which could explain this 
phenomenon, or might be associated with it (the 2nd stage of Schatzman’s 
explanation). This is very similar to clinical reasoning in practice when similarities 
are sought in either the patient history or the examination features, where patterns 
emerge to fulfil an Illness script representing a disease. 
However, before that position was reached it was suggested that I tried to identify 
how my pedagogical perspective was influencing the way in which I viewed the data 
amidst the labelling process, by looking at my analytical memos. Although I had to 
recognise my theoretical anchorage as Schatzman has suggested, this exercise 
proved effective in highlighting my starting position in the data analysis process, and 
providing the impetus to look for conceptual levers that would free the analysis into 
other directions of thought. The left hand side of the Table F accurately reflects the 
position immersed in both pedagogy and the CR literature base, with the reflective 
memos highlighted in bold alluding to a position evolving in the analytical process 
yet to be uncovered. 
My notes from the time illustrate questions which no doubt many researchers have 
asked at similar stages of the data analysis: Could I abandon my prior theoretical 
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knowledge and allow properties of the data to emerge without forcing preconceived 
ideas? (Kelle in Charmaz & Bryant, 2007: 191-2). It brought about a greater 
appreciation of the concept of theoretical sensitivity, broadened my insight into the 
area of research and allowed different perspectives to be considered. 
 
Table F: Acknowledgment of pedagogical position during early data analysis 
 
 
By comparing what was actually seen in the simulation (my interaction with the data 
as visualised) with the reflective discussions thereafter (the participants’ 
perspective) provided a more complete view of the whole process, rather than the 
apparently disparate components. Thus began the differentiation process where 
abstract concepts (dimensions) are considered to represent the processes under 
Early Conceptual Ideas 
(Expectations of the data and what 
my memos/notes say about my 
perspective) 
Reflective and Analytical Memos 
Timeline (time spent on key areas of 
the consultation) 
How did they use SOCRATES? (Time spent on 
each component). No global perspective of 
frameworks emerged at this stage 
‘Key features’ approach 
Weighting of risk behaviour as prominent features 
e.g. smoking and drinking 
Deduction, induction, and looping 
mechanisms 
Sparse examples but overshadowed by focus 
upon consultation skills initially. Required 
several visits back to data to conflate ideas 
Consultation skills demonstrated by 
the participants  
Analysed from basic communications skills 
perspective as observer of simulation which 
blinded initial abduction 
Propositional linkage (from the four 
stage theory), causal, temporal, 
spatial, part, whole, family type. 
Basic biomedical features used a causative 
linkage e.g. what organ is near to the pain? 
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scrutiny, and where the relationships between such concepts are defined. The data 
from the participants’ perspective indicated a very clear and decisive message about 
knowledge management and organisation provided through the use of the 
mnemonic and the structure of the TMH. 
 
Figure I: Process map of early dimensional analysis for cognitive strategies 
 
 
This became the point where two data sets were conflated under an important 
property, that of knowledge organisation as a cognitive mechanism or strategy (see 
memo from July 2012 below and Figure I). However, this process did not emerge in 
a linear fashion. Knowledge organisation emerged as a significant property of the 
main dimension, but at this stage did not accommodate the features enabling the 
participants to cope with the transition, or indeed the cognitive ‘outliers’ which 
included the ‘leaps of faith’ whereby the participants appeared to be making 
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decisions based upon flimsy evidence. Such features would ultimately be 
assimilated into the explanatory matrix at a later stage. 
Conflation of the mnemonic and the TMH guideline as cognitive mechanisms 
(heuristics) to facilitate knowledge organisation and structuring information (in the 
data analysis), bears significant resemblance to how the participants collate the 
features of the history during the simulation, and helps explain their relationship to 
each other. The decision making processes in both are similar and resemble 
scheme inductive reasoning where by the participants utilise an outline structure to 
define and guide their cognitive strategy in gathering information from the simulation 
Within this process there is a strong perspective shift from the baseline analysis of 
using consultation theory as labels, towards the abstract conceptualisation of using 
sequencing mechanisms through Glaser’s codes as a conceptual lever, and 
ultimately in the creation of a significant dimension. The shift in perspective is amply 
illustrated by the theoretical memo at the time (July 2012 below). This memo 
demonstrated the nascent ideas in my mind (theoretical and inductive) with a 
salutatory reminder about the iterative function of DA in checking saturation 
(reflexive and operational). 
 
Theoretical and Reflexive Memo (July 2012) 
Conflation of the cognitive attributes became a fundamental stepping stone in the DA 
process at this stage of the analytical journey. There was a feeling of ‘coming 
together’ between the various properties in the data and the relationships between 
various smaller properties started to line up more effectively. I found myself returning 
to the same theme time and time again, that of knowledge organisation and 
adaptation which appeared to provide a suitable umbrella term for the properties in 
the data. Could this be the central organising concept? This was the second time that 
I had suggested such a similar concept and there is a growing conviction in this 
process as data analysis continues. 
Recently this work was presented at the association of medical educators (ASME) 
with some good feedback and interest (my perception) from those who attended. I 
was reminded of Bounded Rationality (Simon, 1972) by a colleague at Keele with an 
interest in this area and this very much fits with the context setting that I have found 
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in the data. There was a greater emphasis on this in the presentation than I now 
believe it justifies. The cognitive organisation and adaptation seems more inclusive as 
an ongoing concept and this has freed up my thinking. 
 
Equally, this was also a period of revisiting the data in deductive mode to substantiate 
the ideas of ontological insecurity and its epistemological foundations. In essence 
this might have suggested that the participants were unsure of their role during this 
simulation, and at this particular point in the curriculum i.e. the transition between 
facilitated practice and stand alone contact with patients. However, there were only 
two participants who made explicit comments about the role of knowledge in the 
simulation, which although clearly relevant, did not sufficiently saturate this idea. 
Only one participant commented upon role identity (PB) and the impact it had upon 
her view of their role at this stage of professional development i.e.  data gathering 
rather than decision making. 
Revisions in the data analysis chapter were made regarding the impact of knowledge 
deficits and roles. This is a lesson not to jump ahead of the data and resonates with 
the concept of premature diagnostic closure demonstrated in some of the 
simulations. 
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5.3 The Constant Comparative process using cycles of induction and 
deduction 
The iterative processes illustrated in the first draft of this process reflect the initial 
labelling process using a limited perspective for the first iteration. However, a 
maturing position slowly emerged in my application of what is described as 
dimensionality (Kools et al, ibid), in that it incorporates natural analytical ability (‘to 
derive meaning from interpretation or analysis of the component parts’). This 
process took several months and required several visits back to the data (deduction) 
to verify some of the inductive ideas growing through my analysis (Figure J).  
 
Schatzman’s own description of dimensionality includes the ability to address the 
‘complexity of the phenomenon by noting attributes, context, processes and 
meaning’ (1991). Attributes reflected in the first iteration of the data employ relatively 
concrete terms, immersed in biomedical terminology, consultation theory, anchorage 
as a clinician and pedagogical leanings, borrowing heavily from the relevant 
literature base. 
Those in the third iteration reflect a transition towards a perspective which is 
exemplified by more  inclusive, overarching dimensions which explain the ‘whole 
process’, influenced by other ideas such as negotiated order  which acts by shifting 
the perspective  towards social processes, and away from pedagogy. (Strauss, 
1987). This draws together the component properties towards a cohesive 
explanation of what is going on in the participants’ minds during the simulation. 
Amidst the early stages of the data analysis there was a clear tendency to look for 
linear relationships i.e. ‘cause and effect’, rather than the more dynamic process 
described by Kools et al (1996). 
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Figure J: Constant Comparative Process (first iterations) 
 
 
 
Schatzman warns of the difficulties incurred by departing from the safety of ‘linear, 
analytical work’ and describes the parallel and interactive processing as challenging 
Induction
 
Deduction 
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(Schatzman in Maines, ibid). This includes the properties developed from the raw 
data but also in the stages of dimensionalisation that apply to the process of DA. In 
short the inductive ideas in my mind were (generally) not being replicated by what 
was emerging from the data and the mismatch created a blocking mechanism. My 
tendency to look for linearity in rules and procedures was also a hindrance to start 
with.  
Significant movement beyond this point became difficult until other perspectives 
were adopted, through the application of conceptual levers derived from Glaser’s 
coding families (ibid), and suppression of my views as a teacher.   
However, this early phase did amply illustrate theoretical saturation for the use of 
frameworks and heuristics in very simulation, and therefore it could be argued that 
this represents the views of Strauss on allowing the role of theory to facilitate the 
development of conceptual ideas i.e. his ‘forcing variant’ of GTT (Strauss, 1987). 
One of the main problems with the diverse properties arising from the first iteration is 
summed up by Schatzman’s comment, ‘What is all involved here?’ (Schatzman in 
Maines, 310; ibid)   
Others have described a cluster of properties which appeared to have a ‘critical 
mass’ across a number of properties which have also achieved theoretical 
saturation as standalone ideas (Kools et al, 1996), however there appeared to be 
some ‘outliers’ arising from the data which could not immediately be assimilated into 
one overarching idea. Included in this group were the properties labelled ‘leaps of 
faith’, ‘rule in, rule out’ mechanism, and ‘worst case scenario’, which displayed some 
incompatibility with the emergent idea of knowledge organisation through the use of 
cognitive mechanisms such as heuristics.  
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Table G: Analytical Memos exploring ideas about cognition 
 
Cognitive attributes arising from the data 
Heuristics and Frameworks 
which help organise 
knowledge 
 
Question: Are these the 
same? 
 
Answer: Yes-they both help 
collate and organise data 
from the simulation 
 
Knowledge Organisation and 
management 
 
Simplistic biomedical 
explanations for disease 
Use of Risk Behaviour 
Approach to data gathering 
which limits reasoning 
Context creation by the 
participants to limit role 
Learning from the 
experience 
 
Post hoc 
rationalisation 
 
 
(These features were 
developed later in the 
analytical journey) 
Question: How do these 
apparent outliers fit with 
other data? 
 
Worst Case Scenario 
Leaps of Faith 
Rule in, rule out mechanism 
 
Question: 
     There are properties here that 
are working to facilitate 
knowledge in some way, but 
How? 
 
Is there something about 
compensatory mechanisms? 
 
Answer? this appears to be       
compensation for a lack of 
clinical knowledge during a 
particular transition in the 
curriculum. 
 
Memo: these appear to  
be faulty inferences based 
upon flimsy evidence in 
the simulation. 
 
Question: How and why 
does this happen? 
Memo: The participants  
demonstrate adaptive 
processes to compensate for 
particular deficits in 
knowledge e.g. they rely upon 
hard data described by risk 
behaviour rather than softer 
data about the pain. 
 
 
A synopsis of where ideas were being formulated at this stage is contained in the 
tabulated memo and musings in Table G, illustrating the fact that whilst frameworks 
and heuristics had been assimilated, features such as simplistic causal explanations 
for disease and risk behaviour had not yet found their place in the evolving data 
analysis. Also emerging at this stage were properties in the data focussing on 
context creation by participants (creating a slightly different context to the simulation 
The first ideas 
around 
adaptation 
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where none had been given) which appeared to limit their role to pure data 
gathering and restrict any subsequent diagnostic reasoning. Exploration of this 
property occurred in parallel to cognitive mechanisms at this point in the data 
analysis; however, as will be seen later features of this ultimately created a sense 
that an adaptive process was influencing a number of themes arising from the data. 
The questions posed in the table define how the data analysis and interpretation 
shifted in emphasis from what appeared to be poorly refined thought, towards an 
explanation immersed in the stage of development or evolution as trainee doctors 
(reflecting the importance of SI).  
There was a tendency at this stage for analytical notes to emphasise the abnormal 
mechanisms that were being demonstrated, rather than seeking an explanation 
immersed in context appropriate for the stage of development. At this point, ideas on 
conditional reasoning and the impact of anchoring on judgement were important 
levers on developing the analysis. The memo in Table G alludes to faulty inferences 
leading to ‘leaps of faith’ (e.g. ‘there is no abdominal mass, therefore it cannot be 
cancer’). Two examples below show the issues with conditional reasoning illustrated 
from quotations from the transcripts:   
 
Example 1 
When asked about how thinking has been changed by the fact that the actor does 
not have an abdominal mass, the participant replies,  
  
“Definitely not any cancer but it solidifies the thought of a hiatus hernia, the location 
there, maybe gastric region ‘cos that’s just above the stomach”.(PI) 
 
Example 2 
“The most obvious things to me are whether there’s a mass or a blockage, a hernia or 
ulcer, but as none of that seems as likely as gastritis due to alcohol I guess I’ve 
narrowed down in my mind too quickly, but it’s all pointing that way now”. (PB) 
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Example 1 would appear to be a simple misinterpretation involving conditional 
reasoning where premise 1 has been interpreted as ‘all or nothing’, rather than 
focussing on the key word sometimes (likelihood); 
Premise 1: Patients with abdominal masses (sometimes) have cancer. 
Premise 2: This patient does not have an abdominal mass. 
Conclusion: This patient does not have cancer. 
 
This is an example of the error rate of 30% using the form of reasoning called 
‘modus tollens’, and considered a major rule of inference (Evans, 1989). If the term 
‘sometimes’ is taken out of the first premise it becomes evident that premise 1 is 
false (Eysenck, 2001: 351-59). However, in the case of the participants some are 
clearly interpreting this as true with the subsequent error incurred in reasoning 
strategy. Example 2 shows a tendency towards similar thinking regarding masses 
with further rationalisation and insight into her reasoning strategies concerning the 
eventual (correct) diagnosis. 
Interpretation of the ‘leaps of faith’ mechanism demonstrates an interim period in the 
data analysis where the cycles of induction and deduction gradually shaped the 
emergent properties, and the questions above illustrate the ‘probing’  or ‘mining’ of 
the data through induction, with significant help from conceptual levers such as 
Glaser’s coding families. Further illustrations will be covered in the Case Findings 
(Chapter 5) alongside examples of the other dimensions that helped shaped the 
explanatory matrix. 
 
 126 
 
5.4 The Emergence of the Explanatory Matrix 
Two conceptual ideas/levers propagated the analysis at this point towards a more 
effective interpretation: cognitive adaptation and (to a lesser extent) transition.  
Between the 2nd and 3rd iterations, there was pause in the conceptualisation of the 
data as a whole until the data was viewed through these new conceptual 
perspectives which gave rise to the beginnings of the explanatory matrix. Adaptation 
became the keyword through which the participants tried to achieve a way forward 
set by the demands of simulation, the limitations of their clinical knowledge and the 
lack of integration with biomedical knowledge, but also at this stage of the 
curriculum characterised by a transition in expectations of their role.  
This stage of the analysis had considerable resonance with Robrecht’s comment 
that a story/problem is revealed to the researcher by taking an interpretative stance 
or view point on the data with a degree of objectivity (1995).  
This was the point in the data analysis that provided the conceptual position that 
explained the multiple perspectives illustrated in Figure K, and from which took 
shape the explanatory matrix and central organising theme (adapted from Kools et 
al, 1996). Other dimensions arising from the data are considered here alongside the 
cognitive mechanisms as they augment the explanatory power of the emergent 
pathway towards a central perspective. Applying the four central themes of context, 
conditions, process and consequences to the complexity of the initial properties 
arising from the data acted as an organisational lever, encouraging greater 
conceptualisation in a broader sense and into the realm of explanation of the ‘whole 
process’. The interaction between different properties in the data became more 
evident by adopting this framework, particularly the role of context which will be 
discussed in the case findings. 
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Figure K: The emergence of the Explanatory Matrix and Central Organising 
Perspective 
 
 
Transcripts showed examples of context creation by the participants at the start of 
the simulations (adding their own parameters or boundaries to limit their role to data 
gathering in some cases), which acts by limiting the extent of reasoning and the 
boundaries of the inquiry. Role limitation has foundations in the lack of clinical 
knowledge at this transition in the curriculum when greater standalone practice is 
expected to replace the facilitated practice featured in Phase 1.  Within this 
statement is the central concept of coping through adaptation, and even though the 
conditional aspects of ontological and epistemological insecurity suggested in my 
abduction did not reach theoretical saturation in the transcripts (and became an 
almost irrelevant dimension), cognitive adaptation is clearly evident in many of the 
quotations from the simulations. 
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Figure L: Constructing the central dimensions 
 
Properties of data 
Integration of 
ideas 
Dimensions 
 
 
TMH Framework and Heuristics 
devices 
 
 
Memory devices to 
facilitate knowledge 
organisation 
 
Adaptation to new 
role reliant upon 
frameworks 
 
Induction and deduction present 
in diagnostic reasoning but 
reliant upon basic science and 
risk behaviour 
 
Context Creation limiting role 
 
 
Basic science 
protocols used in 
reasoning with role 
limitation 
 
 
        
 
 
Basic biomedical causal 
explanations for illness 
 
Lack of clinical 
knowledge 
integration 
(experiential) 
 
Cognitive adaptation for 
lack of patient narratives 
 
Risk Behaviour (Hard data: more 
concrete than interpretation of 
symptoms) 
 
  
 
‘Leaps of Faith’   
 
 
‘Rule in, Rule out’ ideas 
 
Interpretation with 
poor 
inference 
 
Cognitive Adaptation     
with poor anchoring 
 
Worst Case scenario 
 
Failsafe ‘bottom 
line’  
 
 
Learning from the 
experience 
Restructuring ideas 
and practice 
 
Transformative Learning 
 
Post-hoc rationalisation 
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Cognitive adaptation became the central dimension or perspective which holds the 
key position in the explanatory matrix and gives the most effective interpretation of 
the various dimensions arising from the study. Figure L outlines the conflation of 
ideas with respect to the various dimensions involved in creating the organising 
perspective. The premise behind this perspective suggests that in order to cope 
effectively with the demands of the simulation (and any equivalent exposure to 
standalone practice at this transitional stage), the participants have to adapt to the 
demands of the new situation. They achieve this by relying upon learnt cognitive 
strategies, modifying context slightly, and by using more concrete biomedical values 
in their judgements (risk behaviour for example). However, the process of 
adaptation comes with some pitfalls exemplified by faulty inferences in conditional 
reasoning and anchoring judgements. 
It also helps explain the ‘reflection upon action’ that was evident in the reflective 
discussions (Schon, 1987), and the process of reconstructing ideas for better 
practice from viewing performance in the reflective discussions after the simulation. 
These will be discussed in greater depth in Chapters 5 & 6.The seeds of this idea 
can be seen in theoretical memo from February 2012 which developed into 
something more substantive by July 2012. 
 
Theoretical Memo (Feb 2012): ‘The Central Organising Perspective’?   
 
The participants work from a position of ontological and epistemological insecurity, 
being relatively unable to apply or combine experience from a limited number of 
exposures to clinical medicine thus far in the curriculum. Being uncertain how to use 
limited knowledge and experience to overcome this insecurity they rely upon a 
number of cognitive mechanisms such as mental heuristics and guidelines. They 
appear to be reticent to extend skill to diagnostic reasoning in some cases. 
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Theoretical Memo (July 2012) 
Figure J became a fundamental stepping stone in the DA process at this stage of the 
analytical journey. There was a feeling of ‘coming together’ between the various 
properties in the data and the relationships between various smaller properties 
started to line up more effectively. I found myself returning to the same theme time 
and time again, that of knowledge organisation and adaptation which appeared to 
provide a suitable umbrella term for the properties in the data. Could this be the 
central organising concept? This was the second time that I had suggested such a 
similar concept and there is a growing conviction in this process as data analysis 
continues. 
 
Equally, this was also a period of revisiting the data in deductive mode to substantiate 
the ideas of ontological security and its epistemological foundations. There were only 
two participants who made explicit comments about the role of knowledge in the 
simulation, which although clearly relevant, did not sufficiently saturate this idea. 
Accordingly revisions in the data analysis chapter were made regarding the impact of 
knowledge deficits. This is a lesson not to jump ahead of the data and resonates with 
the concept of premature diagnostic closure demonstrated in some of the 
simulations. 
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6 Chapter 6: Case Findings 
 
The findings which achieved theoretical saturation from the data analysis of the 
simulations and transcripts will be discussed in this chapter. Quotations from the 
transcriptions will illustrate the respective properties of the dimensions and provide 
examples into the mindset of the participants, and how these comments informed 
and shaped my interaction with the data, including inductive ideas leading to the 
formation of the key dimensions.  
The saturated properties which created the most significant and overarching 
dimensions in the study were those describing the cognitive mechanisms or 
strategies which enabled adaptation to the new role of diagnostic reasoning, and the 
intrinsic learning that took place.  In general, the reflexive discussions with the 
participants provided the most effective critical mass towards creating the 
dimensions which ultimately created the substantive theory. 
The dimension of cognitive mechanisms started life as a global idea with little 
differentiation to begin with, encapsulating most of the properties in the data but not 
all. There was a feeling that some of the properties within this dimension were being 
used to adapt to a new role created within the simulation i.e. a diagnostic role. In 
some properties of the data (e.g. use of risk behaviour) there was more certainty in 
handling ‘hard’ data, but in others (e.g. the physical examination) there was far less 
comfort in integrating date with the clinical history. Some of the ‘outlying’ properties 
were difficult to assimilate initially into an overarching theme until viewed through a 
different conceptual focus (e.g. ‘leaps of faith’).  
However, the emergence of this dimension cannot be viewed in isolation as the 
properties arising from the data analysis draw upon interactions with the other 
significant dimension which is Transformative Learning. It is quite clear from the 
reflexive discussions that the participants are able to reconstruct ways of looking at 
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their thoughts and performance which includes ideas that arise in the properties 
contributing to cognitive adaptation e.g. views on premature closure. The emergent 
themes encompass the following ideas which are interlinked in various ways through 
the pathways suggested in Figure J earlier. 
 
1. Causal attribution as explanations for disease. 
2. Using risk behaviour as key feature. 
3. Use of learnt frameworks and heuristics. 
4. ‘Naive Cognition’. 
5. Premature diagnostic closure. 
6. Context creation. 
7. The ‘contribution’ of the physical examination. 
8. Diagnostic Ideas: Emergent semantic thinking. 
9. Learning from the experience. 
 
Sections 1-3 describe the evolving causal linkage of data gathered in the simulation 
that contribute towards diagnostic ideas, with the reliance upon cognitive 
frameworks to underpin data collection. ‘Naive cognition’ introduces the apparent 
‘outliers’ in the data that have particular resonance towards how diagnostic errors 
may evolve alongside the prime issue of premature closure. Section 7 elaborates on 
the apparent ‘black hole’ in the data describing the utilisation of the physical 
examination material compared to the narrative features of the simulation. 
Counterbalancing some of these maladaptive influences are the sections that 
illustrate the emergence of higher cognitive function amongst the participants e.g. 
the appreciation of semantics and the value of transformative learning in the 
reflexive discussions. 
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6.1 Thematic Analysis 
The first three iterations of the data already discussed in Chapter 4 show the 
gradual evolution of the theoretical ideas on cognition in general, and how the 
subsequent iterations of the data moved the conceptual stance towards an the 
adoption of intermediary cognitive strategies which reflected this stage of 
professional development in the broadest sense (Figure M).  The cognitive 
mechanisms in this figure have been emphasised to illustrate how the inductive 
cycles moved the analysis forward and started to provide an dimension that created 
an ‘umbrella’ for various properties. 
Rudimentary properties which arose from the first iteration included Simplistic 
biomedical explanations for disease, utilising risk behaviour as a key feature, the 
use of learnt frameworks and heuristics, and subsequently the section which has 
been labelled as ‘naive’ cognition for the purpose of this chapter. This includes three 
apparent anomalies in cognition such as the apparently misguided interpretation of 
the ‘rule in, rule out’ mechanism. These anomalies will be discussed together as 
they represent features of errors in clinical reasoning with significant ramifications 
for teaching in the curriculum. 
The first section examines the participants’ explanations for illness derived from the 
simulation, including some of the elementary biomedical terms applied to the 
abdominal pain, and the features of the case scenario where the participants 
discuss possible causal attribution i.e. the primary causes of the actor’s problem. 
Within many of these sections, the role of semantic theory has been valuable in 
reaching an appreciation of the layers in some of the participant’s comments i.e. 
teasing out what the participants actually think is the meaning attributed to each 
symptom (Bordage & Lemieux, 1991). This has acted as a conceptual lever with 
which to view the data, adding to the analysis rather than being viewed as a ‘forcing’ 
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mechanism. In this way, it resonates with Schatzman’s ideas on borrowing from 
theory and sometimes being useful in directing research ideas, rather than limiting it. 
 
Figure M: Iterative cycles of data analysis focussing on cognition 
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6.1.1 Causal attribution for explanations of illness 
There is a mixture of statements from the participants which relate to causality of the 
symptoms arising from the simulation derived from using the SOCRATES mnemonic 
(Table H). It can be seen from the quotations that fairly simple ideas and language 
were being suggested to explain potential causes for illness in the simulation, often 
relating to non specific anatomical locations and basic disease processes (e.g. 
inflammation). Basic patho-physiological language or protocols are used to explain 
disease with non specific anatomical descriptors in general, and these appear to 
relate to the site and character of the pain descriptor.  
Causal explanations of this type might be regarded as a poorly refined cognitive 
mechanism by an expert (my original term for this property of the data), however 
their quotations reflect  the interpretation of symptoms described in often very broad, 
basic biomedical terms in tune with their teaching thus far. There is little 
differentiation occurring in the quotations until risk behaviour is combined with these 
vague anatomical relationships. The mnemonic components of SOCRATES which 
cover associated and exacerbating features give more credence to risk behaviour, 
and appear to provide more scope in terms of exploring diagnostics ideas compared 
to other features collected in the simulation e.g. features of the pain.   
 
For example, compare the depth and complexity of these two quotations: 
"I'm thinking stomach or oesophagus, definitely irritated. It's quite central" (PA). 
 
“He mentioned he had a problem with fatty foods, and drinking, so I’m wondering if 
it’s something to do with gall stones” and later “the area of pain that he had, his diet 
and alcohol consumption, being a heavy smoker leads to a picture....” (PH) 
 
The anatomical location of the pain provides a relatively basic cue towards 
diagnostic ideas until it is combined with the causative risk factors of drink, food, 
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smoking, etc. Some of the quotations are even more ambiguous in terms of the 
contribution that anatomical location provides to the diagnostic formulation, but 
when associated with other features a more defined structure in thought processes 
begins to emerge.  
 
Table H: Causal Explanations for the clinical problem 
Data excerpts: 
Vague  descriptors 
 
 “I was thinking appendicitis or something with the abdomen...” (PE) 
“Some sort of significant problem had happened within her abdomen" (PD) 
"I'm thinking more bowel than bladder of gynaecological " (PE)- when asked about initial 
diagnostic thoughts (actor was a woman on this occasion) 
"I'm thinking stomach or oesophagus, definitely irritated. It's quite central" (PA) 
 
"Trying to determine whether we're on about a pain or an ache" (PB) 
 
“....and then working out the differentials based on where it is anatomically, and the fact 
that there’s no referred pain”.(PF) 
 
“One of the first things that I wanted to do was to identify where the pain was, just to 
anatomically close down the kind of thing I was thinking, cos ‘he was in his upper 
abdomen, that kind of area. I was thinking what is in that area that could be causing him 
that pain? “ (PH) 
 
“It did make me think it was more to do with inflammation, and in my head I was already 
jumping to what things could cause inflammation, or what other things could be inflamed 
in that area of the abdomen in general”?(PE) 
 
As PH states these ‘lead to a picture’ or pattern of a possible diagnosis for the 
abdominal pain with features that are linked together i.e. encapsulation of the 
features of an illness/disease. When viewed through the lens of Symbolic 
Interactionism, this relates to their meanings for some of the features of this 
scenario and ultimately provides a partial explanation of the illness involved.  
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It also illustrates the interaction between different properties in the data, and how 
they begin to shape emergent ideas throughout the initial iterations of the data. 
However, interspersed with the basic patho-physiological protocols there emerges a 
picture of growing semantic understanding demonstrated by some of the 
participants which will be discussed later in this chapter. 
In general, comments lack the depth which is derived from clinical contact with 
patients, thereby helping to explain the links between symptoms and signs. The 
simplistic explanations for symptoms within the simulated case are indeed realistic 
explanations immersed in the ‘essentialist’ model of illness (Campbell et al, 1979: 
Norman, 2000), reflecting the use of biomedical knowledge to validate symptoms of 
illness. This is exemplified in the excerpt below as PD relates diagnostic thinking to 
vague biomedical descriptors such as a body system or a disease process; 
  
“I’m thinking more bowel than bladder or gynae’, cos gynae’ hasn’t change at all. I 
haven’t asked her about her urinary tract, so it could be that. Whereas in gastro’ she 
hasn’t had any change in bowels either, i didn’t really go in deep with that, so it could 
be inflammation maybe of that or some form of infection, could be cystitis or some 
form of bladder inflammation or infection.” (PD) 
 
What appears to be missing is the rich tapestry of description generally associated 
with experiential knowledge acquired through hearing other patients describe this 
sort of problem i.e. integrated clinical knowledge providing the causal networks 
between different sets of data. As Benner suggests teaching covers objective 
attributes of illness at this stage of professional development and students lack the 
situational experience to complement this knowledge (Benner, 1984: 20). 
When viewed analytically this idea provides only one perspective with which to view 
the data -that of the meaning and insight into the cognitive strategies used by the 
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participants i.e. they appear significantly restricted, lack subtlety and conceptual 
denseness (cf. Strauss & Corbin’s comments on theoretical sensitivity, 1990; 41-47).   
In order to develop this property further, the participants’ use of ‘risk behaviour’ 
needs to be brought into the equation alongside the basic patho-physiological 
protocols. When these ideas are encapsulated into the diagnostic ideas arising from 
the simulations, more evidence of deeper thought and connection between 
individual features (causal pathways) emerges in the protocols discussed in the 
reflexive discussions. Specific disease labels are seen in the explanations for the 
actor’s problem. 
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6.1.2 Using ‘risk behaviour’ as a key feature 
Alongside the clinical features of the scenario there are at least four risk factors 
deliberately built into to the actor’s descriptor (excessive drinking, smoking, use of 
anti-inflammatory medication, and over indulgence in some foods), which should 
promote diagnostic ideas of gastrointestinal disease and infer predisposing factors 
towards peptic ulceration. These factors would be encompassed by prototypical 
theory to represent the typical features of a peptic ulcer (Bordage & Zacks, 1984; 
Bordage, 2007).Here we see far more differentiation in diagnostic ideas through the 
expression of cognition that links more than one feature i.e. patterns. Some 
quotations lack complexity creating tenuous links to illness e.g. 
"It could be related to food because she eats a lot of curries" (PC). 
 
“About the alcohol? That could be a potential irritant for his pain. Yeah, it could have 
had some causal factor” (PI). 
 
However in general, greater complexity is illustrated by the quotations which afford 
clear examples of effective linkage of causative ideas (Table H), and this can be 
seen in the comments below from PA which exemplifies the emergence of pattern 
recognition in causal attribution. 
‘I’m thinking it’s related to the drinking, potentially the Nurofen, and the smoking can 
irritate the stomach, and combined with food, spicy food & lots of food. What he 
called indigestion I might agree with that.’ 
(PA’s opening comments as to what she thinks is wrong with the patient) 
 
PA has made an explicit link between various risk factors implanted in the case 
scenario in her diagnostic conceptualisation of the actor’s problem. Two competing 
diagnostic solutions are suggested, firstly liver disease postulated through the 
combined risks of alcohol and fatty food; secondly, the three risks factors 
predisposing the diagnosis towards irritation of the stomach lining, rather than liver 
disease. 
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Table I: Causal Attribution related to risk behaviour 
Data excerpts from participants 
 
“He mentioned he had a problem with fatty foods, and drinking, so I’m wondering if 
it’s something to do with gall stones” and later “the area of pain that he had, his diet 
and alcohol consumption, being a heavy smoker leads to a picture....” (PH) 
 
“Just what it could be in relation to what he did, drank too much which immediately 
pointed me to a GI problem....I was thinking maybe indigestion or because he said he 
was at a party it was because of alcohol, with an acidic or fatty foods can, are likely 
to cause a stomach pain thing”.(PI) 
 
“So Peptic Ulcer or Hiatus Hernia can be aggravated by various foods at the party 
and also he was drinking alcohol, both of them can be aggravated by it, aggravated 
by acidic food or drink. So also the milk was a neutralising effect and the location 
was the stomach, so all those three things come together”.(PI) 
 
“Ruling in gastritis more and more with his alcohol, it’s not reflux its irritation, 
something’s irritated his stomach, what is it and then asking more about alcohol”. 
(PB) 
 
“She seems to suggest that she’s taking quite a lot of Nurofen for her knees, and that 
cause gastric ulcers and things like that, in the stomach, in the abdomen...” (PD) 
 
“But then at the same time he’s taking Nurofen, pretty often for this knee, so I know 
with Nurofen you have a predisposition to ulceration or increased bleeding in the 
stomach and the need for antacids and things like that”.(PF) 
 
Whether the participants accurately interpret these clinical features within the history 
(assuming that they have correctly elicited them in the first place) largely depends 
upon their individual perception of causal attribution and the relative importance 
(weighting) of these features within the complete history. Both the structure of the 
TMH and the individual features of the SOCRATES mnemonic create the conditions 
for collecting this data e.g. exacerbating factors for the pain. Here is the cross 
Causal Links in 
bold 
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linkage between individual properties in the data, in this case between the use of 
memory frameworks and chunking of causative features. 
“We went through his eating and drinking and the fact that his pain started with this 
fatty meal at a wedding, with a lot of alcohol consumption. That made me think about 
a few things, firstly what sort of diet he’s having. Is this something that’s been 
precipitated by alcohol consumption, perhaps a long term alcohol problem, or 
possibly due to a fatty intake, and I  was trying to narrow myself down to along a 
gastro sort of line, the fatty intake and alcohol might indicate problems in that area” 
(PH). 
 
PH’s comment demonstrated thought beyond simple pattern linkage, including 
inductive ideas about diet, the contribution  and temporal nature of the alcohol 
problem (acute or chronic) and how this impacted upon his diagnostic reasoning by 
narrowing down (the alternatives) towards a gastric solution. In effect, he is forming 
abstract ideas by formulating his thinking using at least two broad ideas. Firstly, 
through the linkage between cues i.e. pattern recognition, and secondly, using the 
comparative relationship of ‘acute’ versus ‘chronic’ in the way he views its 
contribution towards the diagnosis (semantics). The temporal aspect was also 
picked up in this comment from PD inferring that a further trigger had caused the 
relapse in pain: 
“That told me it might not have been a new issue, it might have present within her for 
a while and suddenly become a lot worse, something had ignited it again”. 
 
PI takes the mnemonic features further by specifically stating the linkage between 
two competing diagnostic alternatives or labels (named as distinct diagnostic terms 
rather than just ‘inflammation of the stomach lining’), and the exacerbating/relieving 
features collected through using the mnemonic strategy. The pain descriptor is also 
included in contributing to the diagnostic alternatives.  
 
“So Peptic Ulcer or Hiatus Hernia can be aggravated by various foods at the party 
and also he was drinking alcohol, both of them can be aggravated by it, aggravated 
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by acidic food or drink. So also the milk was a neutralising effect and the location 
was the stomach, so all those three things come together” (PI). 
 
The level of cognitive linkage in this quotation reflects a well developed causal 
network for this particular clinical problem and how it is represented in thought.  
This decision making process is governed by the participants’ knowledge of the 
connections between risk behaviour and disease (causal links or behaviour that 
predisposes patients to types of illness) .There is a sense that from the quotations 
that the features of risk behaviour are used more effectively in the diagnostic 
process than the clinical features of the pain. When combined with one or two of the 
comments about clinical knowledge deficits, the reliance upon more concrete data 
items may reflect a more factual, literal view suggested by Bordage which lacks 
semantic depth (2007).  
It is possible that collecting more concrete data within the history in terms of 
drinking, smoking, drug use, etc, provides tangible information which can be utilised 
more effectively. In contrast, the subjective, elaborated features of abdominal pain 
are harder to interpret for our participants, and these are more reliant upon effective 
history taking, subsequent interpretation, thought and experience i.e. what Mead 
might call natural analysis. Indeed studies suggest that diagnosticians that are more 
effective employ deeper and varied representations of complaints (Chang et al, 
1998; Bordage et al, 1997). 
The reliance upon concrete terms can be explained by two possible mechanisms: 
firstly, that these terms compensate for the lack of clinical knowledge integration 
accrued from face to face contact and the difficulty of applying it effectively. 
Secondly, the soft data from the actor’s history is harder to assimilate using the 
cognitive editing process which allows clinicians to differentiate key material from 
verbal ‘chaff’ during data gathering (Bruner, 1986). The term ‘soft text descriptors’ 
was coined by Elieson & Papa in their study on the impact of different knowledge 
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formats upon developing mental associations for illness (1994). However their 
findings recommending (hard text) quantitative, mathematical probabilities was later 
questioned by suggestions that students provided with biomedical causal pathways 
for illness retain that information more effectively (Woods et al, 2005). The 
quotations from PG and PD provide a sense that pain is easier to compute when 
associated with a rating scale (NRS) which provides a hard text descriptor: 
“I wanted to get a gauge, uhm, with just using pain it feels quite ambiguous when 
someone’s talking about it. If you get a scale there you can work out the severity of 
it” (PG.) 
“Later I asked how bad it was on a scale of 1 to 10 and she said 7, which is pretty high 
as well, so it was obvious that it was causing a lot of distress. It was obvious that it 
was a serious issue” (PD). 
 
When the participants started using cues across different component of the history 
the inferences became strengthened in the way they discuss the case details, and 
this moves interpretation away from the vague terms which related to anatomical 
location only. So PD goes on to discuss the lack of relief from analgesia combined 
with the pain severity: 
“Yeah it made me realise that she was a serious case that had come in, it was 
something that needed to be addressed straight away, that was the impression that I 
got more and more as it went on. Because even when I was talking to her she was 
grimacing and grabbing her tummy as if she were in pain as we were speaking. So 
this and other things before confirmed that it was something that it was something 
that needed addressing sooner rather than later”(PD). 
 
Although some comments reflect a continued reliance upon consultation tools such 
as the NRS which are illustrated by the novice stage of expertise, there are 
excerpts which suggest richer patterns of cue interpretation when considered 
together in chunks or groupings. 
 144 
 
The properties of utilising simple biomedical interpretation alongside risk behaviour 
as causal explanations for illness at first appeared to suggest a limited view of 
diagnostic explanations. These are concrete terms immersed in biological fact or 
unfettered data on risk activities such as smoking and drinking. They are not 
ambiguous or uncertain, unlike the abstract associations inferred by the other 
features of the history (pain) that may appear more difficult to assimilate with 
restricted prior exposure to such descriptions. This is inevitable with the various 
descriptions of pain requiring significant case based experience for adequate 
interpretation.  
But when cues are used in combination, there is clear evidence of propositional 
networks which are beginning to link relationships between the individual features of 
the history, making order from the chaos of incoming data. Here the various 
properties in the first two iterations began to coalesce and connections became 
apparent. The use of the structured frameworks facilitated the delivery and 
organisation of the data from the simulation, which then enabled links to become 
more obvious through the chunking of individual features as explained above.  
From this information the participants will build upon the elements of disease that 
instantiate Syntactic Theory i.e. the rules of inclusion of symptoms into a diagnostic 
entity (Bordage & Lemieux, ibid). In this case, the features of smoking, excess 
alcohol, medication using an anti-inflammatory drug (Nurofen), and possibly dietary 
indiscretion have all contributed to the diagnostic rules pertaining to peptic 
ulceration. 
Theoretical Memo (May 2012) 
 
It is not surprising that novices resort to basic pathological processes familiar to their 
early teaching, and experts utilise a more pragmatic approach to disease which allows 
them to operate in the real world where answers are not always forthcoming. The 
novice approach is very much demonstrated in the causative explanation invoked by 
the participants in this study. 
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Looking back at previous assignments has also been beneficial, rather than being a 
reminder of my sometimes trenchant starting position. There are two views on 
disease which in many ways perhaps demonstrate the difference between my views 
and those of the participants It arises from the views espoused by Campbell et al  on 
the concept of disease(1979, and Norman(2000).  
They compared the ‘Essentialist’ view adopted by novices that signs and symptoms 
arise from a pathological process that can be identified and rectified, and the 
‘nominalist’ perspective that experts usually hold which is that disease is a collection 
of abnormalities that arise together. This equates to the use of syndromes even when 
basic biomedical explanations are not immediately apparent e.g. chronic fatigue 
syndrome, the description of ‘dropsy’ (heart failure) well before the physiological 
process underpinning it was developed. 
 
Reflexive Memo: 
I have recognised an uncomfortable yet illuminating analogy between the difficulties 
in the data analysis process, and some of the comments from the paper on ‘Cognitive 
perspectives on Medical Expertise’, from Schmidt et al (1990). 
It has reminded me that data collection is idiosyncratic, and that the amount of data is 
not directly proportional to the expertise level of the collector (cf. ‘the intermediate 
effect’). It is how that information is managed and sorted which becomes the 
important feature, and this comment reflects where I currently stand in DA as a novice 
researcher using this methodology for the first time. 
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6.1.3 Use of learnt frameworks and heuristics 
There are two main consultations ‘frameworks’ that are taught during Phase 1 of the 
curriculum, and all of the participants used both of these explicitly during the 
simulation. Although these conveyed a strong sense of ordering data collection to 
use one of Glaser’s coding families, the more interesting comments came from the 
reflexive discussions as to how the participants viewed their usefulness. The 
frameworks demonstrated throughout the simulations are a) the Traditional Medical 
History format (TMH), and b) the ‘SOCRATES’ mnemonic for the features of pain. 
One participant used the CAGE questionnaire for problematic alcohol consumption 
which also features in the teaching programme (Bush et al, 1987).  Through my 
interrogation of the data it was clear that all of the participants demonstrated the use 
of at least one mental framework or schema which they subsequently described 
through an organisational perspective. Some used these as mental ‘aide memoires’ 
and others by writing down a structured approach on paper at the start of the 
simulation. In the latter case, they were asked to discuss what they had written 
down to explore the reasons for use. 
The quotations in Table J exemplify a number of ideas where participants are using 
learnt frameworks as the foundation or template for collecting data from the 
simulation, providing a reliable structure to fall back upon if they lose track of 
collating information i.e. a ‘failsafe’ mechanism (Grant & Marsden, 1984).  
‘I had to follow a logical order’, 
‘Useful it is to have the structure of the history’, 
‘Organise my mind a bit’, 
’Find it helps with structure' (mixed quotes) 
 
“How useful it is to have the structure of the history because sometimes when I lose 
my train of thought...........so I just went back to the traditional structure” (PI). 
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These quotations evoke a feeling of dependence, certainty, organisation and 
structure which facilitate the collection of data from the simulation, and conversely 
without it the participants would find collation of the different components more 
difficult.  Not only are the participants using the frameworks for processing 
information in a logical format, they rely upon it when faced with a loss of 
sequencing in the presentation of the history.  
Some adhere to the mnemonic format literally, illustrated by these comments, which 
reveals a feeling of ‘musturbatory’ thought i.e. I must do it in this way or I will miss 
out important data.  
“I had to follow a logical order” (PC), 
“I’d got my SOCRATES all mixed up, I was thinking my way through the letters and 
got muddled” (PF). 
 
This has some resonance with other studies which suggest that storage and 
retrieval of case based data is reflected in the serial order in which this is 
reproduced (Claessen & Boshuizen, 1985). It is suggested that novices are more 
affected by the random order of presentation in symptoms compared with experts 
(Groen & Patel, 1988: Coughlin & Patel, 1986), and this would explain why our 
participants feel the need for such mechanisms to organise the chaotic influx of data 
that sometimes occurs in history taking. This is inevitable in the real world as 
patients will not reveal cues in the sequence that the student would hope for. The 
analogy with the novice stage of expertise in the skills acquisition model is clear i.e. 
the participants are still reliant upon guidelines and rigid adherence to taught plans 
such as the Socrates mnemonic and structure of the TMH (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 
1986). 
 148 
 
 
Table J: Use of Frameworks and Heuristic Mechanisms 
Data excerpts from participants 
 
" I was attempting to use SOCRATES anything to do with pain' (PA) 
 
"I was thinking SOCRATES......presenting complaint because I knew I had to follow a 
logical order by following that. I think it's a really useful mnemonic" (PC) 
 
“How useful it is to have the structure of the history because sometimes when I  lose my 
train of thought...........so I  just went back to the traditional structure” (PI) 
 
“I went through a vague recollection of SOCRATES, going through the site, onset, character, 
etc.” (PH)  
 
Talking about written aide memoires, "organise my mind a bit, hopefully not miss things 
out!  I suppose there is so much information coming at you at once you want to organise it a 
little and take it one at a time... cover all the posts and I find it helps with structure'(PA) 
 
PH discussing using Socrates: 
“Not explicitly as in definitively, it was certainly in my head and there were tick boxes of what 
I needed to cover, where the pain was, when it started, what type of pain. I think I covered 
most of the points and I find a useful thing to have in my head, but you have to be a bit 
flexible using a tool like that not to exclude other symptoms, not completely disregard 
what the patient’s saying to you. I try to use things like that in a more flexible manner but 
having them in my head to know what to ask”.(PH) 
 
 
In these participants, the use of a written framework creates a tension in the 
simulation which is apparent from their varied views. Some have learnt to use a 
framework from memory implying their expertise level is moving out of the novice 
stage in terms of taking a history; others still feel the need to write down an outline 
to act as a fall-back position but don’t add anything further, and some jot down 
salient comments (e.g. the NRS). The excerpts below provide an insight into some 
of their thoughts: 
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“I felt that I should be thorough and write everything down using the paper made me 
as I was alienating the patient for seconds as I scribbled things down causing an 
uncomfortable silence, and then lost my train of thought as well................ 
The only thing I wrote down was name, age, nausea, 5days, but I remembered that 
anyway; and 10 packet history which reminded me” (PF). 
 
“Yeah I feel it can out the patient off if you’re writing stuff about them. I think if 
someone was writing what I was saying I would think very carefully about the words I 
was saying, and would rather that patient was relaxed and saying everything that 
came into their head. I don’t find writing it down very helpful; if I summarise it 
afterwards hopefully I’m not going to miss too much of what he said” (PB). 
 
When asked about the two aide memoires she had written on paper at the start of 
the simulation (both TMH and Socrates), PG replies: 
 
“I personally use a lot of abbreviations, I always remember in exams because it helps 
me to remember certain things, to ask things, so when I’m studying I make up my own 
little rhymes just to help me remember things. I like to use them only when I’m under 
pressure. I know how to take a history but they’re something to fall back upon just to 
check for myself” (PG). 
 
“Keep it open as we’ve been taught, he’s taking about the pain, and I wanted to use 
that ‘golden minute rule’ to see how much I could get out of him without getting into 
the structured history” (PF). 
 
Clearly the organisational function of the mnemonic and TMH framework feature 
heavily in this group, however flexibility of thought did not achieve the same 
saturation in their comments. There is a sense from one or two remarks that they 
are becoming more flexible in adapting to the demands of history taking, but rely 
upon a  fall back mechanism at this stage of development.   
Mnemonic strategies have been shown to have a direct effect and beneficial impact 
upon the ability to remember a number of diverse areas, including recall of factual 
information by facilitating two aspects of memory. This is achieved by limiting 
potential cognitive overload on short term memory, but also by facilitating encoding 
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and retrieval from memory (McCormick & Levin 1987: Levin 1993; Bellezza 1996: 
Cowan 2001). They provide a basic framework for memory which can be easily built 
upon; they help create associations between individual components by grouping 
information (chunking) and allow easy repetition for learning.  It is interesting to note 
that certain parts of the mnemonic structure deliver information that is used more 
effectively i.e. viewing the risk behaviour as associated and exacerbating features. 
This contrasts quite starkly with the relative paucity within the reflexive discussion 
about how the features of pain create a picture of the illness, as delivered through 
the initial components of SOCRATES. 
Repetition of the use of SOCRATES in serial patient contacts helps link the various 
components until they become automated through deliberate practice (Ericcson et 
al, 1993). In this way it is acting as a schema which helps organise the different 
features of a defined problem and reduce cognitive overload (Schmidt & Rikers, 
2007; Sweller et al, 2011). 
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6.1.4 ‘Naïve’ Cognition 
During the data analysis It became clear that participants were adopting risk laden 
cognition which took inference a stage beyond their knowledge and into areas of 
unsafe practice in terms of general reasoning. Such examples were labelled under 
the composite term of naïve cognition during early iterations of the data, however 
subsequent integration of ideas eventually suggested an alternative perspective 
once the central dimension was established. There were three strategies which 
appeared to fall under this category; 
1) ‘Leaps of faith’ 
2) ‘Worst Case’ scenario 
3) ‘Rule in, rule out’ mechanism 
 
These strategies at first appeared quite separate, but further analysis and 
interpretation provided a better perspective which describes these misguided 
inferences. Some comments reflect a lack of knowledge e.g. PB talking about her 
diagnostic reasoning; 
He didn’t have a change in bowel habit which made me kind of rule out the IBS 
(irritable bowel syndrome) aches and pains”,  
Followed quickly by an example of one of the salient statements illustrating ‘leaps of 
faith’:  
“If there’s no mass that takes away quite a lot of things”. 
Perhaps the most obvious mistaken application in this group is the implicit link 
between the examination feature provided to the participants within the scenario, 
stating that there is ‘no abdominal mass present in the abdominal examination’, and 
the subsequent inference that the patient therefore doesn’t have cancer (Table K).  
The participants also appear to have adopted a phrase (rule in, rule out) without 
truly understanding the underlying implications or indeed the disease probability 
implied by that rule. Inductive processes generally arise from a set of characteristics 
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leading to a diagnosis or solution which encompasses all of those characteristics; 
however, some of the participants are making a quantum leap in judgement based 
often on one characteristic alone. PA’s comment below sums up the mixed 
messages in her mind although her analysis is closer to being accurate than any of 
the other participants.  
She mentions ‘ruling out or ruling in things’ during the systems review towards the 
end of her history, and when asked where she has come across that, she replies; 
“Good question. I suppose it’s like a safety net. You don’t necessarily know what to 
look out for so you just ask general questions and hope that something comes up or 
something gets ruled out, something makes one option more likely or less likely than 
it was before”. 
 
The ‘safety net’ refers to the systems review mechanism within the structure of the 
TMH, but implied in her comment is a ‘hit and miss’ approach rather than someone 
who understands the true benefit of the process. Her interpretation of increasing 
likelihood is correct; however, in most instances the participants are using this rule 
quite literally, often based on one symptom or sign alone, which sets a dangerous 
precedent, representing an abnormal heuristic strategy based upon a weak premise.  
This was set against the backdrop of a ‘worst case scenario’ stance which appears 
to be adopted by some participants, in that the worst possible scenario would be 
cancer and that premise became ‘the bottom line’ in terms of reasoning i.e. cancer is 
the most significant cause that must be excluded from the possible diagnosis e.g. 
 
“I was trying to think through what it could be and I’m really not sure (Pause) some 
sort of problem with her GI tract I suppose. Worst case scenario she could have 
developed something cancerous perhaps, within her stomach, her intestines, GI 
tract?” (PD) 
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Table K: Examples of ‘Naive’ Cognition 
 
Examples of ‘Leaps of Faith’ 
 
“If there’s no mass it takes away quite a lot of things. The most obvious thing to 
me are whether he has a mass or a blockage” (PB) 
 
When told there is no mass on abdominal examination,  
“Definitely not any cancer but it solidifies the thought of a hiatus hernia, the 
location there, maybe gastric region ‘cos that’s just above the stomach” (PI) 
 
“Yeah. If there’s no mass, just tenderness” (PG explaining her reasoning when asked 
about her provisional diagnosis of peptic ulceration after being provided with the features 
of abdominal examination) 
 
“I’d ruled out food poisoning as that is normally over in 24hrs” (nervous laugh) PB. 
 
 
Examples of ‘Rule in, Rule out’ 
 
“When he said it was like indigestion, I was starting to rule out other chest or 
abdominal pains, some people confuse chest and abdomen so I was ruling out 
going down the any kind or cardio respiratory route”. (PB). 
 
“I’m just ruling out the very important symptoms, I can’t miss blood in the stool or 
vomiting blood, things that might signify a bleeding ulcer or something like that”. 
(PA) 
 
“I’m getting background information. I’m’ trying to figure whether this is about the 
drinking/eating episodes or if there’s something I’ve missed out or there’s 
something I need to consider”. 
Researcher: What do you use that for in your mind? 
  
“Ruling out or ruling in things”. 
 
“You don’t necessarily know what to look out for so you just ask general questions 
and hope that something comes up or something gets ruled out, something makes 
one option more likely or less likely than it was before”. (PA) 
 
“I was thinking about all the ‘red flag’ type things as it had gone on for so long I 
was wondering whether it radiated, and what this pain was like, co you know 
abdominal aneurysm or anything like that, bit of a red flag.....” (PG) 
 
 
 
There are a number of possible explanations for making these ‘leaps of faith’. It may 
reflect their interpretation of teaching in the curriculum in that disease presentation 
are often taught by secondary care staff whose representation of disease probability 
reflects the domain which they work, rather than the premise adopted in primary 
care where ‘common things are common’ (probabilistic reasoning), and cancer does 
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not sit top of the agenda. The ‘rule in, rule out’ strategy has been naively adopted 
from Murtagh’s process of restricted rule outs (1990), which guides the clinician to 
exclude the most serious causes of illness, thereby reducing clinical errors 
(Croskerry, 2003). 
This includes the domain of red flag markers for disease which are significant 
symptoms or signs which increase the likelihood of serious disease. Nevertheless 
these are not absolute markers that rule out or rule in specific diseases e.g. neck 
stiffness and photophobia are significant signs seen in Meningococcal septicaemia, 
but are not exclusive to this serious illness (Thompson et al, 2006). In this 
simulation, the presence of an abdominal mass would be a red flag maker for 
possible cancer, however it is not an exclusive finding e.g. it may reflect benign 
enlargement of intra-abdominal organs.   
Equally it may represent extraordinary anecdotes of faulty diagnoses illustrated in 
the press in patients with cancer; perhaps it may represent faulty belief in simple 
conditional reasoning which can be illustrated by the following example; 
Premise 1: All doctors are good people. 
Premise 2: Harold Shipman was a doctor. 
Reasoning: Shipman was a good doctor. 
 
In adopting this type of reasoning, it is likely that the absence of an abdominal mass 
has prompted the ‘bottom line’ in the reasoning process (cancer) to be ruled out. 
The premise is the issue of a faulty belief mechanism or bias in that the participants 
may believe that all cancers present with an abdominal mass, whereas the premise 
is not universal, but partial in its affirmative nature i.e. some cancers may present 
with a mass (Eysenck, 2001 :Ch 10).  
The participants’ quotations cover different issues with a common thread, which is 
‘inference based upon a paucity of evidence’. The first two quotations in Table L 
provide examples on inference on examination features, ‘no mass’ effectively ruling 
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out cancer in their thinking, a dangerous heuristic for clinical practice. The fourth 
comment appears to illustrate a basic assumption that food poisoning always 
resolves within a specific time period, and reflects insufficient knowledge about the 
variations of food poisoning that may cause gastrointestinal upset. 
These comments reflect a rather tenuous adoption of a principle of practice in some 
situations of ruling out the most serious conditions for illness, without an 
understanding of the prevalence of disease in general. The denominator in this case 
is to exclude cancer or something similarly serious, before considering other (more 
common) causes. Within these quotations there appears to be a cognitive process 
which has not been sufficiently explained by teaching and hence this became one of 
the significant pointers into the participants’ perspective which provoked a changing 
in the curriculum during the data collection i.e. the explanation of ‘red flag’ markers, 
likelihood ratios and the interpretation of key symptoms.  
However there did not appear to be an all-encompassing explanation for the sub 
properties of ‘worst case scenario, rule in rule out, and leaps of faith’, which were 
labelled as examples of maladaptive or naive cognition to begin with, and were 
viewed as ‘outliers’ in the data analysis associated with the first iteration. The 
emergence of an overarching adaptive process drew various ideas together, and 
eventually the issues of abnormal inference seen in mechanisms such as ‘leaps of 
faith’ found an explanation.  
In this case the participants were compensating for a poor clinical knowledge base 
by applying a rule of probabilistic reasoning with little understanding of the clinical 
domain i.e. their interpretation was simplistic without depth of context which would 
normally be underpinned by experiential knowledge, but entirely appropriate to their 
(limited) stage of clinical expertise. This idea also provides the foundation for the 
use of basic biomedical explanations of symptoms gathered from the simulation. 
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6.1.5 Premature Closure 
Cognitive errors in diagnosis are correlated with incomplete history taking and 
examination, bias towards one diagnosis, and failure to consider the correct 
diagnosis (Graber, 2005; Norman & Eva, 2010).  Inaccurate diagnoses often have 
significant consequences especially in the domains of Internal medicine, emergency 
medicine and general practice, accounting for almost half of the claims in US 
Emergency Departments (Croskerry, 2003). Premature closure on one diagnosis too 
early in the data gathering process to the exclusion of other possible hypotheses is 
based upon faulty history taking, and so it is reassuring that some of the participants 
in the study are already recognising such errors  and faulty heuristics as illustrated 
by the quotations in Table L. 
Graber divided 100 diagnostic errors from three medical centres into three domains; 
‘systems-related’ (organisational: identified in 65 cases), ‘no-fault’ errors (e.g. 
atypical presentation: 44 cases), and cognitive errors e.g. faulty knowledge and data 
gathering found in 74 cases (Graber, ibid), with errors occurring often occurring in 
parallel. Premature closure is one of the main cognitive biases whereby the clinician 
is trying to force a hypothesis using incomplete data, without considering other 
possibilities and searching for data to confirm or refute the alternatives. Such errors 
are difficult to pick up without accurate self-descriptions and endorse the value of 
the reflective discussion in which the features of early metacognition emerge. Such 
features include a greater awareness of the broader picture, ambiguity in the history, 
and atypical presentations of illness. During the analysis of the simulations, 
examples of premature closure were indeed difficult to isolate from my interaction 
with the data. Even in those participants that failed to recognise the potential 
diagnosis of peptic ulceration, however the reflective discussion opened up avenues 
of reconstructive thought in some of the participants. 
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Table L: Examples of Premature Closure 
Quotations Analytical memo 
 
“To be honest with you I make my mind up too quickly 
and not focus on the broader scheme of things......”(PE) 
 
‘I think it was better than I had expected in terms of the 
way I linked things together but I think what I’ve got to do 
try not to do..... there are three things here which lead 
to this diagnosis, I’m going to go  guns blazing into 
this diagnosis, I need to really broaden and be 
encompassing, try and get my differentials together in a 
bag, and when I’ve got some time pick away at it, in light 
of his previous history which I’d have in front of me. So 
not rushing into any decisions.”(PF) 
 
“I think it’s really important to keep an open mind. When 
you’re doing things you need to have ideas rolling 
around but sometimes you run with one idea and it 
prevents you from weighing up other options, and 
it’s important to keep a broad mind and weigh the 
options up properly “ (PH) 
PH goes on to provide an example from practice where 
she recognised the issues of premature closure as a 
significant turning point: 
“I think I have, would you like me to expand? (yes). 
There was one lady in a clinic and I was certain that she 
had heart failure because she has SOB, had to sleep 
with lots of pillows, pitting oedema  in both legs. For me 
it sounded like three big ticks for heart failure, and I 
was quite surprised that she didn’t, even though she 
has these symptoms and things were a lot more 
complicated. As she got older she developed dodgy 
valves in her knees which had caused this swelling and 
because she had a knee op’ she had put on a lot of 
weight and a bit less fit and that had caused her SOB”. * 
 
Premature Closure on 
diagnosis 
 
 
Reflecting on how to organise 
information and allow time 
and space for decisions i.e. 
avoid premature closure 
 
 
 
 
 
Premature Closure and 
consider other competing 
diagnoses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chasing Cardiac Failure 
rather than considering the 
alternatives, but has 
recognised her error in doing 
so, with (hopefully) a change 
in subsequent practice i.e. 
transformative learning 
 
The quotations show some evidence that ‘rushing into things’ with a fixed mind will 
result in premature closure and close down the bigger picture. It is impossible to 
determine whether this is just purely a processing issue i.e. the diagnosis was not 
considered (an error in reasoning), or may be linked to knowledge deficits as has 
been suggested (Graber, ibid). The example from real practice expressed through 
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the word of participant H in Table M (*) illustrates a current debate about the impact 
of reflective practice and the accuracy of the reasoning process.  
 
“There was one lady in a clinic and I was certain that she had heart failure because 
she has SOB, had to sleep with lots of pillows, pitting oedema  in both legs. For me it 
sounded like three big ticks for heart failure, and I was quite surprised that she didn’t, 
even though she has these symptoms and things were a lot more complicated. As she 
got older she developed dodgy valves in her knees which had caused this swelling 
and because she had a knee op’ she had put on a lot of weight and a bit less fit and 
that had caused her SOB”. (PH) 
 
Little empirical evidence exists so far to confirm such a link, however some sources 
suggest a multidimensional structure to reflective practice which would preclude the 
urge towards premature closure. Through deliberately searching for alternative 
explanations /hypotheses when faced with complex problems i.e. deliberate 
induction, reflective practice facilitates exploration of the consequences of these 
alternatives tested against new data i.e. deliberate deduction (Mamede & Schmidt, 
2004). An attitude and willingness to test ideas alongside critical reflection of 
personal decisions has been found to have a positive effect upon diagnosing 
complex case (Mamede et al, 2008).  
Given enough time to ‘pick away at ideas’, it would appear that the statement from 
PF above has some resonance with these suggestions. When considered alongside 
some of the emergent cognitive strategies which will be discussed later in this 
chapter, there is ample evidence from this relatively limited sample of participants 
that the reflective discussion is opening avenues of thought beneficial in subsequent 
practice. 
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6.1.6 Context Creation 
Performance across cases in differing domains of practice is referred to as context 
specificity, and is an important feature influencing diagnostic reasoning ability in 
action (Eva et al, 1998). Two theories represent contemporary thought on the 
influence of context; Situated Cognition and Ecological Psychology (Lave & Wenger, 
ibid; Durning et al, 2011). Situated cognition immerses learning, reasoning and 
clinical outcomes within the parameters of the experience nominating the interactive 
variables into clinician, patient, and setting. Ecological psychology proposes an 
agent (participant)-environment interaction which can provide affordances (what the 
environment can give), and effectivities (what the participant can do) which are 
interdependent.  
During the simulations it was noticed that the participants were adopting a verbal 
‘bookending’ mechanism to the simulation i.e. using qualified opening and closing 
statements (Table M). By creating their own context to the simulation which 
diverged slightly from the context explicitly provided prior to the simulation (a case 
from a clinical domain of teaching already covered in the curriculum based in the 
media laboratory) they have changed the parameters or conditions pertaining to the 
simulation. The instructions for the simulation stated that the consultation should 
merely be approached using the traditional medical history format, rather than a 
focussed consultation. The participants tried to confer their own context to the 
simulation by introducing themselves from the setting of a ward or clinic, and 
furthermore in some cases to infer a relationship with another clinician to whom they 
would report to e.g. “I’ll just go and tell the doctor everything that you have told 
me........”. This implied a transfer of data gathering and furthermore when aligned to 
other comments, suggested role limitation 
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Table M: Context creation 
 
Excerpts from data 
 
Context Limitation 
What brings you to the hospital today? (PD) 
‘Hi Sam, I’m ***** a third year medical student, is it alright if I see you before the 
doctor today?’ (PE) 
‘I am a medical student in a clinic and the doctor has asked me to ....’ (PB) 
‘I’ll just relay that to the consultant and we’ll help the best we can’ (PD) 
‘I’ll just tell the doctor everything that you’ve told me and he’ll get back to you’ (PC) 
‘I guess my questions were geared to something less than life threatening; once my 
thoughts were geared towards the problem it wasn’t such an issue because I felt I 
was on the right track’ (PB)** 
“The thing that I could have done is to reassure her that she will see the doctor next, 
he knows a lot more than I do instead of nodding and asking more questions, ‘cos 
that comes over as trying to tick the box” (PE). 
 
Role Limitation 
 
When asked ‘what do you think is the aim of the consultation?’  
 
“Just to ask questions that are relevant to the information being given and try to 
tailor the questions along the way to the information that I’m getting throughout the 
interview, whilst at the same time  trying to stick to some structure.(PI) 
 
“Yeah. I’ve not got experience of thinking of problems whilst taking the history. I’m 
just used to ‘rhyming’ off the history and not thinking about what could be going on 
along the way”.(PI) 
 
Researcher: What do you feel is the aim of the consultation in the first place? 
 
PI replies...”Just to ask questions that are relevant to the information being given 
and try to tailor the questions along the way to the information that I’m getting 
throughout the interview, whilst at the same time trying to stick to some structure”. 
 
 
In some respects opening and closing statements reflect the introductory and 
closing functions of the Cambridge Calgary guidelines which form part of their 
communication skills teaching (Kurtz et al, 2005: 17; the basic framework). These 
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are generally regarded as social, process skills integral to the initiation of 
communication demonstrating interest and attentive listening, however the 
participants appeared to be creating limits to their role in this particular scenario 
illustrated by the excerpts. 
There are caveats to this suggestion which may influence the participants’ 
perspective; firstly, that priming for the context may arise from the setting of the 
simulation (the media laboratory in the university teachings buildings-implicit 
context?). By using an office setting more akin to a GP’s surgery or an outpatient 
clinic, with an absence of emergency equipment, this creates anticipation of the type 
of clinical problem about to be encountered (see participant B’s comment **).  
Secondly, the participants were all starting clinical attachments in year 3 in hospital 
settings indicating that the introductory and closing statement are adapted 
accordingly to the context in which they are currently studying. Lastly, both 
simulated role play and clinical examinations in the first two years of the curriculum 
are usually contextualised to the students’ learning level using terms such as ‘you 
are in a GP surgery and have been asked to see the patient before the doctor’. 
 
Clearly the participants are creating boundaries ( Glaser’s ‘degree family’) to the 
simulation by bookending comments which set conditions, namely whatever 
information is elicited from the consultation it will be imparted to the doctor, with the 
implication that decision making is deferred to them (consequence of this action). 
This implies that the participant is creating a role boundary which limits 
responsibilities to data collection during the simulation, without any recourse to 
significant diagnostic reasoning. Paraphrased in Blumer’s language, the meaning of 
the consultation is to ‘collect information and pass it on to more learned authority’ 
which begs the question, when does this behaviour stop and allow full exposition of 
the diagnostic reasoning process?   
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Within this comment there is considerable resonance with Reporter-Interpreter-
Manager-Educator (RIME) vocabulary proposed as a feedback framework for 
students (De Witt et al, 2008), in that the study demonstrates students limiting 
themselves (mostly) to a reporter mode rather than going a stage further into 
interpretation which might elicit more diagnostic thought. This conduct also 
illustrates the theory of Bounded Rationality which sets behaviour with certain 
constraints and goal achievements, both in terms of individual behaviour, but also 
that of the organisation, and therefore the curriculum created by the institution in this 
case (Simon & Newell, 1972).  
Condition setting was amply illustrated by another perceptive participant who had 
worked out the extent of the case scenario ahead of being involved in the 
simulation: 
‘I guess my questions were geared to something less than life threatening; once my 
thoughts were geared towards the problem it wasn’t such an issue because I felt I was 
on the right track’ -PB. 
 
PB has anticipated the means-goal family relating to the remit of the simulation, 
correctly assuming that the case scenario would be something which would 
encompass prior knowledge. However, the context of the simulation was still in 
doubt (definitions of the situation). Equally the mechanism of setting limitations could 
be viewed as a strategy or way of managing the simulation (Type family) which 
ultimately leads to a more significant dimension, that of negotiated order  which 
borrows from recognized sociological theory (Strauss, 1978), and which Glaser 
included in his mainline family of social order and interaction.   
Alongside context setting two other properties emerged transiently in the initial 
stages of data analysis, but ultimately never became fully saturated from 
subsequent transcript analysis; these were the concepts of  
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(i) ‘Calibrating performance against reality’ (which emerged from participant 
B’s eloquent anticipation of gauging what sort of problem would form the focus of 
the simulation); 
‘My anxiety lay with would I gauge the correct severity of the problem. I am going to 
underestimate it because I know it is a problem that you would expect me to diagnose 
or you wouldn’t give it to use; it can’t be anything too serious or complicated but I 
don’t want to underestimate the severity of this condition-he’s talking and breathing 
and we’re not in emergency ward ‘(PB). 
 
(ii)  ‘Consultation viewed as data gathering without a diagnostic aim’ which also 
took root in PB’s comments below; 
‘My aim is to gather information, because we’re not supposed to make diagnoses, 
knowing that we don’t know everything yet. I might think it’s most likely to be one 
thing but there’s a whole of other things that I haven’t heard of that it could be, so I’m 
approaching it as the information gatherer and I’ve got to be more like a detective in 
that respect rather than giving a verdict, coming up with different options, my list is 
probably only a third of what it will be in years to come, so I’m trying to get as much 
information as is relevant to a tummy problem’ (PB). 
 
Both of these quotations from the same participant became peripheral to the 
property of context setting, but nevertheless gave an illuminating insight into one 
person’s view of the interaction.  The sub-properties in the data arising from context 
setting gave expression to the emergence of the transient property of ontological 
insecurity, giving rise to the idea that the participants create context for themselves 
which limits boundaries in role, thereby impinging on cognition and role parameters. 
They are in effect saying, ‘my role as a medical student at this stage of the course 
means that I have defined parameters, both in behaviour and thought’.  
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Ontological insecurity encapsulates Mead’s view of ‘self-concept’ in that it questions 
how we come to view personal identity and role, and how that is influenced by 
interaction with others, and how we subsequently  create the ‘social self’ (1934). The 
view of oneself is determined by a number of interactions and understanding of what 
is required by the institution and others (peers, teachers, etc) at any particular stage 
of professional development. 
The ontological view would be underpinned in most circumstances by 
epistemological limitations i.e.  the boundaries of biomedical knowledge at this stage 
of professional development, and the restricted experience of the clinical application 
of knowledge with patients, described by Eraut as ‘professional knowledge and 
competence’ (1994). This comment incorporates the theories of skill acquisition 
within professional expertise put forward by Benner (1984), the Dreyfus brothers 
(1986) and the normative process of cognitive expertise described by Schmidt’s 
group (1990). 
However, the epistemological ideas in Table N were poorly saturated from the data 
analysis and encompassed few comments about clinical knowledge deficits arising 
from limited patient contact and this resonates with Graber’s findings that knowledge 
deficits represent only 3.4 % of errors in diagnostic reasoning (Graber, 2005). 
Within the ontological perspective lies the central role of reasoning which 
encompasses inferences about relationships between things, events, and people 
(Mead, 1938). The constant reconstruction of meanings from experience described 
by Charon means that the participants have developed a role limiting mechanism at 
this stage of their development consistent with their limited exposure in practice 
(1979).  
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Table N: Limited reflections upon an epistemological base 
 
Excerpts from data Analytical Memo 
“You don’t necessarily know what to look out for 
so you just ask general questions and hope that 
something comes up or something gets ruled out, 
sometimes makes one option more likely or less likely 
than it was before”. (PA discussing ‘ruling out 
mechanism’ illustrating an epistemological deficit) 
Scattergun approach to collecting 
data due to knowledge issues 
 
“Not exactly, no. I got a general idea since gastro 
is one of my weak points, I don’t exactly know 
what I’m looking for or where I’m going so I just 
go through the structure and see what comes 
up....it sets off a pattern recognition receptor”. (PA) 
 
Participant defining weak 
knowledge base 
 
“I’m not sure with GORD whether it improves after 
you’ve just eaten or the timescale of it getting better 
or worse, and the fact that it’s not gone away”. (PF) 
 
Basic deficit in symptoms 
description for GORD 
 
“This brother thing, this is where if I had better 
knowledge, knowledge of epidemiology and the 
hereditary link of stomach acid problems 
 
Epidemiological knowledge deficit 
“To the extent that some pancreatitis which might be 
causing some pain, but because my knowledge isn’t 
vast about how pancreatitis presents, and I’ve not 
had a chance to see patients with pancreatitis”. (PF) 
Poor clinical knowledge of 
pancreatitis based upon limited 
patient exposure 
 
 
In order to compensate for epistemological and ontological insecurity they have 
used a contextualising mechanism to create negotiated, social order within the 
simulation which to some degree has been learnt from exposure to similar events in 
the curriculum (e.g. simulated consultation with actors in year 2). 
However, the concept of negotiated order arose more from abduction than any 
significant saturation in the data in terms of explicit comments from the participants. 
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The memo below distils some of my thoughts during this part of the data analysis, 
before the key idea of compensation or adaptation was firmly adopted as a central 
dimension. Ontological and epistemological insecurity are very much features of a 
tenuous abductive idea without any theoretical saturation in the data. 
 
Theoretical Memo 
(March 2012) 
 
Medical students at this stage of professional development work from a position of 
ontological and epistemological insecurity, being relatively unable to apply or 
combine theoretical knowledge with limited clinical exposure in Medicine. To 
compensate for this deficit they adopt a number of cognitive mechanisms such as 
learnt frameworks and heuristics (e.g. SOCRATES), and context setting. This provides 
some boundaries for action and thought including the role of diagnostic reasoning 
and the goal for history taking in the simulation. Negotiated order is required of the 
interaction with the actor and this provides a structured framework alongside the use 
of the traditional medical history format (TMH). Some of the mechanisms employed 
reflect a naive interpretation of key clinical rules e.g. ‘rule in, rule out’ strategy, cancer 
being the case limiting condition. 
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6.1.7 The ‘contribution’ of the physical examination 
In conflating the ideas described in the previous subsections there was an 
awareness of the relative absence of one feature, coined a ‘black hole’ in one 
memo; with the growing sense of reflexivity that emerged gradually throughout the 
data analysis, one property  emerged as ‘the elephant in the room’. I became aware 
that during discussions with fellow research colleagues using GTT, my description of 
the findings never included how the participants utilised the examination features 
given to them after their initial diagnostic ideas were formulated, based upon the 
history alone. This prompted a further deductive cycle of analysis to determine 
whether this change in theoretical sensitivity was validated in the data, or as 
Charmaz suggests ‘to illuminate variation and identify gaps that require elaboration’ 
(2006). 
Returning to the data on diagnostic opinions towards the end of the simulation 
(before the reflective discussions) might unearth data around the provision of the 
examination details.  However, if theoretical sensitivity means awareness of 
subtleties in the meanings of the data, including insight and the capacity to 
understand features of the data (Strauss & Corbin, 1990: 41-47), then can this be 
extrapolated or abducted to data that implies a deficit?  The potential risk in doing so 
was to force the data. 
The first sub question from the research proposal (1.2) states: To establish what 
features of a simulated consultation provide most information for the student to 
assimilate and process towards a tentative diagnosis. Reflexive insight was 
enhanced by returning to this statement by challenging the implicit assumption in 
this statement written almost 2 years prior to the data analysis i.e. there was an 
expectation that examination features would play a part in the diagnostic process for 
the participants (as would be expected for an experienced clinician). 
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Table O: Perspectives on the examination features 
 
Excerpts from data: 
PB in response to researcher suggesting that she can ask about attendant examination 
features: 
 
“Physical exam not diagnostic tests? I’d want to know if his abdomen was 
distended”. 
(Researcher: ‘He has epigastric tenderness, normal bowel sounds and no mass’) 
 
“Tender? General appearance and whether there is sort of guarding or things 
when you’re touching....? 
 
“We talked about Bowel sounds and they’re normal so we haven’t got any 
obstruction going on....... (pause) ....the most obvious things to me are whether 
there’s a mass or a blockage, a hernia or ulcer, but as none of that seems as likely 
as gastritis due to alcohol I guess I’ve narrowed down in my mind too quickly , 
but it’s all pointing that way now”. (PB) 
 
 
When give examination details of the abdomen; 
 
 “Definitely not any cancer but it solidifies the thought of a hiatus hernia, the 
location there, maybe gastric region ‘cos that’s just above the stomach”. (PI) 
 
 
“I guess I’d want to do a GI exam on her, I’d quite like to know how she’d respond 
to palpitation (clear error in pronunciation) of the stomach”. 
 
Researcher: ’I can tell you her examination shows epigastric tenderness on light 
palpation but no mass, and the bowel sounds are normal”. 
 
“Doesn’t tell me a huge amount more does it? It tells me that there is tenderness 
in that area......”.(PD) 
 
 
“I’d like to examine her abdomen just to feel if there’s any tenderness, a general 
feel of it, and her appearance, and maybe ask for a urine dipstix test if that’s 
possible?.” 
 
Researcher: ‘Ok on abdominal examination, she has epigastric tenderness with no mass 
on light palpation, and her bowel sounds are normal.” 
 
“Well that fact that he has epigastric tenderness on light palpation, that fits in with 
his story of having a pain in that area. Also the fact that he’s not jaundiced at all 
would suggest if you were thinking some gall stone blockage or biliary colic, you 
may expect to have jaundice in that sort of area, so although it doesn’t rule it out, 
it changes how kind of acute..... gall stones might be”(fades away) (PH) 
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Although no clear properties emerged initially, when analysed further it appeared as 
if the data gathering process became uncoupled for most of the participants i.e. the 
relative comfort of the history taking process was high jacked by asking them for 
projected examinations details (Table O). This is rather starkly illustrated by the 
excerpt below. When prompted about what examination features would she like to 
ask for, PC responds (Pause for 9 seconds with sighs): 
 
“I guess take a urine sample, a blood sample, but I’m not sure how you would test for 
peptic ulcers.” 
 
(Researcher reiterates that examination features can be supplied only) 
 
“To confirm the area of pain, see if there’s any swelling, or inflammation, rash”.  (And 
goes on with Sigh)  
“Erm...... Well it isn’t cancer, because that would be (holding stomach; pause 
again).......there’s no mass there.......possibly a build up of gas if it’s there on light 
palpation”.  (PC) 
 
This particular example was notable for the long pauses whilst the participant 
considered what she wanted to gain from the examination features. It stood at one 
end of a spectrum of comments with the feeling that this participant was a loss to 
explore the physical examination features. All the discussions except one revealed a 
lack of systematic thought in approaching the examination as if the linking of 
sequences was disturbed by the changed contingency i.e. unexpected events 
bringing about a change in conditions (Strauss & Corbin, ibid, 143; Glaser, 1978).  
 
This idea emerged from my interaction with the data yet my interpretation has been 
qualified by considering my reflexivity, leading to the premise that there is relatively 
less integration occurring when the parameters of the physical examination are 
being considered.  By comparison with the diagnostic discussion based upon the 
history alone, the subsequent section discussing how diagnostic thought had been 
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influenced by the extra examination features was characterised by indecision and 
poor knowledge organisation (almost a ‘scatter gun’ approach?).  
For example, PB was able to analyse her thoughts quite succinctly when asked 
about her likely diagnosis from the history:  
“Erm, most likely Gastritis, but without any definitive tests you can’t say. I don’t think 
it’s GORD as it’s not eased by milk and persisting although there is still a chance that 
it’s manifesting itself slightly differently, but I feel that gastritis is the most likely”. 
 
But when it came to ask for examination features the approach was far from 
systematic and intra-case comparison illustrated the disparity between the modes of 
enquiry: 
“Physical examination not diagnostic tests? I’d want to know if his abdomen was 
distended. Tender? General appearance and whether there is sort of guarding or 
things when you’re touching?”(PB) 
 
Similarly, PA demonstrates this disjunction between using historical data and 
examination details in a diagnostic context. The fist quote is her diagnostic decision 
based upon the history alone. 
“I would be tempted to go down a gastritis route. 
Excess acid irritating the stomach” 
 
When asked about what examination details she would like her response lacks to 
same clarity of thought; 
 
“I’d like to palpate the abdomen to see if there were any lumps and bumps, any type 
of anomaly there” 
 
With one or two exceptions there is a sense that participants are reaching out for 
key pointers to exclude certain illnesses e.g. absence of a mass, presence of 
distension to suggest obstruction, or generic issues such as inflammation. The 
conversations also tended to revert towards the explanation on history alone without 
any integrated thought and blurred thought slipped into a discussion of 
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investigations occasionally. The systematic nature of the information gathering 
during the clinical history stood in stark contrast to the rather disjointed thought 
patterns when the subject of the examination features arose. 
The temptation was to compare the findings with the research base which could be 
construed as ‘forcing the data’ (in particular the Four Stage theory of expertise). 
Current theory about clinical cognition has little specific to offer about the use of 
examination features per se, except that along with other features they play a part in 
the formation of elaborated causal pathways that link features of an illness together. 
In general, the participants’ use of the examination features available after the 
simulation represents a more chaotic picture, with poor propositional networks to 
explain relationships between symptoms and signs. It is far more likely that the 
limited exposure to examining patients in Phase1 acts as a constraint to integrating 
the physical examination with the features of the history. 
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6.1.8 Diagnostic Reasoning: Emergent Semantic Ideas and Organisation 
Previous sections of the case findings have alluded to limitations in the reasoning 
processes where cognition is restricted by their inexperience in hearing descriptions 
of illness (particularly pain). Their reliance upon basic biomedical causality 
(predisposing or risk behaviour), and misinterpretation of conditional reasoning are 
examples of poorly developed cognitive strategies; however there are also 
fascinating insights into the emergent thoughts being demonstrated by the 
participants which do suggest higher levels of cognition (Table P).  
There are examples of a deeper level of interpretation of the symptoms (semantic 
analysis), what is meant by them, manner in which they are expressed, and the 
linkage between various parts of the history with inferences made from those 
observations. There is evidence from the transcripts of consideration of the content 
of symptoms i.e. the substance, but also at a deeper level the inference or related 
abstraction implied by the comment i.e. structural semantics (Greimas, 1983; 
Bordage & Lemieux, 1991), e.g. 
“Thinking fevers and pulse rates, that all seems to be normal for him, so he does seem 
quite well on his general observations despite his gastric tenderness which perhaps with 
more acute things he may not be”(PH). 
PH is making an inference that because the physiological parameters of the 
examination (temperature, pulse, blood pressure) do not show significant 
constitutional upset, this conveys an idea about what might be causing the problem. 
This is pitched at a general level of severity, demarcating something straightforward 
from an illness of more significance, and indeed a consideration of excluding illness 
of a more acute onset which often causes constitutional deterioration more rapidly.  
Similarly, PA’s comment about a ‘fever that would suggest a systemic thing’ implies 
that the participant is generating a diagnostic hypothesis about systemic infection 
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which is ruled about by the absence of a fever and the fact that he ‘hasn’t seemed 
particularly unwell’. 
 
Table P: Semantic qualifiers 
Examples of Semantic Qualifying statements 
 
Quotation Analytical memos 
 
 
“If there is epigastric tenderness and it came on whilst 
he was eating fatty foods....uhm... then he hasn’t 
seemed particularly unwell, he hasn’t had a fever 
that would suggest a systemic thing”.(PA) 
 
“It wasn’t something like one time food poisoning, it 
was getting worse and he considered it important 
enough to come to the doctor”. (PA) 
 
“That he’s experienced this before and it’s not a new 
dramatic thing to him, that he thinks it’s serious enough 
to come, it hasn’t cleared up like it did last time” (PB) 
 
“I certainly doesn’t pin point anything for me. Thinking 
fevers and pulse rates, that all seems to be normal for 
him, so he does seem quite well on his general 
observations  despite his gastric tenderness which 
perhaps with more acute things he may not be”. (PH) 
 
You’re looking at the fact that he’s presented with this 
pain for five days and it’s a fluctuating pain. I think 
that’s an interesting feature, just trying to work 
out whether this is an acute pain or something 
that’s more long term. I thought that was an 
important thing to identify. (PH) 
“Perhaps it’s got to the point cumulatively that 
drinking or eating this type of food has made it 
worse, and the condition’s progressed..........”. 
(PF) 
 
“Yeah, it made me realise that she was a serious 
case that had come in, it was something that needed 
to be addressed straight away, that was the impression 
that I got more and more as it went on.......” (PD) 
 
 
Inference about impact of illness 
systemically and with time  i.e. 
semantic qualifiers (SQ) 
 
 
Semantic Qualifier (SQ)-this is an 
on-going problem of enough 
severity to seek advice 
 
Teasing out the difference between 
an acute problem against a longer 
term (and persistent) problem= 
abstraction 
 
 
Inference about impact of disease in 
systemic terms (looking at the 
illness at a higher level) 
 
 
 
SQ- ‘acute on chronic’ analysis of 
the temporality of illness 
 
 
 
 
Inference about escalation of illness 
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In essence, the participant is making an inference from two bits of data on general 
health and coming to a conclusion about what sort of illness can be excluded 
(inductive strategy). This is in keeping with the idea that semantic qualifiers provide 
scaffolding for knowledge, and in this case systemic illness against non-systemic 
illness, characterised by the physiological parameters of the case (Bordage, 2007). 
Through a process of chunking various details together, there are occasional 
realisations of a ‘tipping point’ within the history, or a deeper appreciation of what 
this means for the patient and the participant. 
 
“I suppose that they were different, this was a lot worse, and milk wasn’t making this 
better, and the pain wasn’t going away after 3 days but getting worse after 5 days, 
made me think that maybe the things that happened before.............I don’t know how to 
describe it.....pushing towards something bad happening, something had pushed her 
over the edge; some sort of significant problem had happened within her abdomen” 
(PD). 
 
It also illustrates the richness of the meanings and understanding within the 
discourse of the consultation (and subsequent reflective discussion), This richness 
is seen in more successful diagnosticians compared with less successful ones who 
fail to recognise the abstract semantic representations in the data (Bordage, 1986; 
Chang et al, 1998). 
“I’m thinking it’s related to the drinking, potentially the nurofen, and the smoking can 
irritate the stomach, and combined with food, spicy food & lost of food. What he called 
indigestion I might agree with that” (PA). 
 
There is consideration of the representation of an illness at a higher level than a 
disparate mix of apparently unrelated symptoms, implying that causal networks are 
already partly formed and in some cases beginning to adopt an abridged form. In 
the quotation above there is compilation of the predisposing features encapsulated 
across the features of risk behaviour (drinking, smoking, food, and medication), 
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alongside other features in the history to provide an accurate pattern of an early 
‘illness script’, with a diagnostic label of indigestion. What this exemplifies is an 
emergent ability of knowledge organisation i.e. pulling bits of data together that have 
a relationship using simple terms, and organising them into a format that 
approximates the features of a defined illness (Table Q). 
 
Table Q: Knowledge Organisation and Flexibility 
Excerpts 
 
Analytical comments 
 
 
“I suppose so there is so much information coming at 
you at once you want to organise it a little and take it 
one at a time instead of trying to do everything at 
once and forgetting important details and also you want 
to cover all the posts and I find it helps with structure, just 
to have it there”. (PA) 
 
“...but I do find it difficult to hold all that information in your 
head at once, particularly when you’re seeing lots of 
different patients elsewhere”. (PH) 
 
“Like certain things like the presenting complaint that I 
was discussing later on in the consultation, even though 
the general flow has moved away, but I felt that they were 
important to clarify even though it wasn’t necessarily in 
the right  place. So I think comes with practice and make 
sure you’re trying to cover all the areas”.(PH) 
 
“He said something that I could back to, plot it in, organise 
my mind a bit, hopefully not miss things out”. (PA) 
 
“…….but I struggle with the overall picture, rather than 
I think of just one question and its response and 
focus in on that one piece of information rather than 
everything that they’ve told me”. (PI) 
 
Just to ask questions that are relevant to the information 
being given and try to tailor the questions along the way 
to the information that I’m getting throughout the 
interview, whilst at the same time trying to stick to some 
structure (PI) 
 
Labels and Memos 
Coping with amount of data in 
working memory and 
Knowledge organisation 
 
 
Limits of working memory i.e. 
Bounded Rationality (Simon & 
Newell). 
Knowledge organisation 
 
Flexibility of thought and 
looping back to presenting 
complaint 
 
 
 
 
Flexibility and looping back to 
confirm information  
 
Limited flexibility implying 
problem with globalising problem 
and retention of data. 
 
 
Limited remit and restricted 
flexibility of gathering data 
whilst at the same time keeping 
structure 
 
 
 
 
However, as we have already seen knowledge organisation is still reliant upon 
cognitive strategies to act as failsafe mechanisms, and various quotations endorse 
the idea of limited flexibility in thought, at least sufficient to move significantly away 
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from the main framework for the consultation if the actor leads them in that direction. 
This implies that the participants are still reliant upon the TMH as ‘scaffolding’ to 
keep them on track during the consultation, ensuring that they have covered all of 
the sections pertinent to the problem at hand, and conferring a mechanism which in 
part controls the considerable amount of data evolving from the consultation.  
Within the organisational features bestowed by using mental scaffolding such as the 
TMH format is the ability to enable looping which appears to acts as a deductive 
mechanism, allowing the participant to revisit previous information received earlier in 
the consultation for the purpose of clarification or corroboration. Clarification and 
looping were seen frequently during the simulations illustrated by these quotations: 
 
“He said something that I could back to, plot it in, organise my mind a bit, hopefully 
not miss things out”. (PA) 
“I think really trying to keep the structure because that gives it a more fluid (rolls 
hands over one another), and there were times when I was coming and going a little 
bit,......, it’s not necessarily going back and forth that’s the problem, sometimes you 
need to, it’s making sure that you are really thorough when you do those things and 
really cover everything you want to. Just sometimes taking a step back and saying 
‘I’ve got this, this, and this’, what more could I wanting to ask that’s relevant? (PH) 
 
PH conveys the idea that going ‘back and forth’ in the history’ is expected (looping), 
but rather this is facilitated by the structured format of the TMH which controls the 
parameters and components of the consultation or what PI calls ‘the struggle with 
the overall picture’ (cf. Benner’s novice stage being reliant upon guidelines). He 
conveys the tension between emergent knowledge organisation and the relative lack 
of flexibility to respond in a fluid way to incoming information, and not to feel anxious 
about losing control illustrated by this quotation:  
“In the middle of interviewing there’s a lot of things going on in your mind, you think I 
have to get through everything else. Cos sometimes it’s uncomfortable, I’m not that 
experienced in taking histories, and I’m not that comfortable in front of patients to 
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take a pause to gather my thoughts, I always feel I have to keep going and asking 
questions”. (PI) 
 
However PI goes on to comment about the need to step back and take a pause in 
proceedings, signifying that she is considering her consultation style and making 
adjustments for future practice. This implies a higher level of functioning and 
reflexivity in learning from the experience and constructing a different way of 
behaviour. Allowing for the continued reliance upon a working framework typified by 
the novice stage of behaviour, the participants demonstrate reflection upon their 
actions with metacognitive concepts emerging in some cases, which suggest there 
are features comparable with the Advanced Beginner in terms of some of their 
thinking. Cf. Benner’s Advanced Beginner:  ‘Can perform acceptably and, from prior 
experience, will notice recurrent, relevant, general characteristics of a situation, but 
needs support to prioritise’.  
One or two participants appear to be acknowledging some of the early 
characteristics of deliberative and metacognitive processes associated with 
controlling and directing one’s own behaviour, with a view to restructuring data 
collection during the consultation (Schmidt et al, 1990; Schmidt & Rikers, 2007). 
Most of the participants’ remarks refer to restructuring or organising knowledge 
rather than focusing upon the content, which implies they recognise that 
‘repackaging’ or processing information is required through a more flexible approach 
to data collection. 
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6.2  Learning from the experience 
One of the recognized outcomes of watching filmed interviewing is the impact of 
transformative learning utilising reflection upon action/performance (Mezirow, 1991; 
Schon, 1987). The reflective discussions provoked a number of issues including 
reflection upon performance, performance anxiety, learning to do things differently 
through intrinsic feedback (Laurillade, 1997), awareness of premature closure in the 
diagnostic process, active listening skills, and flexibility of thought illustrated by 
some of the quotations below (Table R).  
Many of these properties reflect assimilation of the experience into the cognitive 
structures of the participant, but also changes in cognition as a result of the 
simulation experience (accommodation) e.g. PE’s earlier comments in Table M 
about premature closure (“making her mind up too early”) . She has recognized an 
error in her clinical judgment and processing of information which now provides a 
fuller understanding of how this can be corrected (constructivism). This is far more 
powerful as a message than listening to a lecture about premature diagnostic 
closure which would have little relevance without such an experience.  
There are a number of themes which pervade the comments above, including the 
idea of managing time within the interview and not rushing the process of 
information gathering (linked to premature closure). Remarks about allowing space 
for more thoughtful and reflective ideas about why they were asking questions, 
rather than the taught behaviour of what to ask within the medical history; and finally  
the skill of active listening which resonates with the concept of cognitive 
management and ordering of information in short term memory.   
Contrast this with the process driven behaviour usually demonstrated amongst 
novices and it suggests deeper thought about why such skills are important, and in 
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the case of active listening eradicating lapses in concentration which would lead to 
errors in information gathering. 
Table R: Learning from the experience 
 
Excerpts from data 
 
 
Thinking beyond the process of data collection: 
 
“Learning to be more thoughtful about what you’re asking patients and why you’re 
asking...’cos in the first couple of year we’ve just been taught a list almost of what you need 
to ask. We’re always being told what things are important to you. So we know you have to 
ask about family history, aspect of pain, drugs etc but were not always taught why those 
things are important. I think I’ll learn to be thoughtful about asking rather than just asking 
blindly...” (PD) 
 
Confidence/comfort within consultation-using time for organisation.  
 
“In the middle of interviewing there’s a lot of things going on in your mind, you think I have 
to get through everything else. Cos sometimes it’s uncomfortable, I’m not that experienced 
in taking histories, and I’m not that comfortable in front  of  patients to take a pause to 
gather my thoughts, I always feel I have to keep going and asking questions. Maybe if I 
took a few pauses, although I had these ideas throughout the interview I never paused 
and tried to couple my ideas together and think out rule something ‘cos I always felt 
the need to carry on questions, getting the time to gather the information, and then at the 
end of the consultation you’ve got more pieces of information”.(PI) 
 
Researcher; What insight has gained from watching yourself into taking histories, anything 
as a result of watching yourself back on this? 
 
“I would say be more comfortable with the process but that comes from experience, feeling 
comfortable table to take to take a pause to assimilate the information, and also I’ve 
realised this prior to doing this today that at the end of the interview I kind of rush through 
it,.......... just to feel more comfortable taking my time, gathering my thoughts.(PI) 
 
 
     “I cringe when I watch myself, I seem really expressionless. When he was talking  
about drinking with his wife in the evenings and his mates, he meant most days. It’s this 
need to feel that I push on with the interview”. 
      Researcher: So you were so involved with the process that you didn’t recognise something  
      as an issue in front of you? “Yeah. That’s not active listening towards the end”.(PI) 
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As observed in other studies on simulation using retrospective discussions about 
decision making, the concept of post-hoc rationalisation was evident as illustrated by 
the first quotation below from PI (Schmidt et al, 1988: Norman et al 1989). 
Retrospective protocols are based upon discussion about what has already 
happened, rather than ‘think aloud’ protocols which verbalise decisions/thoughts as 
they occur in real time (Higgs et al, Ch 17, 2008). It is evident that watching the 
simulation back elicited different diagnostic ideas when compared to the real time 
footage.  
On several occasions this process was demonstrated and clarification sought by the 
researcher as to whether diagnostic reasoning was in real time or retrospective. The 
participants were generally very honest in their appraisal of retrospective thought 
and admitting to revised diagnoses during the reflective discussion (post hoc 
rationalisation), and appeared to recognise that this was an inherent part of the 
process without fear of assessment or criticism. When Participant I was reminded 
that neither of these two diagnoses were mentioned during her initial diagnostic 
formulation and that she was rationalising after the event... 
“I know (smiling.) So PU (peptic ulcer) or HH (hiatus hernia) can be aggravated by 
various foods at the party and also he was drinking alcohol, both of them can be 
aggravated by it, aggravated by acidic food or drink. So also the  milk was a 
neutralising effect and the location was the stomach, so all those three things come 
together”. 
 
Later this comment was added about her realisation of the importance of the impact 
of the NSAIDs upon the stomach problem: 
“I did elicit that he was taking the painkillers for his knee, my impression was that he 
was taking for his knee, not his stomach. But I should have asked him how long he 
had been taking the painkillers ‘cos now I’m thinking NSAIDS and GI disturbance and 
at the time, I wasn’t! That’s like a key thing”. (PI) 
Similarly, Participant D made this comment about the drug related risk factor never 
considered in the original diagnostic formulation; 
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“She seems to suggest that she’s taking quite a lot of Nurofen for her knees, and that 
cause gastric ulcers and  things like that, in the stomach, in the abdomen; so now I 
think about it maybe that could be the issue.” (PD) 
 
One of the significant issues arising from explanations after the event is that 
participants ‘descriptions of decision making during the simulation process can be 
altered by retrospective rationalisation.  The participants have recognised their own 
individual learning needs through a safe and positive environment of the reflective 
discussion without any negative feedback. Although debriefing with feedback has 
been highlighted as the ‘most important phase for determining clinical judgement’ 
and allows reflection upon learning, this group are achieving this task intrinsically 
(McGaghie et al, 2010; Lasater, 2007). Although this study gave participants the 
opportunity to opt for a debrief after the reflective discussion (off film), it is clear that 
the intrinsic conversation that the participants have with themselves during the 
reflective discussion acts as a form of substantial feedback on the experience, with 
constructive ideas for future practice (Laurillade, 1997). 
In this respect, all of the features mentioned above reflect adaptations in conceptual 
structures in response to watching back the simulation, and a rationalisation process 
during the reflective discussion (Bradley, 2003). This idea supports the premise that 
patient simulation promotes transformative learning through the construction of 
different cognitive strategies toward becoming an independent practitioner (Parker & 
Myrick, 2010) and incorporates the suggestion that learners ‘construe, validate, and 
reformulate the meaning of their experience’ (Cranton, 1994: 22). It also resonates 
with the interlinked concepts of cognitivism and symbolic interactionism which 
suggest that learners construct new ideas through their interaction with the world (in 
this case the simulation) through internal mental processes (Blumer, 1969; Bruner, 
1966). 
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6.3 Summary of Findings 
The themes that have been discussed create a landscape of interlinked ideas 
emanating from the reflexive discussions and my interrogation of the data. The 
various properties arising from the study have generated a significant pattern of 
related concepts which appear to fashion a substantive theory describing their 
thinking in the context of the simulation, even though the participants’ views about 
their global understanding of diagnostic reasoning are insufficient to attain 
theoretical saturation. 
Two key dimensions emerge from the findings: The first dimension suggests that the 
participants are using intermediary adaptive mechanisms within the simulation by 
employing a number of (learnt) cognitive strategies, and therefore by proxy to any 
other stand-alone experience involving diagnostic reasoning.  However, some of 
these strategies are poorly refined without full understanding of guidelines and 
probabilities; this is having an impact upon conditional reasoning which will be 
discussed in the next chapter. 
In varying degrees, these strategies include context creation within the simulation 
which appears to limit role and expectations to passing on data gained from the 
consultation process. As might be anticipated the participants display reliance upon 
learnt frameworks to facilitate and organise the cognitive load created by the influx 
of information. Immersed within this sudden influx the features of risk behaviour 
(hard data) appear to be used more effectively as causal attributes in the 
explanation of disease compared with the subjective features of the pain descriptor 
(softer data unsupported by experiential knowledge?).  
The combination of causal attributes conveys more about the development of 
pattern recognition and chunking of key information by the participants within the 
clinical history, and by comparison, there is no significant integration of the physical 
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examination features as part of any clinical pattern. The ‘black hole’ suggested in 
the data around the interpretation of the physical features in the case descriptor 
provided both an examination of my reflexivity, and a stark comparison with the 
fluency of using features from the history. 
Furthermore, the findings provide some important evidence of how adaptation can 
sometimes contribute towards cognitive errors through the examples of ‘naive 
cognition’ which are underpinned by erroneous anchoring judgments about disease 
probability (base rate neglect). This is a significant finding as it provides a picture of 
what can go wrong in data interpretation at this early stage, why it is happening, and 
how adjustments in teaching methods may provide better understanding of some 
important clinical concepts.  
The second dimension confirms that learning from the experience is evident in the 
reflexive discussions and facilitates intrinsic conversations where clinical practice 
can be reconstructed by the participant (i.e. Transformative Learning). Within this 
dimension, there are indications of the appreciation of semantic qualifying 
statements and higher cognition demonstrated in the quotations, leading to 
deliberative questioning of aspects of diagnostic practice e.g. premature closure. 
When considered in the context of the Dreyfus model of skills acquisition this 
suggests that some areas of cognition have out stripped the novice stage. 
Chapter 7 will enlarge upon these points and link the relevant findings to the original 
research questions. 
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7 Chapter 7: Discussion 
 
7.1 Link to the research questions 
If the ideas within this study are going to be useful, they need to inform future 
practice (both the students’ clinical practice, and the teaching practice of faculty) and 
create some original thought which furnishes new views on current theory. Any 
theory must have credibility through utilising a rigorous research process, in this 
case using the constant comparative process across data from all the participants 
with theoretical saturation in the key themes (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). The high 
fidelity simulation approach used in this study has high face validity and it can 
generate practical solutions to the problems through its influence on the researcher 
and subsequent teaching in the curriculum. 
The original research question posed in the research application was ‘How do 
novice medical students approach diagnostic decisions and what factors 
contribute to this process’? This was broken down into the following sub-
questions which were used to explore different aspects of the domain through 
data from the simulations and reflexive discussions: 
 ‘What features of a simulated consultation provide the most information for the 
student to assimilate and process towards a tentative diagnosis’  
  ‘How the diagnostic process is constructed from the perspective of the student’  
 ‘Are the students able to analyse decision making and stimulate learning?’ 
 ‘What dimensions can be drawn from the data to provide a more effective theory 
through which we can understand diagnostic reasoning at this stage of 
learning?’ 
  ‘How can teaching methods be further developed to acknowledge the student 
perspective?’ 
 
 185 
 
The case findings and dimensions of the data will be discussed in the context of 
the questions in the next four subsections, however the most interesting and 
thought provoking data from this study arises from the properties labelled ‘Naive 
Cognition’, and the ‘contribution of the physical examination’. These are both 
areas which have redefined my thoughts about what is going on in these 
participants’ minds and provide clues as to how they attempt to cope with a fairly 
new situation in their professional development i.e. stand alone decision making.  
 
Figure N: The substantive theory of intermediary cognitive adaptation 
 alongside other theory 
 
 
The property of naive cognition contributes appreciably to the substantive theory 
which suggests that a form of intermediary cognitive adaptation is occurring at 
this particular transition in the curriculum. Some components of this adaptive 
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process provide an effective support mechanism, others less so. Although this 
transition is associated with cognitive heuristics which have been encompassed 
under the term ‘naive’ cognition, it does provide a possible link between 
cognitive expertise expressed through the normative theory, and how errors 
might originate in subsequent practice (Figure N). 
Naive cognition reflects a lack of understanding about disease probability and 
the anchoring judgments that accompany this train of thought (base rate 
neglect). Subsequent anchoring judgements should be informed by future 
teaching and most importantly by experiential knowledge gained through patient 
encounters. However, these participants do not have this luxury at this stage in 
their development and therefore have to rely upon strategies which are not fully 
developed or indeed understood e.g. the law of restrictive rule outs.  
The phrase, ‘rule in, rule out’ appears to be applied with poor discrimination to 
factors in the narrative and examination without due understanding of the 
underlying guideline. It conveys a sense of ‘black and white’ thinking with clear 
boundaries where individual features of disease are not interpreted through 
either patterns or indeed using probability. This is not surprising as the 
participants do not have the benefit of the larger contextual picture created 
through extensive situated learning in clinical practice (Lave & Wenger, 1991; 
Durning et al. 2011).  
In contrast, data gathering reliant upon frameworks appears more robust than 
the foundations of the participants’ conditional reasoning facility.  The reliance 
upon taught frameworks and mnemonics appears to be providing a fallback 
position in data collection whist they bridge a gap in cognitive expertise where 
the repetitive nature of patient contact has not created ‘automatic’ practice. 
(Ericsson, 2004) These frameworks or schemes only appear to work for the 
history taking component of the simulation, and the same cannot be said of the 
way in which the physical examination details are integrated into the whole 
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picture alongside the history. This is where thought processes appear to become 
‘uncoupled’ and the systematic approach used by the participants in history 
taking is not replicated.   
The integrated curriculum approach involving early patient contact has not yet 
provided a platform through which the participants can start integrating the 
history with the physical examination. The assumption here is that further 
experiential practice will facilitate adaptive clinical cognition to replace these 
faulty heuristics later in the curriculum. These points will be discussed in the next 
section when the substantive theory will be compared to the prevailing theories 
on cognitive expertise, and where this study adds to current ideas. 
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7.1.1 Does this study construct a different view of diagnostic reasoning 
compared with other research? 
The findings from this study provide a valuable counterbalance with existing 
normative theory through the examples of where cognition appears to goes wrong. 
In this sense it gives provides practical examples of how faulty heuristic thinking 
might evolve at this stage of professional development. Specifically it adds 
suggestions as to what may be happening during a transitional stage in 
development where there are changing expectations in a diagnostic role. Indeed, 
after the first clinical attachment in year 3 they are assessed using an oral, case-
based discussion (CbD) which entails diagnostic justification.  
This transition can be viewed from the dual perspective of their interaction with 
patients, and also what faculty expects of them in the assessment process i.e. they 
have moved from facilitated practice to ‘stand alone’ encounters with patients which 
entails diagnostic reasoning, rather than pure data gathering. Indeed this simulation 
is likely to be one of the first exposures to stand alone practice with the added 
burden of being asked to make a diagnostic decision on film.  
Any theory purporting to explain how the participants cope in this relatively new 
setting, has to accommodate the idea of transition based upon what has gone 
before in the curriculum. The integrated curriculum approach provides early 
exposure to patient contact and amongst the benefits for this group of students 
appears to be the relative comfort in history taking, backed up by the learnt 
schematic frameworks; however, this is not demonstrated in integration of the 
examination features and this represents a divergence in using data of this type in 
diagnostic formulation. The propositional relationship between narrative cues in the 
history and the examination details is clearly less refined than the linkage visible in 
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the descriptions of the causal attributes derived from utilising risk behaviour. The 
next stage in the curriculum in Phase 2 (years 3 & 4) should provide enough 
exposure to allow better integration of the examination; however our participants are 
only just embarking on this transitional period. 
Viewed from the perspective of social theory, this stage of professional development 
encompasses a change in the context of situated learning (conditions) i.e. a change 
in the interaction with patients and ‘self-concept’ (Mead 1934; Blumer, 1969). This 
also influences the development of thinking ability within the social environment 
(Meltzer, 1975), and the recognition of new symbols and language which involves 
reconstructing their meanings for ideas and terms through prior interaction (Charon, 
1979).  
The research perspective has been viewed through the theoretical lens of SI, so 
what has been learnt? The simulations strongly reflect data gathering influenced by 
frameworks such as SOCRATES and the discussions endorse this perspective. This 
implies that the meaning of the consultation is primarily data gathering, with little 
thought beyond that process. Other properties of the data such as context creation 
and role limitation are aligned to this suggestion. The participants do not appear to 
have a clear global perspective on the diagnostic process other than for occasional 
comments about the data gathering role which have not achieved theoretical 
saturation . 
Several properties arise from the data supporting the central perspective of an 
intermediate transitory adaptive process in cognition  allied to a specific learning 
stage (novice) in terms of professional development, and this also resonates with 
comments about finding a ‘ self-image’  at various stages in professional 
assimilation and development (Becker et al, 1961). Although this stage does not 
appear to encompass a clear view in the participants’ mind about DR, there are 
comments within the discussions which begin to acknowledge some of the basic 
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principles underpinning the diagnostic process e.g. problems with data gathering, 
premature closure and an increasing awareness of semantic understanding. 
The cognitive errors associated with the property of naive cognition furnish us with 
specific examples of flawed interpretation of guidelines and conditional reasoning. 
These include a maladaptive way of using restrictive rule outs with leaps of faith in 
clinical cognition. Using the absence of a mass as a proxy statement for excluding 
cancer as the denominator for practice, implies faulty anchoring which might result 
in a heuristic error paraphrased as, well if there is no mass it rules out cancer 
(Edwards, 1968). Implicated in this thinking is the rule of ‘modus tollens’ with up to 
30% error rates (Evans, 1989; Eysenck, 2001: 358-60) and this includes the faulty 
inference of the ‘denial of the antecedent’. 
Example. 
Premises: 
If Fred has an abdominal mass, he has cancer. 
Fred does not have an abdominal mass 
Conclusion 
Fred does not have cancer 
This is a fairly stark example but nevertheless illustrates how conditional reasoning 
may influence diagnostic thinking based upon one examination feature. It also 
resonates with the concept of ‘weighting’ of key features within any illness script and 
the relative importance attributed to specific symptoms and signs as described in 
Judgement theory. 
The examples of faulty cognitive adaptation and interpretation arising from the data 
analysis provide a further perspective on the contemporary views on the 
development of diagnostic reasoning in the literature (Figure L). It links the 
prevailing views on the normative reasoning process described by the ‘Four Stage 
Theory of expertise’ (Schmidt et al, 1990) with the faults seen in cognition during 
undergraduate training that lead to the pitfalls associated with cognitive errors seen 
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in practice amongst qualified doctors (Graber, 2005: Norman & Eva, 2010). This 
provides convergence between the substantive theory of this study and prevailing 
theories on cognitive expertise, skills, situated learning and memory. 
This suggests that abnormal heuristics are already evident in the novice stage of 
professional development. It is not merely that novice students have difficulty 
organising and integrating knowledge, and are reliant upon frameworks to reduce 
the cognitive load during the consultation, but there are some very obvious 
misconceptions about disease probability which in some domains acts as an 
abnormal anchoring judgement. This could be predicated by providing a more 
effective idea on disease probability when biomedical concepts are integrated into 
clinical teaching. This will make more explicit the constructive links between 
biomedical knowledge and clinical cognition and their combined contribution towards 
diagnostic justification (Cianciolo et al, 2013). 
Intermediary cognitive adaptation can be viewed from a number of interactive 
perspectives: firstly, it acts as compensatory mechanism for the lack of clinical 
knowledge, and the relative inability to integrate clinical information with biomedical 
knowledge into elaborated causal pathways (encapsulation). This is illustrated most 
effectively by the prominent use of risk factors (smoking, alcohol, etc) in chunking 
key features of the history, rather than interpretation of the features of the pain.  
Such data is more objectified and is easier to assimilate compared with subjective 
narratives of pain which requires exposure more clinical exposure.  
The quotation from PA amply illustrates this point which is based squarely on the 
risk factors for disease rather than interpretation of the characteristics of the 
abdominal pain (PA’s opening comments as to what she thinks is wrong with the 
SP). 
“I’m thinking it’s related to the drinking, potentially the Nurofen, and the smoking can 
irritate the stomach, and combined with food, spicy food & lots of food. What he called 
indigestion I might agree with that.” 
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An expert would rapidly compare the features of the pain with stored scripts 
exemplifying the same condition and look for discriminatory cues in the description 
(pattern recognition/non-analytical cognition). However, our participants do not have 
an extensive store of such pain descriptors (exemplars), and therefore resort to what 
they have been taught about risk factors in the causation of disease i.e. ‘enabling 
factors’ in Illness Script theory. This way of representing causation of disease aligns 
with the ‘essentialist’ view of illness characterised by basic biomedical terminology 
(the underlying patho-physiological ‘fault’), rather than the ‘nominalist’ view at a 
syndrome level exemplified by experts who use the consequences or symptoms and 
signs based upon extensive exposure to similar events (Norman, 2000). 
 
Secondly, cognitive adaptation is facilitated by, and reliant upon the use of learnt 
frameworks and heuristics mechanisms which provide security and accessibility in 
terms of structuring information gathering in working memory i.e. a failsafe 
mechanism which they can fall back upon. This provides a stable platform whilst 
communication skills and confidence are still evolving in encounters with patients 
through which students can learn to become more flexible in their interactions. 
 
Thirdly, this study provides ample evidence of ways in which the participants are 
reconstructing ideas through reflection upon the simulation i.e. transformative 
learning, which is inherently dependent upon the ability to invoke cognitive 
adaptation (see 7.1.3). Included in this section are ideas around the reasons leading 
to avoidance of diagnostic errors (i.e. premature diagnostic closure) such as rushing 
to confirm one diagnosis. Equally, they are able to reflect upon creating time for 
themselves within the consultation to promote reasoning that is more effective. 
 
 193 
 
Tempered against the advantages of cognitive adaptation are the apparent ‘outliers’ 
in the data which illustrate the adoption of faulty adaptive processes or 
misinterpretation of guidelines and rules (labelled as naive cognition). These have 
most significance to the teaching of clinical skills and the avoidance of faulty 
heuristic mechanisms. Indeed, they represent the difficulty in assimilating taught 
guidelines into decision making without the benefits of context driven clinical 
exposure. This resonates with being on the cusp of the ‘advanced beginner’ stage 
base upon the Dreyfus model of skills acquisition, as an individual who can 
formulate ideas that dictate actions in terms of some attributes, but clearly cannot 
encompass all the features of such guidelines, hence they make errors in 
interpretation (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986; Benner, 1984: 22). 
The role of context and clinical experience create the background and expertise in 
being able to interpret clinical guidelines, however these participants are not in a 
position to do this. Knowledge of the background probability of disease is yet to be 
constructed through experiential contact and therefore anchoring judgements are 
impossible to estimate. Diagnostic errors will therefore arise from a number of 
sources including faulty data interpretation from the history (e.g. rushing through 
without active listening), insufficient knowledge (e.g. clinical knowledge of 
pancreatitis), premature closure, anchoring judgements for disease probability and 
lastly faulty interpretation of rules (e.g. Murtagh’s Law).  
The influence of teaching and books can be seen in the anchoring statements used 
by the participants (e.g. cancer used as a ‘worst case’ scenario or the diagnosis that 
has to be excluded first of all).  In one of the key texts recommended in reading lists 
throughout any module in the curriculum (‘Clinical Medicine’, Elsevier), the chapter 
on gastrointestinal disease opens with the following paragraph, ‘The clinician’s main 
task is therefore to separate out the patients who require investigation, remembering 
that 20% of all cancers occur in the gastrointestinal tract’ (Kumar & Clarke, 2005).   
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With this salutary statement, the reader is immediately given the impression that the 
‘bottom line’ in decision making is to exclude cancer and investigation is a key 
sorting component, and is a view written entirely from a secondary care perspective. 
It is not surprising that the limited exposure to primary care at this stage of the 
curriculum is not able to counterbalance this view (‘common things are common’ 
e.g. dyspepsia due to dietary impropriety with medication, not due to gastric cancer); 
however it does provide an indication of where the participants’ perspectives are 
being influenced. 
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7.1.2 What features of the consultation provide most information towards a 
tentative diagnosis? 
It has been suggested that some 70-80% of diagnoses arise from information 
collected within the medical history rather than via the examination or subsequent 
investigations, although this research is dated , was based in secondary care setting 
in Neurology outpatients, but has been propagated ever since as a central tenet in 
gathering information (Hampton et al, 1975). This study demonstrates that these 
students rely heavily upon features gathered from the clinical history to provide the 
main diagnostic cues, yet illustrate difficulty integrating the features of the 
examination that were provided after the simulation. The properties of the data from 
the first iteration onwards point towards reliance upon narrative features (i.e. the 
story that unfolds from the conversation between the actor and the participant). The 
participants’ interpretation of this information is what occupies most of the data 
analysis, beginning with the use of the learnt frameworks such as SOCRATES and 
the traditional medical history. 
The relative absence of discussion about the examination features makes for a stark 
contrast in the data analysis, and although may appear a divergent property, it 
actually reflects the lack of integrated pathways in causal networks. The ‘black hole’ 
discussed in the case findings was a term deliberately adopted for an area that 
pointed towards an undeveloped cognitive skill at this stage of their professional 
development i.e. being able to link examination features to the clinical history in 
diagnostic terms. The manner in which the participants asked for, and then utilised 
the material provided in the examination features generally illustrated an inability to 
chunk the examination features with those in the history, with a tendency to resort to 
asking about diagnostic tests first.  
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The general fluency demonstrated by the immediate use of the TMH and 
SOCRATES during the simulated consultation illustrated a disparity when compared 
with the hesitancy in engaging with the examination features. This might indicate 
that the relative lack of exposure to examining patients within the curriculum prior to 
this study results in poorly developed propositional networks that relate things to 
each other i.e. symptoms to signs.  
The consistency in using learnt frameworks and a specific mnemonic for subjective 
complaints during the clinical history indicates a more systematised approach to 
data collection, with well-defined cognitive structures being utilised. However this is 
not reflected in the discussions about the examination features meaning that 
abridged networks (including examination features) explaining both symptoms and 
signs under a diagnostic label, are not well developed in this group of participants. 
Indeed provision of examination material often invoked examples of naive cognition 
such as ‘leaps of faith’ (around the absence of a mass), exemplifying faulty 
conditional reasoning and anchoring judgements. 
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7.1.3 Can students analyse their own decision making through reflective 
analysis? 
One of the central tenets of the undergraduate portfolio at the medical school is to 
foster critical reflective practice. Schon describes this as, ‘ the process of internally 
examining  and exploring an issue of concern, triggered by an experience, which 
creates and clarifies meaning in terms of self, and which results in a changed 
conceptual perspective’ (1987)  This references the aspirations of the GMC for the 
doctor as a professional (GMC, 2009), but also allows the individual to gain 
awareness of assumptions and biases influencing decisions in clinical practice 
(Sandars, 2009). The participants in this study will have completed several reflective 
assignments as part of their engagement with their professional portfolio before this 
study, and therefore should be familiar with the processes involved in reflective 
practice. 
It is therefore reassuring to find that the participants are able to discuss learning 
from the experience, and more specifically illustrate Transformative Learning which 
leads towards constructing future practice (Mezirow, 1991). This applies to issues 
such as premature diagnostic closure, structuring the consultation process, 
monitoring thought within the simulation (metacognition), and the emergence of 
flexibility of thought which some quotations make reference to.  
 
“Learning to be more thoughtful about what you’re asking patients and why you’re 
asking...’cos in the first couple of year we’ve just been taught a list almost of what you 
need to ask. We’re always being told what things are important to you. So we know 
you have to ask about family history, aspect of pain, drugs etc but were not always 
taught why those things are important. I think I’ll learn to be thoughtful about asking 
rather than just asking blindly...” (PD) 
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The quotation from PH above shows a degree of reflection upon the differences 
between asking what, and asking why during the medical history which implies 
reconstruction of motive within the questioning, and also a reflective observation on 
the influence of teaching.   
Quotations such as this can have a significant impact upon the bearing of teaching 
communication skills, moving away from purely procedural skills towards skilled 
communication as a creative art with humanising sincerity (Salmon & Young, 2011; 
Silverman et al, 2011), and this has already been incorporated into the teaching 
programme as one of the pedagogical changes emanating from this study. 
Similar properties reflect assimilation of the experience into the cognitive structures 
of the participant (in this case asking why more often).  Movement towards more 
considered thought during history taking (accommodation) is aptly illustrated by 
participant E’s comments about ‘making her mind up too early’ i.e. she has 
recognized an error in her clinical judgment and processing of information which 
now provides a fuller understanding of how this can be corrected (constructivism).  
 
Such cognitive mechanisms provide encouraging evidence for the use of high 
fidelity simulation in challenging behaviour, but also suggest that some participants 
are moving out of the novice stage of expertise towards becoming an advanced 
beginner i.e. ‘Can perform acceptably and, from prior experience, will notice 
recurrent, relevant, general characteristics of a situation, but needs support to 
prioritise ‘(Benner, 1984: 22). The participants discuss the characteristics of the 
situation with respect to their own thought processes and consultation skills as well 
as discussing how they put together the diagnostic puzzle together.  
Indeed self- explanation of problem solving has been used as an instructional 
strategy to improve diagnostic performance in year 3 medical students in a PBL 
curriculum using written cases, without resorting to any feedback process from 
faculty (Chamberland et al, 2011). Examples of written diagnostic explanations 
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(protocols) were found to improve learning from verbalising diagnostic thought, but 
only for more unfamiliar cases.  
Similar protocols are seen in the transcripts from this study, even though the 
particular representation of dyspepsia shown below was not viewed in this way at 
‘first pass’, it illustrates an effective explanation of disease for the participant to take 
forward into practice. By recognising a diagnostic error during the reflexive 
discussion, this participant has reconstructed a pattern of features which elaborate 
upon his original view during the actual simulation (Schmidt & Boshuizen, 1993). 
Post-hoc representation of the simulation from PI was verbalised this way: 
“So PU (peptic ulcer) or HH (hiatus hernia) can be aggravated by various foods at the 
party and also he was drinking alcohol, both of them can be aggravated by it, 
aggravated by acidic food or drink. So also the milk was a neutralising effect and the 
location was the stomach, so all those three things come together”. 
 
Such examples are aligned to the constructivist perspective relating to simulation, in 
this case at a refined level representing the participant’s view of dyspepsia, albeit 
reconstructed through the reflexive discussion (Bradley, 2003). It also resonates 
strongly with reflection on action in thinking about the situation differently (Schon, 
1987). This may include more awareness of situational components developed 
through prior experience and may explain why the participants have sought to limit 
the context of their simulation. 
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7.1.4 What impact does this study have upon teaching methods? 
One of the core messages from the University of Brighton’s Strategic Plan (2012-15) 
is to ‘deliver a transformational student experience founded on research-informed 
learning’ with a commitment to ‘using staff based research in the curriculum’ 
(University of Brighton, 2012).This statement represents the ideological basis of a 
professional doctorate by informing teaching and driving developments in the 
curriculum. Adjustments in teaching in both the domains of communication and 
reasoning have already been instituted during the timeframe of this thesis as a direct 
result of the emergent findings.  
Firstly, the clinical history taking series that runs throughout Phase 1 now goes 
beyond the ‘reductionist’ approach of merely instructing students what to ask of the 
patient. It now goes beyond this to ask why we ask specific questions about illness. 
It is hoped that this change in emphasis will align itself with the central themes of 
reflective practice from the undergraduate portfolio, and at the same time engender 
thoughtful reasoning in due course (Mamede et al, 2008). 
 If the values of reflective practice upon clinical judgment and medical expertise are 
to be believed, then the combined aspirations of the undergraduate portfolio and 
teaching on reasoning should provide a beneficial platform in constructing the skills 
of deliberate induction and deduction. This means the deliberate willingness to 
search for alternative hypotheses and their consequences and thoughtfulness in 
effortful reasoning (Mamede & Schmidt, 2004). In this way medical students and 
doctors can critically examine their own decision making processes, particularly 
beneficial for more complex examples of case processing. Further work to develop 
formal theory on the potential link between these two features may be productive. 
However, engagement with reflective practice is often regarded initially negatively 
early in the curriculum and accompanied by mixed success, replaced eventually by 
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a more positive attitude later on (Driessen et al, 2007). This observation from 
various studies may represent the different motivational drivers for learning at points 
in the curriculum, and may also indicate the influence of the spiral curriculum in 
revisiting topics at greater levels of depth and relevance (Askell-Williams & Lawson, 
2006). 
The reflective discussions within this study have reinforced the values of 
reconstructing practice for the participants illustrated by such phrases as ‘not 
rushing things, standing back, giving myself more time, be more thoughtful, listening 
more effectively’, made in response to analysing simple process skills in the 
consultation ( which might be termed micro skills in spite of their importance). In 
addition they are also developing metacognitive ideas on how time and thought can 
be managed more effectively in future practice, which equate with self-efficacies i.e. 
broader learning strategies or macro skills?.These skills mediate how students 
engage with studying topics in education, but also how they might engage with 
patients without resorting to a reductionist perspective of using standardised 
questions and responses which lack humanism (Elen & Lowyck, 1999; Askell-
Williams & Lawson, ibid). Future modular development to include filmed simulations 
in formative clinical examinations (Objective Structured Clinical Examinations) with 
feedback from faculty has been suggested for inclusion in a pilot scheme or the 
academic year 2013-14. 
Secondly, the theoretical load in the CR presentation in Year 2 has been reduced to 
focus upon relevant learning for the novice stage, and linked with a short, filmed 
consultation with explicit perceptual comments implanted in the video file as it 
evolves (which explains the diagnostic thinking of the clinician as the consultation 
progresses).  The UKCC (UK Council for Communication Skills in Undergraduate 
Medicine) teaching package on Communications Skills developed for all UK medical 
schools has been instrumental in augmenting this part of the presentation. The main 
causes of errors in diagnostic reasoning that have been illustrated in the study have 
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been incorporated into a more explicit statement for this developmental stage i.e. 
focussing on issues such as inadequate history taking and rushing the data 
gathering process. Such advice relates closely to current activities in the 2nd year 
curriculum during primary care attachments when history taking opportunities arise 
most frequently. The advice is therefore both timely, linked to an integrated piece of 
work in the curriculum (Case based assignment in the portfolio), and relevant to the 
developmental stage of the students.  
Thirdly, the use of filmed simulations with feedback/discussion could be applied to 
reasoning in terms of therapeutic decisions and patient management at a later stage 
in the curriculum when issues of management and investigation are becoming 
encapsulated alongside diagnostic ideas (Norman, 2005: Monajemi et al, 2007). 
Most research in reasoning focuses upon the diagnosis as the end goal, and the 
role of integrating management issues with data gathering and diagnostic 
formulation has been largely ignored. It ignores the common scenario of the 
‘unknown diagnosis’ seen in about 50% of cases in primary care where no 
diagnostic label is applied (Heneghan et al, 2009). Strategies used to define the final 
diagnosis may include further investigations, a ‘test of time’ for self-limiting illnesses 
(‘wait and see’ strategy), and a ‘test of treatment’ e.g. diagnosis of nocturnal cough 
caused by Asthma.  
The therapeutic and investigatory components of patient management are largely 
taught in the ‘clinical phase’ in most programmes before the next significant 
professional transition (qualification) occurs (Teunissen & Westerman, 2010). It is 
assumed that synchronisation of diagnostic and management issues in case 
processing occurs at this stage, however research suggests that internists are 
quicker and use higher level inferences than final year students, implying that 
knowledge encapsulation with management issues is more effective in relative 
experts (Monajemi, ibid). Filmed simulations in examining the cognitive processes 
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associated with case processing using a therapeutic/management focus would 
afford a useful insight into a key professional role. 
This study has confirmed the benefits of using filmed simulations using SPs in 
creating an opportunity for facilitated, transformative learning. Even amongst the 
examples of post-hoc rationalisation there is a degree of honesty which bodes well 
for reconstructing future practice. Transformative learning can influence both 
consultation skills and decision making at a key transition in the teaching 
programme when stand-alone practice becomes the normative process, albeit very 
tentatively. Similar benefits will be obvious to other healthcare professionals and 
generally in the broader field of education at various stages of expertise. With 
adequate briefing and preparation there should be no barrier to the value of high 
fidelity simulation used in a similar manner, or used to support vicarious learning in 
domains of practice where cognitive attributes are being considered.  
The two constraints to the introduction of an equivalent process into curriculum 
design are logistics and time. Support from media services and acting groups have 
to be organised effectively to accommodate large number of students to replicate 
this type of simulated learning, although the use of I pads may overcome this 
problem. Furthermore, if explicit debriefing is intended then training for facilitators in 
giving appropriate feedback is essential using techniques such as ALOBA (Agenda 
led, outcome based analysis (Kurtz et al, 2005: 113-154). The emphasis must be 
upon building confidence, allowing the student to learn from intrinsic conversations 
arising from watching performance, and creating an ambience of constructivism for 
future practice, rather than a critical approach. 
From an educational perspective, this study illustrates evidence of faulty heuristic 
mechanisms occurring at an early stage of professional development (e.g. worst 
case scenario of cancer used as an anchoring judgement), and there is no reason to 
deny that similar mechanisms may occur in other professions. This has considerable 
resonance across various domains in healthcare e.g. nursing, particularly where 
 204 
 
situated practice is used in parallel with teaching of biomedical sciences without 
some explicit signposting as to how cognitive errors can evolve. In addition, 
teachers should be aware of the reliance upon frameworks and guidelines in novice 
practitioners, including how they judge when it is best to introduce stand-alone 
practice with an eye to monitoring cognitive skills, and how such exposure may 
subsequently influence patient care? 
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7.2 Reflexivity: how has this changed my perspective?   
In parallel with the impact upon teaching methods, this study has realigned my 
perspective upon the introduction of teaching on diagnostic reasoning. Not least of 
which has been the increasing awareness that I have overestimated the participants’ 
conversance with the idea of what is meant by a diagnosis, and similarly assuming 
that the exposures to practice during Phase 1 have given them more confidence in 
diagnostic reasoning than found in this study. The evidence from this limited sample 
of medical students suggests that they remain firmly in the novice stage of expertise, 
reliant upon frameworks and mnemonic devices for stand-alone clinical practice. 
However, some quotations suggest they are developing cognition comparable with 
advanced beginners and the reflective discussions have unearthed some thoughtful 
observations upon individual cognition and practice. Would these observations or 
intrinsic conversations have occurred without involvement in the study? The results 
appear to suggest that we (faculty) can do more to provide similar experiences to 
promote these ideas in the minds of our students. 
Over the last three years since reasoning was introduced into the Phase 1 
curriculum, my theoretical anchorage has changed as a direct result of this study 
(Schatzman, 1991). There is considerable resonance between the concept of 
‘Natural Analysis’ and the diagnostic reasoning process. The latter may be regarded 
as a natural extension of an individual’s innate powers of natural analysis and 
provides a clue towards the idiosyncratic nature of some reasoning ability. In this 
respect, my position as a researcher using dimensional analysis for the first time has 
moved me back into novice mode, and thereby allowed me to gain a better 
appreciation of the perspective of the participants with respect to the reasoning 
process. It has provided a warning not to make assumptions about how others think, 
and this concept is paramount when planning new ideas for the curriculum aimed at 
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developing cognitive skills. During the analytical process when momentum was 
pedestrian, my analysis was facilitated by conceptual levers (Glaser’s coding 
families). His coding families acted as a framework or guideline to accelerate the 
data analysis and also structure my thoughts. Similar levers can be sought to 
provide different perspectives on experiences in the curriculum for students e.g. 
portfolio assignments. 
My use of conceptual levers within the research process is comparable to the use of 
mnemonics and history taking frameworks used by the participants i.e. they both 
guide and limit exploration of ideas by creating parameters for use, and by opening 
up ways of looking at data (symptoms and linkage). These mechanisms could 
reasonably be represented as scheme inductive reasoning in that they provide the 
basic framework for organising and collating thoughts through the information 
received from the simulation. Furthermore, I would hope that the introduction to 
clinical reasoning in year 2 also acts as a conceptual lever for the student cohort, 
providing an opportunity to think more effectively about their decision making and 
suggesting ideas about framework mechanism to guide thinking. 
The study has augmented an appreciation of the peripheral factors associated with 
communication and reasoning by adopting a more sociological perspective of the 
interaction called the ‘medical consultation’. If the central tenets of symbolic 
interactionism are applied to the findings of this study, the meaning of diagnostic 
reasoning is not cemented in place yet for these participants, and the interpretive 
process that ‘shape, handle and modify the meanings of the things for them’ has a 
transitional component which is adaptive and cumulative. The multiple realities 
suggested by Charmaz are not static and the interpretative processes than the 
participants depend upon are reactive, constantly realigning understanding through 
changing knowledge, experience and context (Charmaz in Morse, 2009). 
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7.3 Strengths and limitations of the study 
This study has illuminated some of the cognitive strategies associated with 
diagnostic reasoning as seen through the ‘lens of the student’, and has provided an 
insight into the specific features associated with their cognition at a key transition 
point in the curriculum where changes in role and expectation are considerable. The 
conceptual framework using Symbolic Interactionism is appropriate to the research 
questions and provides congruence with Dimensional Analysis as a research 
approach to build theory. Procedural precision has been maintained through the use 
of the constant comparative process, comparing emergent ideas and properties 
across the participants to allow theoretical saturation of the themes discussed in the 
case findings. Methodological rigour has been achieved through acknowledgment of 
prior theoretical anchorage utilising memos with sufficient reflexivity, with the 
outcome that empirical data is not biased by my perspectives. 
Logical connections or resonance exists  in most of the case findings with the 
theories relevant to this domain (convergence), which strengthens the theoretical 
congruence of the study without falling prey to the concept of ‘forcing data’ (Glaser, 
ibid). The substantive theory illustrates alignment with prevailing theories which 
include the skills acquisition model (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986; Benner, 1984), the 
development of the cognitive perspective of expertise (Schmidt et al, 1990), Schon’s 
work on reflection (1987), and the formal models in cognitive psychology which 
include the use of mnemonic strategies in facilitating memory (Levin, 1993; Cowan, 
2001).  
There are no significant deviations by comparison with current theory, although two 
new findings have emerged in cognitive behaviour that can be seen to constrain the 
performance of the participants at this stage of professional development (based 
upon the examples of naive cognition and the lack of integration with the physical 
examination).  These particular findings have created an important link between the 
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normative theory of cognitive expertise and the errors seen in clinical practice 
amongst qualified doctors (Graber, ibid), as it suggests  the manner in which errors 
in anchoring judgements are already developing in medical students. Even in a 
small sample, the ramifications of this sort of reasoning are significant for future 
clinical practice and therefore one of the strengths is the relevance to professional 
practice.  As a consequence the impact and nature of clinical teaching in the early 
stages of the curriculum can be re-examined and modified to minimise the 
development of fault heuristics in anchoring (the ‘raison d’être’ of the professional 
doctorate). 
Good face validity has been achieved using a high fidelity, simulated environment of 
this type, reflecting an office based  setting as would be seen in General Practice or 
a hospital clinic. It also demonstrates both process and content validity, in that the 
data generated in the simulation provides an accurate representation of their 
performance, but without assessment criteria being used (Andreatta & Gruppen, 
2009). The case scenario was developed through a small expert group with 
considerable clinical experience, and is appropriate to the biomedical content in the 
curriculum. It also reflects the procedural skills taught in teaching clinical practice i.e. 
contextual validity.  However, it covers only one domain of clinical practice and 
therefore its content specificity is limited as reasoning ability is known to vary across 
case types (Elstein et al, 1978; 292-94). 
The participant group is by necessity small using a grounded theory technique 
without the use of a translation product such as ‘Envivo’. An explicit decision was 
made early in the project not to use this method of data capture, and transcription 
was done wholly by the researcher in order to view the non verbal cues that might 
provide further data to incorporate into the data analysis. The limited generalisability 
provided by a qualitative study of this nature and size is a potential limitation; 
however, the study has generated immensely rich data from which to draw out 
emergent themes with appropriate theoretical saturation in the areas discussed in 
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the case findings. Recruitment of participants was more challenging than first 
assumed, and the timing of the simulations coincided with the start of the transitional 
modules in Year 3, providing competition with availability and free space in the 
media laboratory. In theoretical terms, the timing was ideal (the start of a key 
transition), however for recruitment purposes this was less than ideal and the 
intended participant group of approximately 15 students was not achieved (this 
would have been 10% of the cohort). Three potential participants also dropped out 
during the data collection period. 
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7.4 Conclusion 
A professional assimilation process is known to exist in Medicine, which includes 
key transitional stages in the curriculum which are not always signposted for either 
students or indeed faculty. This process includes subtle changes in identities with an 
ever changing self concept influenced by new symbols and language, and teaching 
staff must take this into account when overseeing such critical transitions (Becker et 
al, ibid: 419; Charon, 1979). At this stage of professional development, the 
participants are immersed in a data gathering rather than a diagnostic mode, and 
impose limitations on their role. In spite of this, they demonstrate some perceptive, 
semantic ideas which illustrate transformative cognition and an appreciation of 
illness at deeper levels. 
Their cognitive strategies reflect the dependence upon framework mechanisms to 
control and organise information within the simulation, which places them firmly in 
novice mode using the skills acquisition model (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986). However, 
there are examples of semantic links involving higher conceptualisation of illness 
which would indicate forward movement along the spectrum of expertise. This would 
suggest an intermediary transitional adaptive process in cognition occurs at this 
stage of the curriculum, necessitated by the transition from facilitated practice in 
Phase 1 to stand alone exposure during subsequent clinical attachments.  
The reflective discussions illustrate representation of illness using semantic 
qualifiers and emergent metacognition, which are being formulated through 
constructive thought and the intrinsic conversations during the reflective 
discussions. This is evidence that some higher level concepts are being 
encapsulated into diagnostic ideas which provides some explanation for symptoms 
and signs as exemplified by PH’s comment below (Schmidt & Rikers, 2007).  
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“You’re looking at the fact that he’s presented with this pain for five days and it’s a 
fluctuating pain. I think that’s an interesting feature, just trying to work out whether 
this is an acute pain or something that’s more long term. I thought that was an 
important thing to identify.” (PH) 
Such ideas enable progression in cognitive expertise to the next stage of 
professional development, but with the continuing reliance upon fall back 
mechanisms apparent in the use of frameworks and mnemonics for collecting data. 
The idea of adaptive expertise using innovative problem solving is clearly not 
applicable to this level of professional development and cognitive adaptation at this 
particular stage of development resonates more with belief in the ‘achievement 
model of expertise’, linked to the acquisition of knowledge and skills through 
experience e.g. proficient data collection (Mylopoulos & Regehr, 2009). The data 
analysis includes indirect references to semantic theory through an appreciation of 
the meanings of symptoms and signs e.g. Participant A’s inferences about the 
absence of systemic infection; 
 
“If there is epigastric tenderness and it came on whilst he was eating fatty 
foods...Erm... then he hasn’t seemed particularly unwell, he hasn’t had a fever that 
would suggest a systemic thing.” (PA) 
 
Since increased use of semantically rich inferences is associated with increased 
diagnostic success and reflects the gradual elaboration of knowledge associated 
with experts, this is indeed encouraging evidence of enhanced cognition (Bordage, 
1994). As these rich inferences illustrate higher levels of understanding it would be 
reasonable to extrapolate that cognition of this sort is more likely to be associated 
with the ideas of deliberate induction and deduction facilitated through engagement 
with reflective practice in the undergraduate portfolio (Mamade et al, 2008).  
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The engagement with critical reflective practice may be acting as a preparatory 
process for subsequent adaptive cognition when faced with the ensuing curriculum 
transition which awaits this group of students, together with the increasing 
complexities of healthcare across a number of specialist domains yet to be 
encountered. The emphasis upon developing critical thinking in the portfolio may be 
shifting the disposition of the students along the spectrum of analytical thought and 
thereby facilitating the diagnostic reasoning process through deliberative induction. 
Formal theory to support these suggestions would require another study to 
substantiate the underlying ideas, although grounded theory would act as a suitable 
methodological approach.  
 
Although there is evidence of cognitive transformation, it remains limited to certain 
aspects of the participants cognitive attributes (e.g. semantic appreciation), whilst 
other areas remain anchored to taught guidelines through reasoning processes that 
ultimately require more substantial exposure through patient contact (e.g. integration 
of the physical examination into diagnostic thought). To paraphrase Schatzman’s 
comment, this mixture of cognitive attributes ‘both limit and direct natural analysis, 
......and directs organisation of relationships’’ applied to the diagnostic reasoning 
process, with an explanatory matrix which centres upon cognitive adaptation for this 
group of participants (Schatzman in Morse, 2009: 93). 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Research Application and Ethical Approval (BSMS REGC) 
 
Research Governance and Ethics Committee (RGEC) 
 
Application Form 
 
Section A – to be completed for ALL projects 
 
 
Title of Project: Diagnostic Reasoning in medical students using a simulated 
environment 
Is the 
project a; 
(please 
highlight or 
tick box) 
PhD/MD/ProfD/
MPhil study  
BSc/BA/MSc/MA 
study  
Staff Research  UG student project  
Name of Principal Investigator / Supervisor: Dr Wesley Scott-Smith 
School/Division: Medical Education Unit 
Contact Details – Email: w.scott-smith@bsms.ac.uk                            Telephone 01273 
644595 
Names of all Researchers/Students: Wesley Scott-Smith. 
Participants;  Volunteers from BSMS students following completion of Phase 1 study (24 
months) 
Does this project require NRES approval? 
NO   
 
 
       
 
 
Proposed start date:   March 
2011 Proposed completion date:      October 2012 
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Section A continued 
 
Risk Assessment (Please tick or highlight the appropriate boxes) 
Will the study involve: 
Causing participants physical damage, harm or more than minimal pain  No 
Manual handling of participants, vigorous physical exercise, or physical 
activity  from which there is a likelihood of accidents occurring?  No 
Physiological interventions or procedures outside of standard practice -  
These might include the administration of drugs or other substances; 
taking bodily samples or human tissue (e.g. blood, saliva, biopsy or urine) 
from participants; use of probes or other equipment to measure or monitor 
bodily performance  
 No 
Psychological interventions or procedures outside of standard practice -  
These might include techniques such as hypnotherapy, psychometric 
testing  
 No 
Exposure of participants to hazardous or toxic materials, such as 
radioactive materials  No 
Inducing psychological stress, anxiety or humiliation 
Yes  
Questioning of participants regarding sensitive topics, such as beliefs, 
painful reflections or traumas, experience of violence or abuse, illness, 
sexual behaviour, illegal or political behaviour, or their gender or ethnic 
status 
 No 
Children under 16  No 
Incapacitated adults and/or people with learning disabilities or mental 
health     problems  No 
Groups where permission of a gatekeeper is normally required for access 
to its members, for example ethnic groups?  No 
Access to records of personal or confidential information?  No 
Storage and analysis of tissue samples  No 
Any other risk not identified above  No 
If you have answered ‘Yes’ to any of the above questions please describe the safeguards 
and monitoring procedure. 
Although evidence from research studies using simulated interviews in medicine have 
shown a subsequent benefit in the participants’ interviewing skills, such occasions can 
undoubtedly produce some apprehension about performance. Therefore all participants 
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will be offered a ‘debrief’ session at the end of the reflective discussion. This will provide 
an opportunity to deal with any emotional issues arising from the simulation and 
participants’ anxieties over performance. Pendleton’s rules for feedback will be adopted 
in these cases as is recommended in similar teaching sessions in the BSMS curriculum. 
Even though the researcher is not acting as an assessor in this study, in the unlikely 
event of the researcher observing unprofessional behaviour or practice that raises 
concerns from a participant during the simulation he has a professional duty to report 
that those concerns to the Phase Leader for further action    
Section B – Project Protocol/ Proposal  
 
Please submit your project protocol or proposal or complete the template 
below.   
Please ensure your protocol covers the points listed in the template.    
 
What is the purpose of this study? Please clearly state the aims of the study or 
hypothesis to be tested.  
How do novice medical students approach diagnostic decisions and 
what factors contribute to this process? (The sub-questions are cited 
in section A). 
The aim is to develop a substantive theory on how students at this stage in 
their development approach the key skill of diagnostic reasoning by asking 
them to reflect upon their actions and decisions within a simulated 
consultation.  
The data derived from the filmed consultations and the reflective discussion 
will provide material to observe real time decision making and illustrate the 
sources of knowledge and experience that underpin the diagnostic 
decisions chosen by the participants during the simulation. 
 
What is the methodology  
This study will use a qualitative analytical method called Dimensional Analysis, 
a form of Grounded Theory which is rooted in symbolic interactionism 
(acknowledging that views and interpretations of events are influenced by 
interaction with others, and that data cannot be analysed in isolation from 
knowledge and prior experience). 
Each participant will be filmed in real time during a simulated consultation with 
an experienced actor (working from a standardised script initially), using a 
common clinical case scenario in an area of medical practice familiar to the 
student (covered already in the curriculum). Such simulations are recognised as 
the nearest approximation to real practice (high fidelity) and are used 
extensively in medical training. 
Following completion of the simulation the participant will be asked to make 
tentative diagnoses based on the history alone. The participant will then be 
asked what features of an examination they would like to know to augment their 
diagnoses from the history (the attached case scenario provides some limited 
examination features which the researcher can provide for the participant to 
consider alongside the history).  The participant will be asked once more to 
consider the diagnoses in the light of the history and examination together. 
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At this point to the participant will be asked to comment and reflect upon the 
filmed simulation, prompted by further questions from the researcher where 
necessary (filmed also). The focus will be upon information gathering, decision 
making and factors affecting these ideas derived from their individual 
experiences. 
Data from both the simulation and the subsequent discussion will be analysed by the 
researcher. Recurrent themes from the data will be drawn together to form dimensions 
will might support a substantive theory to describe the evolution of diagnostic decisions 
in the participant group. 
What sort of participants will be involved? (i.e. how many, gender, ages) 
15-20 volunteer students who have successfully completed Phase 1(years 1 
and 2) of the five year curriculum at BSMS, excluding those with significant 
healthcare experience e.g. qualified nurse (as they will have already refined 
some decision making processes from prior experience or teaching). This 
number of participants should provide enough material to achieve theoretical 
saturation for the study. 
If vulnerable groups (i.e. children, incapacitated adults) will be involved please 
give full details and outline steps that will be taken to protect them. 
N/A 
What are the inclusion/exclusion criteria? 
Inclusion criteria; the participants are undergraduate medical students at BSMS 
who have successfully completed Phase 1. They will therefore have no 
connection with the researcher as an examiner or assessor in the curriculum.  
Exclusion criteria: The participants should have no prior experience from 
another healthcare setting (e.g. nurses)which might influence their decision 
making processes from prior professional experience. 
Please state your rationale for your participant choice 
The participants are considered as novice clinicians as defined by the 
‘Experiential Model of Skills acquisition’  and therefore show limited situational 
perception and a tendency to adhere to rigid rules 
How will participants be identified and recruited? (Copies of any recruitment 
material must be attached.) 
Undergraduate volunteers will be asked to participate in this study by the 
researcher through student central by web invitation posted by an independent 
administrator with additional posters in the medical school. An ‘opt in’ policy will 
be used so that students interested in participating can then provide the 
researcher with contact details.  
Participants must have successfully completed the Phase 1 examinations at the 
end of year 2 and be embarking upon Phase 2 of the BSMS programme. 
What measures will be taken to ensure confidentiality, privacy and data 
protection?  
Data should be secure against unauthorised access and comply with data 
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protection legislation. Where possible the data should be anonymised, where this 
is not possible confidentiality should be maintained. 
The identities of all participants in the study will remain confidential for data 
analysis and any subsequent discussion/publication. Digital recordings of 
consultations will be loaded onto a storage device with encrypted access and 
kept in a locked cabinet in Mayfield House to comply with the Data Protection 
measures recommended for research at UOB.  
 
What is your procedure for obtaining informed consent? If it is not possible to 
obtain informed consent, full reasons must be given. (Participant information 
sheets and consent forms must be attached) 
Before agreeing to involvement in the study each participant will have read the 
Participant Information Sheet(PIS) form with a verbal reiteration from another 
member of the Medical Education Unit (MEU) to allow opportunity for questions 
and clarification of the research process. If they are happy to proceed the 
consent form will be signed. 
What are the risks to participants or researchers, and how will these be 
managed?  
These students have already been exposed to simulated consultations in the 
curriculum using Pendleton’s rules for feedback. It is acknowledged that such 
events can provoke performance anxiety and therefore each participant will be 
offered a ‘debrief’ session after the reflective analysis if they choose so.  
Other studies have suggested that reflective analysis of simulated consultations 
improves subsequent interviewing skills so the experience may be beneficial to 
participants. If practice is observed that raises concerns then the participant will 
be asked to see the Phase Leader for further advice/action. 
 
Will participants be reimbursed for expenses or given any inducements?  
If so, please give details. 
No 
How, where and when will the data be collected?  
Please include a copy of any questionnaire that will be used or sample questions 
used in structured or semi-structured interviews. 
 
Simulated consultations and the reflective analysis will be filmed in the clinical 
skills suite at BSMS using an experienced actor familiar with simulation for 
consultation activities. The actor will be provided with a standardised clinical 
case scenario from which to work from, however the interaction will depend 
upon the consultation skills of the participant (see attached case scenario). 
 
• Participants in the study will be asked to treat the simulation as a medical 
consultation using the traditional medical history rather than a focussed 
interview technique. Participants will be allowed approximately 20 minutes to 
complete the consultation.  
• They will then be asked to provide some tentative diagnoses from the 
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history alone. Following this they will be asked what information from physical 
signs they would regard as useful in this case to accompany the history.  
• The researcher will provide the physical signs from the case scenario 
only. 
• The participant will be asked to refine the first diagnoses in the light of the 
additional examination features. 
 
The filmed material will be analysed retrospectively using reflective analysis 
from the participants’ perspective prompted by semi structured questions from 
the researcher. (See attached document). The participants will have the facility 
to stop the film to comment upon decision making processes at any stage and 
to expand upon their thoughts and diagnoses.  
 
What facilities will be needed and who will provide them? 
Clinical skills room at BSMS with two way mirror for filming/recording of the 
simulated consultation. The actor will be provided through the ‘Playout’ group 
who currently provide actors for collaboration with BSMS in simulations and 
OSCEs. 
How will the results be analysed and by whom?  
The filmed consultations and subsequent reflective discussions will be analysed 
by the participant in the first instance, allowing them to pause the film to discuss 
components of the simulated consultation in the context of information sources 
and decision making. Further analysis will reside with the researcher and on 
occasions the project supervisor for advice only (Professor J Scholes). 
What are the expected benefits of the research to participants or researchers? 
Other studies using reviews of simulated consultations with participants have 
shown that there is a clear benefit in subsequent interviewing skills, primarily 
through reflective insight into performance. 
Analysis of the data derived from this study will provide the researcher with a 
clearer idea of what influences the diagnostic decision of medical students in 
this context with ramifications for the teaching of Diagnostic Reasoning in the 
BSMS curriculum and beyond. 
What means of dissemination will be used? 
Internal communication at research meetings at UOB/UOS and external 
publication 
What arrangements will be made for giving the participants access to the 
results? 
The participants will be able to view both the initial filmed consultation and the 
subsequent reflective discussion. The final study conclusions will be distributed 
to all participants. 
What results/end points are to be measured/noted? 
It is envisaged that this study will provide enough data to construct a theory of 
diagnostic reasoning through the ‘conceptual lens’ (perspective) of the student 
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by watching diagnosis in action during the filmed consultations. The various 
influences of modelling/observing doctors in practice, interaction through 
teaching and assimilation through experience may be recognised alongside 
other emergent themes within the data. 
How will this project be funded? List all sources of funds e.g. grants, commercial 
sponsorship, school’s funds etc. 
No funding required 
Has the project been subject to scientific or peer review? If ‘Yes’ please give 
details or submit the report with this form. 
No 
Do any researchers have any financial interests in this research or its outcomes, 
or any relevant affiliations?  
If ‘Yes’ please give details and include an appropriate comment on the 
Participant Information Sheet. 
No 
 
Appendix 2:  
Participant Information Sheet 
 
Diagnostic Reasoning in medical students using a simulated environment 
Please read this document carefully. Any questions that arise from reading this 
will be clarified by a member of the Medical Education Unit before taking part in 
the simulation. 
 
Who is doing this research? 
This research is being undertaken by Dr Wesley Scott-Smith for completion of the 
thesis stage of his Professional Doctorate in Education (EdD) at Brighton University.  
 
What is the aim of this study? 
This research is concerned with understanding what factors influence the views of 
medical students on the diagnostic process during a simulated consultation, and is one 
of the first times that decision making is being  viewed from the perspective of a novice 
medical student.  
The outcomes of this research may inform any further developments in how diagnostic 
reasoning is taught at BSMS and other medical institutions. 
 
What are the potential benefits in taking part? 
Similar studies using simulated consultations have shown that participants improve in 
their consultations skills as result of their involvement, and a deeper insight into 
decision making improves diagnostic skills. 
 
What will I be asked to do? 
Involvement in the research will entail your participation in a simulated consultation 
using a trained actor lasting approximately 20 minutes, which will be filmed for 
subsequent discussion with the researcher. Afterwards he will ask you to analyse some 
of your diagnostic ideas and decisions during a play back of the consultation (this will 
also be filmed).  
 
What happens in the simulated consultation? 
• In the clinical skills suite at Mayfield House, you will be asked to take a 
comprehensive medical history during the consultation with the actor (not a focussed 
interview).  
• When you have indicated that you have finished the researcher ask you to 
provide one or two tentative diagnoses based upon the history alone.  
• You will then be asked what further information you would require from a 
physical examination that would help clarify your diagnoses. The researcher will 
provide some of these details. 
•  You will be asked to consider those diagnoses in the light of the examination 
details and may reconsider your diagnostic opinion at this stage 
What happens after the simulated consultation? 
The researcher will then ask you to review the filmed consultation with him. You will be 
able to stop/pause the film at any point to make comments or reflections upon your 
decisions, information gathering and analysis. The focus will be upon diagnostic 
decisions (reasoning). The researcher may prompt the discussion with some questions. 
 
What if I have any concerns over my performance? 
There will be an opportunity to undergo a debrief session with the researcher should 
you wish to address any concerns over your performance. Your involvement is not 
being assessed and is not part of your degree at BSMS. 
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Will my involvement in this study be kept confidential? 
Confidentiality will be a key issue; each filmed consultation will be viewed by the 
participant with the researcher (WSS), and on occasion with the academic supervisor 
of the researcher for advice purposes only (Professor Scholes). Discussions will remain 
confidential and individual anonymity will be maintained during analysis and reporting 
through the use of coded identity. Material from the study will be kept in a locked 
cabinet at Mayfield House, UOB and encrypted access will be used for storage 
devices. 
 
What if I want to pull out of the study? 
If you consent to being part of the research, you nevertheless retain the right to 
withdraw at any stage should you so wish. This will not affect your progress at BSMS.  
 
What will happen to the results of this study? 
The results of this research will be used for the EdD research and will be disseminated 
within BSMS through research seminars and a paper for publication will ensue.  We will 
also ensure that you, as a research participant, are made aware of our findings and of 
any resulting changes that might be made to the teaching programme.  
Any complaints that may arise should be addressed to the Heads of Research, 
Professor Kevin Davies (BSMS) or Dr Carole Robinson (UOB).     
 
 
 
 
THANK YOU FOR YOUR CONTRIBUTION TO THIS RESEARCH 
 
 
Researcher contact details: 
Name:      Dr. Wesley Scott-Smith, Medical Education Unit, 344A Mayfield House, 
Falmer. 
Tel:            01273 644595                                                                                                           
E-mail:       w.scott-smith@bsms.ac.uk                                        
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Appendix 3: Consent form 
Title of study- Diagnostic Reasoning in medical students using a 
simulated environment. 
 
Initial box 
I agree to take part in this research which is looking at ‘Diagnostic 
Reasoning in medical students using a simulated environment’. 
 
 
I have read the Participant Information sheet and understand the 
procedures  
and possible risks. I understand the purpose of this research and what my  
involvement in it would entail. I have had the opportunity to raise any 
questions  
that I might have had about the study and have had them answered to my  
satisfaction. 
 
 
I am aware that I will be filmed in a simulated consultation with a trained 
actor and that I will be able to view the filmed material and make reflective 
comments upon my decision making. More specifically, I agree to the 
material to which I have contributed, on film and transcript, being used for 
research purposes, as part of the above study, subject to the conditions 
specified in the Participant Information Sheet.  
I understand that access to it is restricted to Dr Wesley Scott-Smith and 
his academic supervisor (Professor Julie Scholes), unless additional 
agreement is obtained. 
 
I understand that my anonymity will be preserved where possible in the 
use of the materials via the use of pseudonyms and I understand that 
direct quotations from the filmed consultation may be quoted in the study, 
although such quotations will be anonymised.  
 
I  understand that the limits of confidentiality apply if unprofessional 
behaviour is witnessed by the researcher during the simulation. 
 
 
I understand that I can withdraw from the study at any time without reason 
or consequence for this action. 
 
 
 
 
Signature of participant 
……………………………………………………………...........................................................               
 
Name (Please print) ……………………………………………………...............Date 
………………………………………………. 
 
Name of person requesting 
consent..........................................Date................................................... 
 
Contact details.  
e-mail: ……………………………………………………..Phone contact:  
……………………………………………………............ 
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Appendix 4: Standardised Case Scenario for the Actor 
 
Study: Diagnostic Reasoning in medical students using a simulated 
environment 
 
Case Scenario for Actor 
Your name is Sam Cooper and you are a 35-45 year old married estate agent and you 
have been suffering from bad stomach pain for 5 days which has been increasing in 
severity day upon day. You thought this was indigestion initially following a family 
celebration. 
 
There have been two similar episodes in the last year where the pain was not a bad 
and lasted for 3-4 days but eventually settled without any specific help or remedy. 
 
Pain: This pain is situated between your chest and umbilicus, felt like a deep seated 
ache initially but has worsened considerably (you would now rate it 7/10 on a pain 
scale if asked). It lasts for an hour or two and you feel sick, but haven’t vomited.  It 
eventually eases a little but there is always some background pain. There is no 
problem with swallowing food or drink. 
 
Aggravating factors: This episode of pain happened since you attended a family 
wedding and indulged a bit too much.  You enjoy spicy foods and have a liking for 
curries. You also enjoy a Whisky (or two) in the evening. Rich food appears to bring on 
the pain (Roast pork at the wedding as an example). You have drunk milk during 
previous episodes with limited effect but there has been no relief with the current pain. 
 
Weight: You are a ‘little overweight’ and think you get enough exercise by walking the 
dog once a day in the park. You lost a few pound in weight after the last episode of 
pain but have since regained them. 
 
Smoking: You smoke two or three cigarettes a day, cut down in the last two weeks 
from at least 10 per day because at the back of your mind you were worried about 
heart disease.  
 
If asked by participant 
The pain is not in the chest and does nor radiate into the neck or arms 
You do not suffer from palpitations or a cough, but you get short of breath going up two 
flights of stairs at work or playing in the garden with your kids 
Bowel habit is normal-you go every other day. No blood seen and normal brown colour. 
You have no urinary problems 
There are no gynaecological complaints (if scenario played by woman) 
 
Past Medical History 
You had your appendix removed age 19 year. 
You have a painful right knee from a ligament injury playing Squash during you 
twenties. This is worse after walking the dog and is eased by Nurofen which you have 
taken quite recently for your knee problem. 
 
Medication:  
Nurofen  200mg three time daily when required for painful knee.  
Codeine and paracetamol for current pain with partial relief 
 
Allergies:  None 
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Family History; 
Your father and mother are alive; father is 65 and had heart surgery (a ‘bypass’ if 
asked) a couple of years ago following an episode of chest pain. Mum has been a 
diabetic for 10 years (controlled by tablets). 
Your older brother had an operation on his stomach last year but you can’t remember 
what the condition was called. 
 
Work: Your partner works in part time publishing company and your children are 12 
and 10 yrs old (boys).Work has been difficult recently due to the recession and 
finances at home are becoming stretched. 
 
Overall: You are a bit concerned about the cause of this pain because of your family 
illnesses but hope it is only indigestion, however feel it is far worse than you would 
expect. You’ve not asked the pharmacist for advice. You partner has urged you to 
come along for tests. 
 
Advice on playing the role: 
The participant will be asked to take a full medical history from you over about 20 
minutes. You should remain polite, interactive but not provide too much information too 
quickly. You should appear in pain at times during the interview by the occasional 
grimace. The participant should piece together the information from the questions that 
they ask you.  
 
There is no prescribed order to divulging the information except that you start with the 
‘severe pain in your stomach’. The participant should seek to clarify the site of the pain 
from you, the length of symptoms and all the associated features described in the 
scenario. 
 
 
Additional examination features after completion of history: 
 
Researcher: Question to participant (who should state what specific features 
they would like to hear about).  
 
What additional features of an examination would you like to know? 
 
The patient examination details: 
 
No jaundice visible or signs of liver disease 
Temperature: 36.8C 
BP 116/82, Heart rate 88 sinus rhythm  
Heart Sounds: normal 
Chest examination: Normal 
Abdominal examination: Epigastric tenderness with no mass (On light palpation if the 
participant asks specifically). Bowel sounds normal. 
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Appendix 5: Semi structured prompts for reflective discussion (adapted 
from Benner) 
Diagnostic Reasoning in medical students using a simulated environment 
 
Semi-structured questions for prompting the reflective discussion with the 
participant whilst viewing play back of filmed consultation: 
 
Before playback: 
 
1. What is your overall experience of the simulation? 
 
2. How do you view the medical diagnostic process in general? 
 
3. From what sources have you formed your opinion of making diagnoses? (probes: 
watching GP tutor/ other clinicians/teaching at the medical school/family 
members who are doctors/TV) 
 
 
During Playback stops: 
Generic prompts to facilitate discussion and perspectives on decision making 
during the reflective discussion. 
 
4. Why did you think these features were more useful? 
5. What did you think about this bit of information? 
6. How did this information influence your thinking? 
7. What were you thinking at this point? 
8. Did you think that at the time of the simulation? (checking for post hoc 
rationalisation) 
9. To what extent of you think it is beneficial to reflect upon this consultation? 
10. How do you think you can learn from this type of activity? 
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Appendix 6: Ethical Approval 
 
Research & Development Directorate 
Royal Sussex County Hospital 
Clinical Investigation & Research Unit 
Eastern Road 
Brighton 
BN2 5BE 
 
Dear Dr Scott-Smith 
 
Full Study Title: Diagnostic Reasoning in medical students using a simulated 
environment 
R&D Ref No. : 11/040/SCO 
 
I am writing to inform you that you have Research Governance approval to proceed with the 
above named project. This letter acknowledges that you have all the necessary internal and 
external regulatory approvals. The sites covered by this approval include: 
 
University of Brighton 
 
Conditions of Approval 
 
The approval covers the period stated in the Research Governance & Ethics Committee 
(RGEC) application and will be extended in line with any amendments agreed by the RGEC. 
Research must commence within 12 months of the issue date of this letter. Any delay beyond 
this may require a new review of the project resources. 
 
Amendments 
 
Project amendment details dated after the issue of this approval letter should be emailed to the 
R&D Office for formal approval. 
 
ICH-GCP Monitoring 
 
The Medical School has a duty to ensure that all research is conducted in accordance with the 
Research Governance Framework and to ICH-GCP standards. The R&D Department will take 
responsibility for the ongoing monitoring of the study and reporting of any adverse events. In 
order to ensure compliance the department undertakes random audits. If your project is 
selected you will be given 4 weeks notice to prepare all documentation for inspection. 
 
I wish you luck with your project and would grateful if you could inform me when the project is 
complete or due to be closed on this site. 
 
Yours sincerely 
Caroline Brooks 
 
 244 
 
 
 
Appendix 7: Summary of Simulations 
 
 
 
(Word Count 57, 697 excluding references and appendices) 
 
 
 
 
Participant 
Simulation 
(History only) 
Examination 
features 
Reflective 
Discussion 
with researcher 
Participant A  
 22 minutes 
18sec 
7 minutes  
17sec 
47 minutes 
20sec 
Participant B 
 14 minutes 
20sec 
4 minutes 
45 sec 
34 minutes 
38sec 
Participant C 
  9 minutes 
3sec 
7 minutes 
13 sec 
12 minutes 
32 sec 
Participant D 
  9 minutes 
27 sec 
4 minutes 
41 sec 
27 minutes 
25 sec 
Participant E 
  7 minutes 
20sec 
8 minutes 
13 sec 
27 minutes 
32 sec 
Participant F 
13 minutes 
20 sec 
10 
minutes 3 
sec 
44 minutes 
16 sec 
Participant G 
11 minutes 
36 sec 
7 minutes 
29 sec 
30 minutes 
Participant H 
17 minutes 
38sec 
8 minutes 
52sec 
46 minutes 
Participant I 
10 minutes 
21sec 
10 
minutes 6 
sec 
52 minutes 
12 sec 
Total 
115 min 23 
sec 
68 min 39 
sec 
321 min 55 
sec 
Average  
(nearest 
minute) 
13 min 8 min 
 
36 min 
 
